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Abstract
The thesis studies certain forms of obedience and disobedience to the law. It
looks at compliance that results from a belief in the law's authority, then the
behaviour of people who obey and disobey legal obligations for moral reasons
and, finally, the phenomenon of civil disobedience. I examine these particular
responses to the law because of the way in which they are normally understood.
The leading theories of them are justified with reference to moral norms. I
argue, however, that a philosopher can make sense of these practices without
subjecting them to 'moralistic' analysis and suggest 'pure' alternatives to the
dominant accounts. By doing so, I not only strive to improve comprehension of
these instances of obedience and disobedience, but also seek to demonstrate the
j. J; .'p i.OiTi £ I
superiority of the philosophical approach on which my alternative
■ :T o'; '• v V" d 1 V .
interpretations of them are based. My claims in this thesis, then, are both
t ■ ■ ,V.
substantive and methodological: I describe various responses to the law as well
as a means of understanding them.
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Introduction
Following the bombings on the public-transport system in London in July 2005,
Thomas L. Friedman wrote:
After every major terrorist incident, the excuse makers come out to
tell us why imperialism, Zionism, colonialism or Iraq explains why
the terrorists acted. These excuse makers are just one notch less
despicable than the terrorists
This sort of opinion is common. People often denounce attempts to make sense
of immoral conduct.2 In doing so, they assume a connection between
understanding and morality. They suppose that comprehension of human
action involves moral evaluation of it. But is their assumption warranted? Can
one explain behaviour without reference to moral norms?
I provide an answer in the first chapter of this thesis. My topic is the
means by which a philosopher might describe a practice. I deny that he or she
must engage in 'moralistic' interpretation. Even if comprehension is necessary
.e'ti rovists j j
.
1 T.L. Friedman 'Giving the Hatemongers No Place to Hide' The New York Times 22 July
2005. Compare D. Clark 'To explain is not to excuse' The Guardian 21 September 2001.
2 Recall, for instance, the controversy over the publication of Gitta Sereny's book on Mary
Bell, who was convicted at the age of eleven of the manslaughter of two boys. See G. Sereny
Cries Unheard: The Story ofMary Bell (London: Macmillan, 1998).
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for moral evaluation of conduct,31 dismiss the converse proposition by insisting
on the possibility of a 'pure' methodology in which morality does not feature.
My argument against the need for moralistic analysis starts with an
exploration of the perspectives that a philosopher might adopt to detect and to
make sense of different practices. I examine the 'internal' and 'external' points of
view from which H.L.A. Hart says that deliberate conduct might be observed
and elaborate on the attitude of 'acceptance' that characterises the former.
Acceptance, I submit, is the belief that a particular set of norms includes the
:
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decisive reason for an action. It means participation - which need not be
permanent - in one practice as opposed to another.
I then introduce three distinct ways of understanding such participation.
I specify these modes of comprehension by looking at - without contributing to
- the exegetical debate about the methodology that Hart employs in support of
his theory of law. Having stated these techniques, I dismiss one of them - which
I entitle 'philosophy as lexicography' - and assert the need for a philosopher to
interpret the language (and thus the convictions) of the participants in any
practice that he or she wishes to describe.
aci; >n. it o v . \
3 For a notorious suggestion to the contrary, see John Major's interview on 21 February
1993 with the Mail on Sunday. When asked about juvenile crime, the then-premier declared a
need for society 'to condemn a little more and understand a little less.'
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Both of the remaining methods are interpretive. They require evaluation
- as opposed to mere narration - of everyday speech. According to many
philosophers, the appraisal on which interpretation depends must be moral.
Ronald Dworkin belongs to (and is a prominent member of) this group. A
theory of a practice, he says, must explain 'why a practice of that general shape
is worth pursuing, if it is.'4 He regards the imposition of a moral purpose on
conduct as essential for comprehension of it.
I reject his belief in the necessity of moralistic analysis, however, by
arguing for the possibility of the third methodology that commentators attribute
to Hart. Moral criteria are absent from this kind of interpretation. Instead, a pure
, A op - j..
theorist evaluates behaviour with exclusive reference to 'meta-theoretical'
y\ A •' . Yr • y, • j -
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norms. To establish the feasibility of this approach, I advance my own version of
1 ;
. I
it - which comprises four non-moral ideals - before refuting arguments for the
inevitability of its moralistic rival.
I thus defend the possibility of pure interpretation. But I do not claim that
this methodology is necessary. Indeed, I do not even try to justify my faith in its
superiority. Since every attempt to do so must rely on the very norms of which
this mode of understanding consists, I can only demonstrate its relative worth
4 See R. Dworkin Law's Empire (London: F^ntana, 1986) 66. See also R. Dworkin Justice in
Robes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press/2006) 15.
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by implementing - rather than arguing for - it. In this thesis, I apply it to certain
forms of obedience and disobedience to the law. The dominant theories of these
practices are moralistic. I offer pure alternatives to them not only in an effort to
improve comprehension of the behavidur that they describe, but also with the
'V'.tJh V: vorf-.i l ' p.
objective of revealing the inferiority of the methodology on which they are
based.
The first response to the law that I examine - in chapter two - is the
obedience of people for whom legal rules have authority. I compare my pure
analysis of their conduct to the moralistic account that Joseph Raz articulates.
He defines authority in relation to its legitimacy. His 'service' conception
provides a moral explanation - via the 'dependence' and 'normal-justification'
theses - for the peremptoriness that he considers the distinguishing feature of
t" n ••<#: itjer
authoritative norms. He seeks to capture this quality in the 'pre-emption' thesis,
which states that the directives of a legitimate authority prohibit action -
although not reflection - on some of the reasons from which they ought to be
derived.
By placing moral constraints on the exclusionary force of authoritative
rules, however, Raz flouts two of the meta-theoretical values to which I express
my commitment in chapter one. Because the conditions of legitimacy on which
Introduction
he insists are neither precise nor compatible with the ordinary meaning of
peremptoriness, his moralistic conception of authority lacks both clarity and
comprehensiveness. I strive to remedy these defects with my pure alternative,
which defines authority in terms of the theory of acceptance that I present in the
first chapter. Legal norms are authoritative, on my account, whenever - which,
admittedly, may not be often - they include the decisive reason for action. A
person for whom they have this status complies with the law for its own sake
and not for a reason of any other kind. Hence, he or she treats a legal obligation
that is the product of deliberate enactment as an order (or command) due to his
or her acceptance of the order (or class) of norms to which it belongs.
AA ii pol'jbet;(c.'j
My attention then shifts to moral justifications for obedience and
: . ;T" V: *' \ Lb i T !
disobedience to the law. These reasons are of two sorts: each of them is either
dependent on or independent of the substance of a legal obligation. The
existence of a reason of the former type is contingent on moral appraisal of the
behaviour that the law requires. In chapter three, I analyse the criteria - of
which most are principles of justice - that pertain to this assessment.
My understanding of these norms is determined by the general theory of
morality to which I subscribe. Many philosophers - among whom utilitarians
are prominent - endorse an account of moral practice called 'value-monism'.
Introduction
They hold that one or a restricted set of the ideals in which participants believe
is the source of the rest. These philosophers - to play yet again with words -
order (or arrange) this order (or set) of principles so that moral dilemmas are
merely apparent. They pronounce the compatibility of every moral ideal.
For Isaiah Berlin, however, clashes between moral values are often real.
He ascribes their authenticity (and the loss that follows inexorably from them) to
the intrinsic worth (and thus the incommensurability) of the ideals involved. He
regards many - whereas value-monists regard only one or a few - of the values
of which moral actors speak as ends-in-themselves. With exclusive reference tor
, x:t
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meta-theoretical norms, I defend the 'value-pluralism' that he advocates and
thereby refute Dworkin's allegation that his repudiation of moral unity lacks
philosophical support.
Although Berlin's methodology is not obvious, Dworkin is wrong to
suppose that he must practise moralistic interpretation. By demanding a moral
explanation for the meaning of every value and dismissing value-pluralism for
failing to meet this condition (or, more accurately, a modified version of it),
Dworkin ignores the potential of non-moral norms to justify value-pluralism. To
compensate for his neglect, I ask whether a pure theorist ought to favour
. 'I'c-: 'oucHh . ■ .
Berlin's conception of morality and conclude that he or she could only deny the
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existence of moral dilemmas by exaggerating the importance of coherence and
discounting the requirement for a theory to fit with the actual experiences of
moral agents.
. g.ec , ,dk-v i-i.t!
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In Black Dogs by Ian McEwan, Bernard - in conversation with Jeremy, his
' 1
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son-in-law and would-be author of a memoir about Bernard and his deceased
wife, June - rails against the inflated concern for unity and the concomitant
distortion of practice on which - according to a pure theorist - value-monism
seems to depend:
Bernard had a sudden change of mind. He swung round to me.
'By God, you're so keen to know,' he cried. 'I'll tell you this. My
wife might have been interested in poetic truth, or spiritual truth,
or her own private truth, but she didn't give a damn for truth, for
the facts, for the kind of truth that two people could recognise
independently of each other. She made patterns, she invented
myths. Then she made the fatts fit them. For God's sake, forget
about sex. Here's-your subject ^ how people like June bend the
facts to fit their ideas instead of the other way round. Why do
people do that? Why do they go on doing it?5
If value-pluralism results from the proper application of the meta-theoretical
norms of coherence and comprehensiveness to moral practice, however, then
the role of a pure theorist in philosophical discussions of morality is inevitably
limited. Bernard Williams is aware of this consequence. It makes him rather
glum:
I. McEwan Black Dogs (London: Vintage, 1998) 86.
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There is a problem with [pluralism and distrust of system in
morality]: how does one carry on the subject - the subject, that is to
say, of philosophy? I had a conversation recently with Michael
Stocker, an American philosopher of similar temper. We were in
the bar of a melancholy modern hotel in a melancholy run-down
city in upstate New York. After one glass of bourbon, we agreed
that our work consisted largely of reminding moral philosophers
of truths about human life which are very well known to virtually
all adult human beings except moral philosophers. After further
glasses of bourbon, we agreed that it was less than clear that this
was the most useful way to spend one's life, as a kind of flying
mission to a small group isolated from humanity in the intellectual
Himalaya.6
Notwithstanding Williams's alcohol-induced gloom, I maintain that value-
pluralism - as the conception of morality with which a pure theorist ought to
agree - makes most sense of the ideals that moral actors cite as content-
dependent reasons to obey and disobey the law. Yet a predictable objection to
this account of morality - and, therefore, to my claim that one should rely on it
when evaluating the substance of the law - states that it is unable to work out
. -t i- Y oytdpt'»
the dilemmas to which: it\givesorise. Although I accept that it cannot solve
y , wHy i.• ;
genuine - as distinct from merely apparent - conflicts between moral ideals, I
6 B. Williams The Liberalism of Fear' in In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and
Moralism in Political Argument (Selected, edited, and with an introduction by Geoffrey
Hawthorn) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) 52. On the ignorance of moral
philosophers, see also J. Gray Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans arid Other Animals (London:
Granta Books, 2003) 103: 'George Bernard Shaw wrote somewhere that a well-bred Englishman
knows nothing of the world - except the difference between right and wrong. The same could be
said of pretty well all moral philosophers. Like the well-bred Englishmen of whom Shaw wrote,
they think their ignorance is a virtue.'
8
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deny that its inability to settle these clashes is problematic. Only if the answers
to moral questions must be entirely theoretical is value-pluralism undermined
by its failure to indicate a method for the application of contradictory principles.
I dismiss this need, however, and present a way of dealing with moral
dilemmas that is simply consistent with - as opposed to specified by - value-
pluralism. I submit that moral actors might - and, indeed, must - discriminate
between incompatible norms by exercising judgment, which involves
■
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examination of - to borrow Charles Larmore's expression - 'the particularity of
►' <- .Hi>
a given situation.'7 In doing so, I acknowledge the limited relevance of
philosophical reflection to moral decision-making. Hence, my thesis considers
the place of philosophy in morality as well as the role of morality in philosophy.
Moral justifications for obedience and disobedience to the law of the
other - that is, content-independent - sort are my subject in chapter four. Such
reasons are contingent on moral appraisal of something besides the conduct that
the law requires. They are derived from principles of legitimacy - rather than
r.c i \ i>y ; * t Xs.
justice - which, I suggest, generate two kinds of content-independent reasons to
comply with legal obligations. These principles warrant obedience to the law on
account of either the mere fact of its existence or the process from which it
C. Larmore Patterns ofMoral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)
20.
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results. From the perspective of a pure theorist whose understanding of
morality is pluralistic, I look at both. Contrary to philosophical consensus, I
classify a reason of the former type as a 'political obligation'. I claim that my
'thin' conception of this duty better satisfies the quartet of meta-theoretical
norms to which I am committed than 'thicker' alternatives. My contemplation of
the procedural explanation that moral agents often provide for their obedience
to the law is more concrete, however. I do not engage in conceptual analysis of
this second kind of content-independent reason. Instead, I consider the
justifiability of the common belief that the supposedly 'democratic' source of a
legal obligation furnishes moral actors with a reason to act lawfully.
The final response to the law of which I offer a pure interpretation - in
the last chapter - is civil disobedience. My discussion focuses on the influential
theory of John Rawls. For him, civil disobedience is 'a public, non-violent,
conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of
■■ ' '■.>& "taf^rffdi ° <i'T •
bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government.'8 At the core of
his definition - as he readily admits - is a moralistic conception of political
behaviour that supposes agreement between democratic citizens on the
principles of which his liberalism consists. By portraying civil disobedience as a
8 J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 320.
See also J. Rawls 'The Justification of Civil Disobedience' in Collected Papers (Edited by S.
Freeman) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) 181.
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means of correcting deviations from these shared ideals, however, Rawls not
only neglects ordinary beliefs about this form of dissent and politics in general,
but also confuses questions of meaning and morality on whose separation the
meta-theoretical norm of clarity insists. I thus propose the excision of his liberal
account of politics from the definition of civil disobedience and the insertion of
my pure alternative, which originates - but is not wholly present - in the work
of Carl Schmitt. With this substitution, I conclude my attempt to demonstrate
the superiority of the philosophical approach to which I express my




The Possibility of Pure Interpretation
This thesis looks at some ways in which people respond to the law. It also
studies the means by which a philosopher can make sense of these responses.
Influential understandings of the specific practices that I scrutinise are justified
with reference to moral norms. I reject such 'moralistic' theories and, instead,
offer descriptions that are based on a 'pure' methodology in which moral
evaluation has no place. My claims, then, are both substantive and
methodological: I describe various responses to the law and a philosophical
approach for making sense of them.
Before I can apply this alternative methodology (and thereby formulate
these alternative understandings), I must establish that pure theory is at least
possible. In the present chapter, therefore, I am concerned exclusively with
methodological issues. I do not examine in detail any particular responses to the
PO: r re .''t
law, but merely the processes by which they might be understood. More
precisely, I argue that a philosopher can describe these practices without
subjecting them to moral evaluation.
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The Possibility of Pure Interpretation
My argument in this chapter has seven sections. I start by indicating the
specific responses to the law with which I am concerned in subsequent chapters
and explaining my interest in them. Then - in the second section - I consider the
perspectives from which a philosopher can identify and make sense of these
practices. I develop H.L.A. Hart's distinction between the 'internal' and
'external' points of view by analysing the phenomenon of taking part in a
practice. The subsequent section introduces three different ways of theorising
about such participation. I set forth these techniques by outlining the current
fie H SSibilfty P
disagreement between commentators as to the methodology employed by Hart
in defence of his legal theory. I do not enter this debate, but simply use it to
present three modes of comprehension.
I then look more closely at these methods. In section four, I dismiss
theories of practices that do no more than report the beliefs of participants as
articulated in their speech. I argue that interpretation (and not mere narration)
of their convictions is necessary. A philosopher who interprets a practice seeks
to identify the significant aspects of it and this task requires evaluation of the
f. ! f 'Olth l: • ' i
language of participants. ;;"
Many legal theorists justify such an assessment in moral terms. In the
fifth section, I discuss moralistic interpretation by looking at their work. With
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reference to Julie Dickson's recent analysis of jurisprudential method, I consider
some attitudes of these philosophers towards moralistic interpretation before
isolating the proposition whose denial is the purpose of the present chapter.
My refutation of this proposition has two stages. First - in the
penultimate section of the chapter - I describe an alternative form of
interpretation that eschews moral evaluation. In the absence of non-moral
criteria for assessing a practice, moralistic interpretation would be necessary by
default. In section seven, I conclude my case for the possibility of pure theory by
rejecting arguments for the inevitability of moralistic interpretation. I also
account for my refusal to make the stronger claim that pure interpretation is
necessary as well as possible. I hold that neither the necessity nor even the
superiority of a mode of interpretation - whether pure or moralistic - can be
justified (although a philosopher's preference for interpretation of a specific
kind might be explained by causes other than reasons). Consequently, the only
means by which I can demonstrate the superiority of pure interpretation is by
practising it. And I do so throughout this thesis. Indeed, I presuppose its
viability and rely implicitly on it in the following sections.1
. i ' ' j.ii; .. -'
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1 I respond in the final section of this chapter to the predictable criticism that such reliance
makes my argument circular.
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One can respond to the law in numerous ways. One might, for instance, write a
letter to a newspaper about a recent judicial decision, vote in an election against
a government with a poor legislative record or express incredulity to friends
upon learning that certain behaviour is illegal. The reactions with which I am
concerned, however, are varieties of obedience and disobedience. In this section,
1 distinguish acts of obedience and disobedience from other responses to the law
before introducing the specific practices that I examine in subsequent chapters.
. ie p: •sibTty . i T.
A person obeys the law by complying with a legal rule and disobeys it by
not doing so. But some legal rules with which compliance and non-compliance
are possible cannot be obeyed or disobeyed. According to Hart, a legal system
comprises both 'primary' and 'secondary' rules.2 The former generate
obligations by stipulating ways in which a person to whom they apply should
(and should not) act and the latter allow for the management of these
obligations. Secondary rules facilitate particular actions, including the formation
of contracts, the creation of legislation and the adjudication of disputes.3 Since
* eci-.i: 'factii. . fh
the law does not regard compliance with secondary rules as compulsory - there
2 See H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law (2nd edition) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994),
especially chapters three and five. I say more about these different sorts of rules in section three
when discussing Stephen Perry's claim that Hart's theory of law is moralistic.
3 Although the 'rule of recognition' is not power-conferring - see my discussion in section
two - Hart nevertheless classifies it as secondary. I can ignore this rule here.
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is, for instance, merely a legal option to contract with others - they can be neither
obeyed nor disobeyed. Obedience or disobedience is a potential response only
to a legal rule that demands the performance of certain behaviour and whose
infringement is typically called a 'crime', 'tort' or 'breach of contract'. Although
secondary rules enable the introduction of (as well as the resolution of any
subsequent disagreements about) duty-imposing norms, they cannot themselves
be obeyed or disobeyed.4
Yet one might abide by or contravene a primary rule without obeying or
disobeying it. Whereas conformity or nonconformity to a legal norm of this type
need not be intentional - some crimes, for example, can be committed recklessly
- obedience and disobedience are deliberate responses to legal demands. To obey
or disobey a law, one must intend to comply with or violate a primary rule.
Therefore, every act of obedience or disobedience to the law must satisfy three
conditions.
. : S 0 '.'OV y.dip
First, the actor must have sufficient legal knowledge. Since a deliberate
response to the law requires familiarity with it, an act of whose actual legal
status the actor is unaware can be neither obedience nor disobedience. Such
ignorance - whether caused by the falsity or the absence of a legal belief -
4 On the impossibility of obeying or disobeying secondary rules, see H.L.A. Hart The
Concept of Law 31-32.
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prevents intentional compliance with and contravention of the law. Hence, a
tourist in Sydney to whom the legal prohibition on offensive language in a
public place is unknown does not disobey the law by swearing outside the
Opera House.5 Only a primary rule of which one has knowledge - mere
suspicion is not enough6 - can be obeyed or disobeyed.
Even if correctly recognised by the actor as legal or illegal, the act must be
performed for a reason. It must be planned (and not - as with reckless conduct -
merely thought to be likely). Consequently, one neither obeys nor disobeys the
: !.e■ i;::ft■ %
law if one fails to attain the objective for which one acts. Suppose that a man
. ovi UM'< ■?'
tries to kill another man, but is prevented from doing so by the unexpected
. I'
j . I . ; • :
intervention of a third party.7 As this man does not wish the other man to
survive, he cannot be said to disobey the legal ban on attempted murder.
Moreover, his desire for a fatal result precludes his obedience to the legal rule
proscribing the completed offence. To qualify as obedience or disobedience,
behaviour must effect a specified purpose.
5 The crime of using 'offensive language in or near, or within hearing from, a public place
or a school' can be found in sec'tibn 4A bf the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW). Of course, the
holiday-maker's ignorance of this rule provides no (legal) defence to a charge of breaching it.
6 Compliance with or violation of a legal norm whose existence one regards as no more
than probable is reckless, not deliberate.
7 To avoid needless complexity, I assume that this intervention precedes an assault on the
proposed victim (or the perpetration of any other crime).
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Finally, the law must be a reason for or against the action. Adherence to
or infringement of a primary rhle that has no bearing on conduct is purely
. /•'■d h -V'bV;' • • .
incidental. That I comply with the legal duty not to steal, for example, is no
more than an anticipated side-effect of sitting at my computer and typing these
words. My conformity to this legal norm, even if foreseen, is not deliberate. As
Victor Tadros argues, a consequence cannot be intentional unless it comprises a
reason for or against a particular activity.8 Since the law of theft has no impact
on whether I should write my thesis, I do not intentionally abide by it. In such
circumstances, my compliance does not amount to obedience. However, if I grab
$10 from someone's pocket, then - provided I mean to take it and know that
■'.M: Ait"'
doing so is illegal - I intentionally defy the legal obligation not to steal. The law
is a reason against taking the money. By appropriating it despite this reason, I
disobey the law.
Fulfilment or violation of a legal duty is intentional, therefore, if done for
a reason and in the knowledge that the law requires or prohibits the behaviour
in question. According to Robert Paul Wolff, however, obedience involves more
than deliberate compliance with a demand: 'Obedience is not a matter of doing
what someone tells you to do. It is a matter of doing what he tells you to do
: vA ■ A t
■ W ... AvVv i -
. • v .' 11: •; \
■ KA- • • V
8 See V. Tadros 'Practical Reasoning and Intentional Action' 20 Legal Studies (2000) 104.
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because he tells you to do it.'9 On this definition, obedience to the law is wilful
adherence to a primary rule for its own sake (and not for, say, a moral reason).
But Wolff's account is too narrow. By applying the label of obedience to
deliberate compliance with a legal obligation only if motivated by the obligation
itself, he distorts ordinary language. Other forms of intentional conformity to
the law are normally classified as obedience. And the distinctiveness of the
conduct that Wolff regards as obedience can be marked without such distortion
by describing it as a particular species (rather than the sole type) of obedience.10
' ee'f f .-rsibdjiy v; #•:' :
Hence, I resist Wolff's further condition and maintain that obedience to the law
is possible even if a primary rule is not the motive for action. I deny that a legal
norm must be the reason for action when obeying the law: that it is a reason (of
which the actor is aware) is sufficient.
To obey or disobey the law, then, one must act for a reason (of any sort)
in the knowledge that there is a legal reason for or against doing so. But this
does not mean that every instance of obedience or disobedience must be
preceded by both legal analysis and practical deliberation. Rather, one might
l.iyh r ,i, i
habitually obey or disobey certain primary rules. Having entered a valid
/v'h -dU;i = n
9 R.P. Wolff In Defense of Anarchism (Berkeley, California: University of California Press,
1998) 9. See also R.C.A. Higgins The Moral Limits of Law: Obedience, Respect, and Legitimacy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 9.
10 See chapter two.
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contract, for example, one might simply copy one's previous obedience to legal
norms generated by such agreements. Notwithstanding that one contemplates
neither the legality of nor the motivation for one's response to this particular
contract, one intentionally complies with (and thus obeys) the legal
requirements arising from it. By imitating - whether directly or indirectly -
conduct that was accompanied by an appreciation of these factors, one relies
implicitly upon them. Before obeying or disobeying the law, therefore, one need
not always be conscious of the decisive reason for and the legal reason for or
against one's action. Of course, one who does not think about these reasons in
. ! I . • y ]• • V ■
advance might articulate them ip( a subsequent explanation.
h ycmqn .
Despite the existence of numerous forms of obedience and disobedience
c f.'i-i; Jk V
to the law, I look at only three ways of obeying or disobeying a legal rule in this
thesis. I begin by studying obedience that results from a belief in the authority of
law. I then inspect the practice of obeying and disobeying legal norms for moral
reasons. Finally, I consider the phenomenon of civil disobedience.
Why do I restrict the scope of my inquiry in this manner? One might
suppose that I examine these practices because I regard them as the most
common forms of obedience and disobedience to the law. But I make no claims
. .1"
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about their prevalence.111 note merely that these particular responses to the law
■' vHi,




My concern is prompted by the way in which they are often understood.
Influential descriptions of these practices are justified with reference to moral
norms. Joseph Raz provides a moralistic reading of authority by insisting on the
prior status of authority that is morally legitimate. I look at his theory in chapter
two. Chapter three - from which chapter four develops - examines Ronald
Dworkin's application of the same methodology to moral practice. He explains
i, ■ ■ j y . £.;j>. % v.
the values (or, more precisely, all but two of the values) of which morality
pen nigHj-c w .
consists in moral terms. In chapter five, I explore John Rawls's moralistic theory
of civil disobedience. For Rawls, the meaning of civil disobedience depends on
his liberal view of politics.
Yet are such theories necessary? In the present chapter, I deny the need
for philosophers of these practices to engage in moral evaluation of them and I
suggest an alternative method by which they might be understood. This method
is, in my opinion, superior to the moralistic approach of Raz, Dworkin and
Rawls. Hence, I study these, responses to the law because prominent
x,, . c■ arf.fn ;* b
11 For discussion of such sociological matters, see T.R. Tyler Why People Obey the Law (New
Haven: Yale University, Press, 1990).
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understandings of them rely on a methodology that I reject. Before articulating
my rejection, however, I must consider the perspectives from which
philosophers might detect and then describe these practices. I do so in the next
■■■;ail . ; .
section.
: A vV ,rr'iU: '. }h
II
Obedience and disobedience are intentional responses to legal demands. Hart
distinguishes between two points of view from which one can look at deliberate
conduct. He says that one might observe it from either the 'internal' or the
'external' perspective. In this section, I examine these points of view and ask
whether a philosopher is able to identify and then describe an act of obedience
' !
or disobedience from both angles.
The inside view of a deliberate action is from the position of the actor.
According to Hart, one adopts the internal perspective by sharing the 'critical
reflective attitude'12 of the person whose intentional behaviour one observes.
This attitude involves 'acceptance' of particular rules as 'guides to conduct' and
'standards of criticism'.13 To regard a deliberate action from the inside, one must
H.L.A. Hart The Concept oflaiv 57.
See H.L.A. Hart The Concept ofLaw 89, 242, 255.
The Possibility of Pure Interpretation
'accept' the same rules as the actor. Alas, Hart - perhaps due to uncertainty14 -
says little about the 'distinctive normative attitude'15 that characterises the
internal point of view. Apart from resisting its equivalence to moral
endorsement,16 he does not define it. I strive to remedy this absence with the
following account of acceptance.
My description starts from the assumption that, of the (perhaps
■ •
_ j
numerous) reasons for a deliberate action, the actor must regard one as decisive.
This reason motivates the actor. Thus, any person who claims to have more than
one 'explanatory' reason for doing something fails to make explicit the real
purpose of the deed.17 Take the case of a woman who accounts for what she
does by citing every reason in its favour: if her behaviour is genuinely
deliberate, then either she is lying - perhaps in an attempt to convince a
sceptical audience that her action is correct - or she is motivated by a belief that
the sum of the reasons for an action should exceed the aggregate of those
; ;t#i\: hum. >/e . <
against it. For every intentional action, then, the actor has an ultimate reason. Of
course, the actor's reliance on this (as opposed to another) reason cannot be
A'". i ; "
14 See N. Lacey A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004) 223, 228, 335-336.
15 H.L.A. Hart The Concept ofLaw 255.
16 See H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law 203, 257.
17 On 'explanatory' reasons, see J. Raz Practical Reason and Norms (2nd edition) (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1990) 16-20.
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justified. Were the actor to contribute such a justification, it would deny the very
primacy of the reason that it supports. As Ludwig Wittgenstein states: 'To be
sure there is justification; but justification comes to an end.'18 After the decisive
reason - that is, at the end of justification - comes acceptance.
The actor accepts the set of rules to which the ultimate justification for the
action belongs. Acceptance is the actor's belief that rules of a particular type
include the decisive reason for the action. An individual who is moved to act by
a legal reason, for example, takes this critical-reflective attitude to the rules of a
}V\f j".
legal system. By accepting certain rules as 'guides to conduct', the actor
participates in a distinct practice. The identity of the practice in which the action
is located depends on the nature of the actor's motive. Hence, a person whose
ultimate reason for acting is moral participates in moral practice. Acceptance
might also be described as the actor's engagement in a practical discourse. This
discourse comprises rules, one of which is the ultimate reason for the action.
If internal scrutiny of a deliberate action requires acceptance of the same
kind of rules as the actor, then an observer who adopts the internal perspective
• Ac, i siws jb:, dti •
must agree with the nature of the actor's motive. Such observation entails
participation in the same practice as the actor. An internal observer takes part in
18 L. Wittgenstein On Certainty (Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright)
(Translated by D. Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969) § 192.
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this practice by evaluating the action in accordance with a rule of the type that
motivates the actor. The 'standard of criticism' on which the internal observer's
appraisal relies need not be identical to the rule by which the action is caused:
that they belong to the same order is sufficient. Since the rule used by an internal
observer might be distinct - albeit not in kind - from the rule that motivates the
actor, an internal observer can either commend or condemn the action. In other
words, fellow-participants in a specific practice might disagree about the action
that ought to be performed in a particular situation.19 Yet their dispute supposes
agreement on the sort of rule by which the actor should be motivated. Insofar as
• J ' '■ i' ill '• .
such consensus is absent, internal observation is impossible.
. .' IV /tard.oi
The implications of this account of acceptance can be illustrated by
considering its impact on Hart's theory of law. According to Hart, acceptance of
the rules of a legal system entails acceptance of the 'rule of recognition' by
which they are identified.20 This rule 'provides criteria for the assessment of the
validity of other rules; but [...] there is no rule providing criteria for the
assessment of its own legal validity.'21 It is the highest rule of a legal system.
Acceptance of legal rules thus implies acceptance of the rule of recognition that
validates them. Moreover, Hart insists on collective acceptance of this basic rule
~~, . x ljl oDser vat .
19 I look more closely at such disagreement in section four of this chapter.
20 On the 'rule of recognition', see HA.A. Hart The Concept ofLaw 94-110.
21 H.L.A. Hart The Concept ofLaw 107.
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by legal officials. He believes that legal rules cannot exist unless officials (such
as judges) accept them.22 For Hart, the existence of a legal system is contingent
on 'a unified or shared official acceptance of the rule of recognition containing
.. T.-'V * s ' -i- K'O'ii.. ■ V a". •
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the system's criteria of validity.!23 Whether citizens also have this critical-
; . f . : i.
reflective attitude is beside the point so long as the duty-imposing rules of the
system are 'generally obeyed' by them.24 Significantly, Hart denies that official
acceptance of the rule of recognition must result from a moral obligation:
Not only may vast numbers be coerced by laws which they do not
regard as morally binding, but it is not even true that those who
do accept the system voluntarily must conceive of themselves as
morally bound to do so, though the system will be most stable
when they do so. In fact, their allegiance to the system may be
based on many different considerations: calculations of long-term
interest; disinterested interest in others; an unreflecting inherited
or traditional attitude; or the ipere wish to do as others do.25
Contrary to, say, Richard Hdlton - for whom acceptance is apparently an
entirely moral attitude26 - Hart thinks that one might accept a rule of recognition
(and the rules whose legality it certifies) for a non-moral reason. On my
22 If official status is created by (and so presupposes) a legal system, then Hart's proviso is
illogical: see D.N. MacCormick H.L.A. Hart (London: Edward Arnold, 1981) 109.
23 H.L.A. Hart The Concept ofLaw 115.
24 See H.L.A. Hart The Concept ofLaw 116. Of course, I need not (and, in fact, do not) accept
the requirements for the existence of a legal system that Hart specifies. For a critical appraisal of
these conditions, see B.Z. Tamanaha A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001) 143-148,152-155.
25 H.L.A. Hart The Concept ofLaw 203. See also 257.
26 See R. Holton 'Positivism and the Internal Point of View' 17 Law and Philosophy (1998)
597, at 600-606.
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definition, however, acceptance of legal rules can never be justified. Since one
accepts the scheme of rules to which the decisive reason for one's action
belongs, then one cannot have a reason - whether moral or otherwise - for
accepting a rule of recognition. One accepts legal rules if they include the
ultimate justification for one's action. By giving a reason for this acceptance, one
simply denies that a legal rule provides - in Scott Shapiro's words -
'y. l|tfvyv;'' '
'motivational guidance'.27 Indeed, one whose fidelity to a legal system depends
on a further reason accepts non-legal rules. Hence, officials negate their
acceptance of legal rules by providing a reason for it.
Although Hart says that a legal system cannot exist without official
acceptance of the rule of recognition, he does not believe that officials must
always accept legal rules. He requires only that their professional conduct is
motivated by the law and acknowledges that they might accept non-legal rules
when acting in a personal capacity.28 I conclude my examination of acceptance
og-i. ,u!e.
with, first, a defence of the possibility of engagement in different practical
V'
discourses at assorted times and, second, a brief discussion of potential
explanations for participation in a specific practice at an identifiable moment.
27 See S. Shapiro 'On Hart's Way Out' in J. Coleman (ed.) Hart's Postscript: Essays on the
Postscript to The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 173.
28 See H.L.A. Hart The Concept ofLaw 117.
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Those for whom intentional behaviour is of a single type deny that an
actor might accept rules of various kinds over time. A popular (but not the only)
version of this objection maintains that every deliberate action is moral.29 Yet
such a claim is ambiguous. I suggest three potential readings of it, none of
which succeeds in denying that a person can participate in many practices on
diverse occasions.
The statement that every deliberate action is moral might mean that
intentional behaviour can always be morally assessed. This first interpretation is
■ Ye;f c ihbiljVy hi Pu. .
harmless. Although any wilful act can be evaluated with reference to moral
i i hi.
norms, numerous other types of appraisal are possible too. According to the
logic of this first interpretation, then, every deliberate action is also legal and
prudential and so on. Moreover, moral evaluation of an intentional act is
possible even if the actor's motive is non-moral. A critic of a deliberate action
need not accept the same set of rules as the actor. By failing to require constant
acceptance of moral norms, this first reading is entirely compatible with
individual participation in a range of practices over time.
a ■ • u "
Alternatively, perhaps every deliberate action is moral simply because
M At'ad-■
every reason for action is moral. This interpretation denies that a person can
29 Other prominent (and similarly problematic) forms of this denial include the assertion
that economic rationality is all-encompassing and the slogan that 'everything is polities'.
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engage in a number of practical discourses throughout life by asserting that
there is no practice other than morality. But a description of moral practice that
T-vbd Tr hvyyty wi<
extends to all intentional acts' (including, say, those of cruelty) is obviously
flawed. Whatever philosophical method one employs, such an expansive
account of morality is untenable.30
In fact, that any - never mind every - person takes part only in moral
practice is improbable.31 Even if one recognises the limits of morality and
concedes that at least some people act for non-moral reasons on at least some
occasions, no individual's participation in moral practice is likely to be constant.
Imagine a man who accepts only moral norms. He is a 'moral saint'.32 All of his
intentional conduct - however-vmundk'ne - is motivated by morality. In
■ v if'. /'Ff%hiTT\ '■
circumstances where moral rules do not require a specific action, his behaviour
4- V
is arbitrary. Since he never treats a non-moral reason as decisive, none of his
actions is inspired by, say, his own self-interest or his love for another person.
Indeed, he never eats a particular meal just because it is tasty, plays a game with
the sole aim of having fun or visits a place for its beauty alone. He is so unlikely
30 For a similar point, see P. Singer 'Why Act Morally?' in Practical Ethics (2nd edition)
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 315-316.
31 On the limited extent to which people act morally, see J. Gray Straw Dogs: Thoughts on
Humans and Other Animals (London: Granta, 2003) 88.
32 See S. Wolf 'Moral Saints' 79 'Journal ofPhilosophy (1982) 419.
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that some people might even refrain from calling him 'human'.33 His
pathological moralism contrasts with the changing motivations of a normal
individual. Whereas he depends exclusively on moral rules, a 'human' shifts
between various practices. As George Orwell notes, 'sainthood is [...] a thing
; (Lj ; ■ Gtm'fyh? fife .
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that human beings must avoid.'34
Finally, someone for whom every deliberate action is moral might believe
that reason necessitates exclusive reliance on morality. According to this person,
acceptance of non-moral rules is not rationally possible. But any attempt to
justify participation in moral practice is either circular or contradictory. Such
participation is presupposed if one cites a moral reason for it and refuted if the
justification that one provides is non-moral. Since logic thus precludes any
rational objection to amoralism - whether partial or complete - this third
I-;, : f; 1 .v- ..'iy i.'i
reading also fails to establish the impossibility of engaging in a variety of
' 1
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practical discourses at different times.
. \
Hence, a person can switch between orders of reasons. Although
acceptance - whether temporary or permanent - of one (as opposed to another)
33 Of course, consistent amoralism is no more likely (and thus no more 'human') than
constant participation in moral practice. See, for example, B. Williams 'The Amoralist' in
Morality (Canto edition) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
34 G. Orwell 'Reflections on Gandhi' in Shooting an Elephant and Other Essays (London:
Penguin, 2003) 353. A 'human' can nevertheless learn much about morality from observing a
saint: see R. Gaita 'Goodness beyond Virtue' in A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love and
Truth and Justice (London: Routledge, 2000).
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set of rules cannot be justified, it might be explained by causes other than
reasons. These causes are of three types.35
First, one might participate in a specific practice because of one's
character. Suppose a woman's bravery causes her to act for a moral reason. Her
courage does not justify her participation in moral practice: to say that one
". TTytly;fhT . ..
should do something because one is brave makes no sense.36 Rather, her bravery
is a trait of character that prompts her acceptance of moral norms.
Second, the power of another person or other people might cause one to take
part in a certain practice. This capacity takes a number of possible forms.
Acceptance of legal norms might be brought about by a charismatic lawyer, for
instance.37 'At the end of reasons', says Wittgenstein, 'comes persuasion.'38
Third, one might engage in a specific practical discourse as a result of
exercising judgment. This involves choosing between orders of reasons in a given
. . - !• -dp f • ■
context. It is about deciding which of them provides the ultimate justification for
; ■ .V : •••!' iv •.
35 Although these sorts of causes are not mutually exclusive, I say nothing here on the
difficult topic of their interaction.
36 See B. Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985) 10. Of course,
a person might be motivated by a (non-moral) desire to appear brave. But this is quite different
from citing actual bravery as the reason for an action.
37 By assuming the existence of such a person, this example no doubt contradicts
conventional wisdom.
38 L. Wittgenstein On Certainty § 612.
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Qction in a particular situation. I look more closely at this final option in chapter
three.
Incidentally, each of these causes can also explain the way in which (and
not merely the fact that) someone takes part in a certain practice. A rational
explanation for a distinct mode of participation is impossible: any attempted
justification is either an act within that practice (and, therefore, an aspect of the
explanandum) or a contribution to another practice (and so inconsistent with the
conduct for which a reason is sought). Individual temperament, the power of
r... i.jiiity <jt "Uf
another person or other people and the use of judgment, however, can explain
different styles of participation. Take moral practice, for example. One man's
sensitivity to the suffering of his fellow humans might generate his
compassionate behaviour towards them, whereas another man's desire for
freedom might be due to the attitudes expressed by his parents during his
youth. A third man might wish to increase equality as a result of exercising
judgment.
Yet a person with knowledge of these causes might be accused of
irrationality. G.A. Cohen contemplates an objection of this sort.39 He examines -
pe*' ']e i£vhu ] J ':
but neither accepts nor rejects - the claim that a belief is irrational insofar as its
39 See G.A. Cohen 'Paradoxes of Conviction' in If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So
Rich? (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000).
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holder is aware of its dependence on causes other than reasons.40 The success of
this charge would, he says, generate the paradox that 'people are starkly
irrational in contexts where we do not normally account them irrational.'41 In
particular, Cohen asks whether a person is irrational to the extent that he or she
holds a belief in the knowledge that it results from his or her upbringing and
thus lacks rational support.
The conclusion that a person is irrational in such circumstances is,
however, a non sequitur. The irrationality of a belief does not follow from
learning that it is a consequence of upbringing or any similar fact. No more than
the non-rationality of a belief is entailed by the absence of a justification for it. To
be irrational, a belief must be contrary to (and not merely unsupported by)
reason. But rational criticism of both the fact and the mode of acceptance of a
particular order of reasons is impossible. As prior to reason, these beliefs cannot
be the subject of rational assessment. Given that recognition of their dependence
on causes other than reasons implies only their non-rationality and that no
reason can be offered against them, their irrationality (and the paradox that
Cohen describes) cannot be established.
C
40 Note that this allegation implies the irrationality of every judge for whom a 'legal-
realist' account of the causes! of judicial decisions is convincing. On the attributes of legal
realism, see B. Leiter Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism
in Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) chapter one.
41 G.A. Cohen 'Paradoxes of Conviction' 13.
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My account of acceptance, then, supposes that a deliberate action must
have an ultimate justification. The actor accepts the set of rules to which this
decisive reason belongs. Yet I do not suppose that one must always accept rules
•s .f '. ; 'l
of the same kind. Mv. account-recognises that one can engage in various
ViV i •'wd'steT'fi ; ;
practical discourses on different occasions. Moreover, it identifies three possible
explanations for participation in a specific practice at a specific time (and in a
specific manner): individual temperament, the power of another person or other
people and the use of judgment. In this way, therefore, I define the critical-
reflective attitude that characterises the inside view of a deliberate action.
But what about the external perspective? Whereas an internal observer of
a wilful act participates in the same practice as the actor, an external observer
does not agree with the nature of the actor's motive. Hart distinguishes between
two kinds of external observation: he separates an external observer who is
aware of the critical-reflective attitude of the actor from an external observer to
whom the actor's beliefs are invisible.42 Neil MacCormick labels the former point
of view 'hermeneutic'.43 In adopting this version of the external perspective, one
shares the 'cognitive' (but not the 'volitional') element of rule-acceptance.44
42 See H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law 89.
43 See D.N. MacCormick H.L.A. Hart 29-44.
44 See D.N. MacCormick H.L.A. Hart 38. See also D.N. MacCormick Legal Reasoning and
Legal Theory (2nd edition) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 292.
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While not (currently) a participant in the same practice as the actor, such an
observer is familiar with it. From the hermeneutic point of view, one appreciates
the rules that the actor accepts. This knowledge enables one to make normative
statements and thus simulate participation.45 In refining Hart's description of the
hermeneutic perspective, MacCormick says:
[I]t is simply not' true 'that all statements of 'ought', 'must',
'should', 'right', 'wrong', 'obligation', 'liability' or whatever, do
presuppose an assumption on the speaker's part of the internal point
of view or of committed acceptance of rules or other standards.
Such statements do certainly presuppose some rule or standard to
which reference is made. But it need not be a standard which the
speaker accepts or adheres to from the internal point of view. [...]
Any such normative statement may be made either from the
internal point of view or from the hermeneutic point of view, and
the mere act of making such a statement is entirely ambiguous in
its presuppositions as between the two.46
From the hermeneutic perspective, then, one can identify legal duties without
participating in a legal practice. One's perception of these obligations is
'VI: • V /' "• i'CK :>• « •' \
consistent with one's acceptance of non-legal rules. According to Shapiro, a legal
y ■ ut fhh ;■ -f"
rule of which one is merely aware can supply 'epistemic guidance'.47 One is
epistemically guided by a legal rule that is not the ultimate reason for action and
with which one complies for a non-legal reason. Whereas one who is
45 On simulated participation by an external observer, see M.H. Kramer In Defense of Legal
Positivism: Law without Trimmings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 165-166.
46 D.N. MacCormick H.L.A. Hart 39.
47 See S. Shapiro 'On Hart's Way Out' 173-174.
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motivationally guided by a legal rule participates in a legal practice, one whose
obedience is epistemically guided observes this practice from the hermeneutic
point of view. When Hart says that citizens might 'acquiesce in' - that is, be
epistemically (rather than motivationally) guided by - legal rules,48 he supposes
that they need only take the hermeneutic perspective to a legal practice. Even if
their knowledge of this practice is not complete,49 Hart assumes that it is
sufficient for them to obey the law in most circumstances. Hence, for Hart, a
legal system cannot exist unless citizens at least observe official acceptance of
■ '(■ ' i\ , ■ ■- f
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the rule of recognition from the hermeneutic point of view.50
One who adopts the alternative version of the external perspective,
though, is completely blind to the rule-acceptance of others. As Hart states:
Such an observer is content merely to record the regularities of
observable behaviour in which conformity with the rules partly
consists and those further regularities, in the form of hostile
reaction, reproofs, or punishments, with which deviations from
the rules are met. After a time the external observer may, on the
basis of the regularities observed, correlate deviations with hostile
reaction, and be able to predict with a fair measure of success, and
to assess the chances that a deviation from the group's normal
behaviour will meet with hostile reaction or punishment. [...] If,
however, the observer-- really keeps austerely to this extreme
external point of view and does not give any account of the
manner in which members of the group who accept the rules view
48 See H.L.A. Hart The Concept ofLaiv 117.
49 See H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law 114.
50 Note that my analysis here is consistent with rejection of this condition for the existence
of a legal system.
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their own regular behaviour, his description of their life cannot be
in terms of the rule-dependent notions of obligation or duty.51
In short, this uncompromising form of external observation allows one to
witness physical movement and speech, but nothing else.
Can a philosopher detect and then describe an act of obedience or
• en ? i wubibh ko,
disobedience from both the internal and external points of view? Certainly,
observation from the extreme-external perspective precludes identification of
such an act. An observer who adopts this radical viewpoint cannot tell in which
practice intentional behaviour is situated. In fact, this observer is not even able to
see that it is intentional. To identify an act of deliberate compliance or non¬
compliance with a legal duty, then, a philosopher must adopt a perspective from
which the critical-reflective attitude of the actor is at least evident. Both the
internal and the hermeneutic points of view satisfy this condition. Detection of
i V <? .U.:. . .UK: ibi
an act of obedience or disobedience requires a philosopher to either share or
-I'l '!'• i "it-.'SjT i T •
appreciate the actor's acceptance of certain rules.
! i .1 •. ' i;»:M • T
Although necessary, internal or hermeneutic observation of the practice
in which the actor participates might not be sufficient for one to identify an act
of obedience or disobedience. Since one must recognise the actor's conformity to
or violation of a legal duty, one has to adopt either the internal or the
51 H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law 89.
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hermeneutic perspective to a legal practice. If the actor is motivationally guided
by a rule of law, one observes a legal practice simply by looking at the practice
in which the actor participates. One can thus detect this response by considering
a single practice from either the internal or the hermeneutic point of view. If a
legal rule provides mere epistemic guidance to the actor, however, one must
scrutinise two different practices. Detection of such obedience requires internal
or hermeneutic observation of a legal practice and - depending on the
perspective from which this legal practice is observed52 - internal or
i •. , : 'J f ■
hermeneutic observation of the non-legal practice in which the action is located.
One can identify an act of disobedience in the same way as one detects an act of
obedience that is motivated by a non-legal reason.
Provided that one is aware of the legal obligation to which the actor
responds, then, one can identify an act of obedience or disobedience by
observing it from either the internal or the hermeneutic (but not the extreme-
external) point of view. To detect an act of deliberate compliance or non-
i. . v.fcU.
compliance with a legal duty, one must at least be aware of the actor's critical-
reflective attitude. But from which perspective might a philosopher
subsequently describe this behaviour? According to Dworkin, a philosopher
52 Given the nature of acceptance, one cannot simultaneously view two practices from the
inside.
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cannot make sense of a practice without participating in it.53 He maintains that
one must formulate a theory of deliberate conduct from the internal point of
view. I end the present section by suggesting otherwise.
An external observer of a practice, says Dworkin, can do no more than
report the convictions of participants as articulated - whether explicitly or
implicitly - in their speech. The outcome of this exercise is a neutral account of
the practice. It does not discriminate between (but simply notes) the different
opinions that participants express about their behaviour.54 Yet Dworkin
. cA;: ,/ o< i
contends that a philosopher must interpret (and not merely narrate) the beliefs
• : prli cc Vy»H, i:, i
of participants. An interpretation seeks to isolate the significant elements of a
! < - • M ■'
practice by evaluating the convictions of those involved. It thus takes sides in
disputes between participants about their conduct. For Dworkin, such
evaluation must be internal. He regards acceptance of the sort of norms by
which participants are motivated as necessary for interpretation. Hence, he
concludes that a philosopher cannot understand a practice from the outside.
According to the version of philosophy on which Dworkin insists, a
philosopher simultaneously describes and participates in a practice. Philosophy,
i.inc..-:pn
53 See R. Dworkin Law's* Empire (London: Fontana, 1986) 64; R. Dworkin Justice in Robes
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006) 141. See also S.R. Perry 'Hart's
Methodological Positivism' in J. Coleman (edHart's Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to The
Concept ofLaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 346.
54 On the possibility of such disagreements, see section four.
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on this account, is a way of taking part in (and is not itself) a particular practice.
The opinions of a philosopher are simply less concrete than those of other
. t '■ ' i 4 U S k i i ' >1
i :' V\'f£, p i
participants. As Dworkin says o'f jurisprudence: '[A] legal philosopher's theory
u. ■] ;).
of law is not different in character from, though it is of course much more
abstract than, the ordinary legal claims that lawyers make from case to case.'55 A
philosopher, then, expresses the beliefs of some fellow-participants in a less
specific form. Dworkin reckons that the convictions of non-philosophical
participants in a practice can always be - even if they seldom are -
communicated theoretically. This means that a philosophical translation of
every legal opinion is possible:
' 'l jj. i-'&i «t 2 '• ..
'i sop TT me s.n.
Any practical legal argument, no matter how detailed and limited,
assumes the kind of- abstract foundation jurisprudence offers, and
when rival foundations compete, a legal argument assumes one
and rejects others. So any judge's opinion is itself a piece of legal
philosophy, even when the philosophy is hidden and the visible
argument is dominated by citation and lists of facts. Jurisprudence
is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision
at law.56
But Dworkin is wrong to think that a philosopher must describe a practice from
the inside. Even if he is right about the necessity of interpretation - and, in the
fourth section of this chapter, I argue that he is - his claim that it depends on
:) e
R.' Dworkin Justice in Robes 141.
: ram amem, n >• m
56 R. Dworkin Law's Empire 90. .
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internal observation is false. He ignores the possibility of interpretation from the
external point of view.
Dworkin fails to grasp the potential for such interpretation because of his
'
; jUV{ ; 'V . i V •' 71 •
belief that external theorists are guilty of 'obscurantism'.57 He contends that they
are unable to contribute to non-philosophical discussions and that their work is
relevant to them alone.58 This allegation follows from his assumption that they
cannot do more than present a neutral record of these debates. One might,
however, interpret - and so take sides in disputes between participants about -
a practice in which one does not (currently59) take part. To evaluate the
convictions of participants, one need not share their critical-reflective attitude.60
Rather, one can assess their opinions from the hermeneutic perspective of
• '
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another practice. My account of pure interpretation, for example, indicates a
>sftk.Te guilt' If <
discrete order of norms on which a philosopher might rely. A pure theorist
evaluates the deliberate conduct of others by accepting distinct criteria, such as
clarity and consistency.61 Philosophy, therefore, can be more than a
sophisticated mode of participation. It might be an autonomous practice from
57 R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 170.
58 See R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 185-186.
59 One might, of course, participate in a practice both prior to and following external
analysis of it.
60 For a similar argument, see M.H. Kramer In Defense of Legal Positivism: Law without
Trimmings 169-170.
61 I say more about these values in section six.
, l::|.!
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which other practices - including those of obedience and disobedience - are
analysed.
Yet Dworkin implies that this brand of philosophy is elitist. He says that
external theorists 'look down' on the behaviour that they describe.62 But this slur
is no more warranted than his charge of obscurantism. These philosophers take
up a perspective that everyone might adopt. Moreover, the practice in which
; vT' pn-V -j.i
they participate is not better than any other: it is simply different. Rather than
observe from above, they look across at the conduct of people whose critical
reflective attitude they do not (presently) share.
Given this alternative conception of philosophy, one can defend an
understanding of a practice - other than philosophy, which is necessarily self-
justifying - from the outside. Norms of the sort that participants accept need not
motivate a philosopher. And Dworkin - rather surprisingly - admits as much.
He concedes the possibility of external analysis when he says that 'virtual'
7 • .. • 5 oi i' 7
participation is sufficient for interpretation.63 His acknowledgement that one
<eU< than a
might evaluate a practice in which one does not actually take part negates his
claim that a philosopher must make sense of deliberate conduct from the
internal point of view. Not only is Dworkin wrong about the need for a
62 R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 141.
63 See R. Dworkin Law's Empire 422, note 14.
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philosopher of a practice to share the critical reflective attitude of participants,
but he undermines his own case.
A philosopher, then, might both detect and describe a practice of
obedience or disobedience from either the internal or the hermeneutic
perspective. But how - and not merely from where - should a philosopher
understand this behaviour? The answer depends on the methodological criteria
that a description of a practice ought to satisfy. I introduce some means of
comprehension in the next section. I do this by looking at the ongoing debate
V.T..- T'V'ity : ' ...
about the methodology employed by Hart in defence of his account of law.
Ill
Many commentators wrangle over the way in which Hart describes legal
practice.641 consider their dispute in this section, but I do not purport (and have
no reason for trying65) to solve it. My only concern is to set out three distinct
methods between which a philosopher of a practice must choose. I look more
closely at these philosophical techniques in subsequent sections. My immediate
'> xt -sAiiohV I Go I
aim is simply to introduce them. ;
'
i.
64 Hart describes legal practice in general (as opposed to that of a particular society): see
H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law 239-240. This distinction has no impact on my argument. For
scepticism about the generality of Hart's account, see B.Z. Tamanaha A General jurisprudence of
Law arid Society.
65 Nothing in my argument depends on ascertaining Hart's jurisprudential methodology.
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A number of commentators/ maintain that Hart's description of law
merely reports the beliefs of legal actors as articulated - whether explicitly or
implicitly - in their speech. According to Dworkin, for instance. Hart's theory is
'semantic'.66 This mode of understanding comprises the single rule that a
description of a practice should match the language of participants. It does not
analyse the concept of which participants speak. By treating linguistic usage as
decisive, it reduces philosophy to lexicography. One might cite the following
extract from the preface to The Concept of Law as evidence for this reading of
Hart's theory of law:
».> nn* knijttoxs*. ny
Notwithstanding its concern with analysis the book may also be
regarded as an essay in descriptive sociology; for the suggestion
that inquiries into meanings of words merely throw light on words
is false. Many important distinctions, which are not immediately
obvious, between types of social situation or relationships may
best be brought to light by an examination of the standard uses of
the relevant expressions and of the way in which these depend on
a social context, itself often left unstated.67
66 See R. Dworkin Law's Empire 34-35; R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 31, 165-166, 214. See also
D. Lyons 'Moral Aspects of Legal Theory' in M. Cohen (ed.) Ronald Divorkin and Contemporary
Jurisprudence (London: Duckwprth, j 984.). 64; N.J Stavropoulos 'Hart's Semantics' in J. Coleman
(ed.) Hart's Postscript: Essays on the Postscript, to the Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001) 59.
67 H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law v.
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Jules Coleman, however, says that 'Hart's aim is not to report on usage, but to
analyse the concept of law.'68 And Hart himself emphatically denies that he
makes sense of legal practice by simply recording the language of its
participants: '[N]othing in my book or in anything else I have written supports
'v. i-rV t.»
. i.££i'" ' f 1 •
such an account of my theory.'69 Certainly, his reference to 'descriptive
sociology' - which Dworkin finds 'baffling'70 - cannot be understood as a
commitment to ordinary-language philosophy given his implicit admission (in
the quoted extract) that 'inquiries into the meaning of words' do not supplant
his 'concern with analysis'. Although he insists that an appreciation of everyday
speech is necessary, he appears to reject its sufficiency. He professes to do more
than list the beliefs of those who take part in legal practice. Hart thus dismisses
the allegation that he is in thrall to ordinary language. Whether his rejection
r, k i r'
indicates a lack of self-understanding - "as Dworkin and others might allege - is
not my interest here.
68 J. Coleman 'Methodology' in J. Coleman & S. Shapiro (eds) The Oxford Handbook of
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 313. See also M.
Bayles 'What is Jurisprudence About? Theories, Definitions, Concepts or Conceptions of Law' 18
Philosophical Topics (1990) 23, at 29; M. Bayles 'Hart vs Dworkin' 10 Law and Philosophy (1991) 349,
at 360; T. Endicott 'Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting' in J. Coleman (ed.) Hart's Postscript:
Essays on the Postscript to The Concept ofLaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 39-47.
69 H.L.A. Hart The Concept ofLaw 246.
70 R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 165. See also 214.
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Perhaps, then, analysis (and not lexicography) is Hart's project. To
analyse the concept of law, one must identify the significant aspects of legal
practice. This requires evaluation (rather than mere narration) of the beliefs of
legal actors. Such an assessment depends on criteria according to which one can
discriminate between the opinions of those who accept legal rules. Some
■ uihdirT; -; jSs
commentators declare - indeed, Stephen Guest is 'in no doubt'71 - that Hart
relies on moral norms. They say that his description of law results from
moralistic interpretation.
As apparent proof of Hart's dependence on morality, many of these
commentators refer to his contention that his theory of legal positivism
improves moral deliberation by 'preserving the sense that the certification of
something as legally valid is not conclusive of the question of obedience'.72
MacCormick belongs to this subgroup. He states:
, tt' ■ p:-Uv.ns::>vf T
Paradoxical as some may find it, Hart's reason for insisting on the
conceptual separateness of.'law' and 'morality' is [...] a moral
reason. Hart is a positivist because he is a critical moralist. His aim
is not to issue a warrant for obedience to the masters of the state. It
71 S. Guest 'Two Strands in Hart's Theory of Law: A Comment on the "Postscript" to
Hart's The Concept of Law' in S. Guest (ed.) Positivism Today (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996) 30.
72 H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law 210. For further discussion, see H.L.A. Hart 'Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals' in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1983) 72-78; H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law 207-212.
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is to reinforce the citizen's warrant for unrelenting moral criticism
of the uses and abuses of state power.73
Contrary to his depiction elsewhere of Hart as a semantic theorist, Dworkin
regards the alleged impact of legal positivism on moral decision-making as
'Hart's main argument' for the possible iniquity of legal rules.74 Unlike
MacCormick, however, Dworkin refuses to classify this argument as moral.
Instead, he says that Hart appeals to 'some hypothesis about how to think
clearly about the issues he mentions.'75 Regardless of whether one agrees with
Dworkin or MacCormick, HartijSi adamant that his theory 'is morally neutral
and has no justificatory aims'.76 He explicitly rejects moralistic interpretation.
Even if the supposed consequences of legal positivism are morally valuable,
Hart denies that his description of law is contingent on them. They are, he
73 D.N. MacCormick H.L.A. Hart 160. See also S. Guest Ronald Dworkin (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1992) 27; S. Guest 'Justice, Law and Ronald Dworkin: Jurisprudence
at the End of the Century' 51 Current Legal Problems (1998) 335, at 342; M. Kramer 'Dogmas and
Distortions: Legal Positivism Defended' 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2001) 673, at 683; D.N.
MacCormick 'A Moralistic Case for A-moralistic Law?' 20 Valparaiso University Law Review (1985)
1, at 10; F. Schauer 'Positivism Through Thick and'Thin' in B. Bix (ed.) Analyzing Law: New Essays
in Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 69-70.
74 See R. Dworkin 'A Reply by Ronald Dworkin' in M. Cohen (ed.) Ronald Dworkin and
Contemporary Jurisprudence (London: Duckworth, 1984) 254.
75 R. Dworkin 'A Reply by Ronald Dworkin' 255.
76 H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law 240. See also J. Coleman 'Methodology' 336; W.J.
Waluchow Inclusive Legal Positivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 98, note 29.
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implies, merely a beneficial; sidereffect-of legal positivism. At most, he would
•
i to- ijht-r if>-1
claim that he is - to use John Gardner's expression - a 'positivity-welcomer'.77
Although Hart dismisses moralistic interpretation, Stephen Perry is
convinced that he 'applies such a methodology in The Concept of Law when he
limits law to normative systems with a rule of recognition, thereby excluding
social practices that consist of primary social rules alone.'78 For Hart, a regime
comprising only primary rules - namely, those that establish duties - suffers
from certain defects: it lacks a way in which any doubt concerning the identity
of its rules might be eradicated; it has no procedures for creating new and
extinguishing current obligations; and it needs an effective mechanism for
, ' ■ 'f i'i ■ ■:
o .
; '
deciding whether specific rules have been infringed.79 Hart says that these
deficiencies are cured by 'supplementing the primary rules of obligation with
secondary rules which are rules of a different kind.'80 The latter 'specify the ways
in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced,
eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined.'81
According to Hart, a 'rule of recognition' solves the problem of uncertainty,
77 See J. Gardner 'Legal Positivism: 5V2 Myths' 46 American Journal of Jurisprudence (2001)
199, at 205. ! Vs Ah' .
78 S.R. Perry 'Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory' in A. Marmor (ed.) Law and
Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy-fOxford::Clarendon Press, 1995) 118.
79 See H.L.A. Hart The Concept ofLaw 92-94.
80 H.L.A. Hart The Concept ofLaw 94. A
81 H.L.A. Hart The Concept ofLaw 94.
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'rules of change' facilitate both the creation of new and the abolition of existing
duties and 'rules of adjudication' allow for the efficient resolution of disputes.82
The introduction of these;secondary- rules, he says, 'converts] the regime of
-.iplayi.'
primary rules into what is indisputably a legal system.'83 Given Hart's belief that
law remedies the defects of a regime comprising only duty-imposing rules,
Perry concludes that Hart 'delimit[s] the concept of law by appealing to the
values of certainty, flexibility, and efficiency.'84 Dworkin - in contradiction of his
other (inconsistent) statements about Hart's methodology - also infers that Hart
relies on these moral values to justify his legal theory.85
Yet the conclusion that Hart's description of law is the product of
moralistic interpretation need not follow from his contention that a legal system
effects certainty, flexibility and efficiency. These values need not be his
pi: • - . hiiiKp
motivation for including secondary rules in his theory. Indeed, Coleman says
that Hart's discussion of the shift from a pre-legal regime to a legal system
might be understood as 'a kind of social-scientific/functionalist explanation of
law [that] reinforces the philosophical analysis of law as a union of primary and
secondary rules, and makes the philosophical theory continuous with a
See H.L.A. Hart The Concept ofLaw 94-97.
H.L.A. Hart The Concept ofLaw 94.
S.R. Perry 'Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory' 118.
See R. Dworkin 'A Reply by Ronald Dworkin' 255.
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standard social scientific explanation/86 Rather than using the values of
certainty, flexibility and efficiency to justify his description of legal practice, in
h
other words, perhaps Hart mentions them to explain its historical development.
Incidentally, the dispute as to whether Hart engages in moralistic
interpretation is part of a more general debate over the extent to which this
methodology features in the history of legal positivism.87 Some commentators
believe that the legal-positivist tradition is dominated by moralistic theorists.88
Others, however, think that legal positivists - both past and present - generally
eschew moralistic interpretation. In fact, MacCormick calls such avoidance 'the
,Y, hUh ■
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great positivistic fallacy'.89
: • •; f; • i • ■ '
The third methodology that several commentators attribute to Hart is
i i' ■ ' ' ! '• ''• ' j .
also a form of interpretation. According to this mode of understanding, a
description of a practice ought only to meet certain 'meta-theoretical' standards,
86 J. Coleman 'Methodology' 342. See also J. Coleman The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a
Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 207.
87 For discussion, see G.J. Postema Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1986) 328-330; P. Soper 'Choosing a Legal Theory on Moral Grounds' in J.
Coleman & E.F. Paul (eds) Philosophy and Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) 31.
88 See T.D. Campbell The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996) 74;
D. Dyzenhaus 'Positivism's Stagnant Research Programme' 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
(2000) 703, at 708-709; D. Dyzenhaus 'The -Genealogy of Legal Positivism' 24 Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies (2004) 39.
89 D.N. MacCormick 'The Ethics of Legalism' 2 Ratio Juris (1989) 185, at 189. See also S.
Guest 'Why the Law is Just' 53 Current Legal Problems (2000) 31, at 51; D. Lyons 'Moral Aspects of
J v C" ■
Legal Theory' 64.
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such as clarity and consistencydTBetause it specifies criteria that are exclusively
non-moral for analysing the beliefs of participants, I call it 'pure' interpretation.
Coleman says that Hart 'quite clearly' adopts this means of comprehension
when describing legal practice.91 Dworkin, moreover, implies that Hart is a pure
theorist when he attributes Hart's legal positivism to a desire for clarity.92
Indeed, Hart himself seems to advocate pure interpretation in the following
passage:
[A legal theorist] must [...] be guided, in focusing on [some]
features rather than others, by some criteria of importance of
which the chief will be the explanatory power of what his analysis
picks out. So his analysisbwilkbe guided by judgements, often
controversial, of what is important and will therefore reflect such
meta-theoretic values and not be neutral between all values.93
Yet Hart's apparent insistence on pure interpretation is complicated by his
assertion that 'explanatory power' is the primary meta-theoretical value. Far
from being a philosophical norm, explanatory power results from the application
of such norms.94 Whether a theory exhibits this quality, in other words, depends
90 I say more about these standards in the penultimate section of this chapter.
91 See J. Coleman 'Methodology' 335-336. See also J. Coleman The Practice of Principle: In
Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 201; J. Dickson 'Methodology in Jurisprudence: A
Critical Survey' 10 Legal Theory (2004) 117; W.J. Waluchow Inclusive Legal Positivism 98, note 29.
92 See R. Dworkin 'A Reply by Ronald Dworkin' 255.
93 H.L.A. Hart 'Comment'in R. Ga\fi§c)h> (ed.) Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The
Influence of H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Qarendpn Pr,ess, 1987) 39. On 'explanatory power', see also
H.L.A. Hart The Concept ofLaw 81,155. , .
94 For a similar argument, see G.J. Postema 'Jurisprudence as Practical Philosophy' 4 Legal
Theory (1998) 329, at 334.
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on the methodological criteria that it ought to satisfy. Hence, a theorist for
whom philosophy is equivalent to lexicography would credit explanatory
.tki
power to a description, iof ay practice-'that simply records the language of
participants. The same theorist would claim, moreover, that a moralistic or a
pure interpretation of a practice lacks this capacity. Hart's reliance on
explanatory power, then, simply begs (rather than answers) the question of the
appropriate method for describing a practice.
In spite of disagreement about the means of comprehension that Hart
employs, I express no opinion on whether he engages in philosophy as
lexicography, moralistic interpretation or pure interpretation. I mention the
controversy regarding his .methodology only as a way of introducing some
> Wj®*fc,.ipfcGl;
different philosophical techniques for understanding intentional conduct
•' i I i' t:
(including acts of obedience and disobedience to the law). In the next three
sections of this chapter, I consider each of these approaches in turn.
IV
Should a description of a practice simply report the beliefs of those who take
part in it? For some theorists, philosophy as lexicography is defeated by the fact
that participants do not always agree about their behaviour. I argue here that a
, . hquiMptj..?,« j
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particular form of this objection succeeds. Having rejected philosophy as
lexicography, I then comment on the need for interpretation.
My critique supposes that participants are able to disagree about their
practice. According to Dworkin, however, some legal philosophers deny the
possibility of such disputes. I start by presenting his convincing reply to this
denial.
Dworkin says that disagreement between those who take part in a legal
practice is either 'empirical' or 'theoretical'. Conflict of the former type occurs
whenever legal actors 'agree about the grounds of law - about when the truth or
falsity of other, more familiar propositions makes a particular proposition of law
true or false - but disagree about whether those grounds are in fact satisfied in a
particular case.'95 Their dispute is 'theoretical' if 'they disagree about the
grounds of law, about which other kinds of propositions, when true, make a
particular proposition of law true.'96 Dworkin's label for quarrels of the second
sort is rather misleading, however, given that a theorist of a practice need not
; iT
share the critical reflective attitude of participants in it.97 I thus regard
'substantive' as a more appropriate epithet than 'theoretical' for debates
between lawyers about the grounds of law.
95 R. Dworkin Law's Empire 4.
96 R. Dworkin Law's Empire 5.
97 See section two of this chapter.
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Legal philosophers who reject the possibility of substantive discord, says
Dworkin, assume that '[w]e follow shared rules in using any word: these rules
set out criteria that supply the word's meaning.'98 By supposing that
participants always agree about their practice, these philosophers dismiss
clashes over the grounds of law as merely apparent. For them, 'the only sensible
disagreement about law is empirical disagreement'.99 Dworkin, though, argues
that legal actors often contest the meaning of law.100 To deny the authenticity of
these disputes, he says, 'fits badly with the kind of disagreements lawyers
actually have.'101 Indeed, he accuses philosophers for whom legal criteria must
be shared of reducing law to 'a grotesque joke'102 because they infer
participation in different legal practices from the lack of substantive consensus
and reach the 'absurd'103 conclusion that 'arguments [about the grounds of law]
are pointless in the most trivial and irritating way, like an argument about banks
when one person has in mind savings banks and the other riverbanks.'104
Of course, substantive conflict also exists between participants in non-
. <■;£"■ ■ 1 .e . 'ea.!i
legal practices. Moral actors, for instance, often apply different principles to the
■ 'h; 1 bade.' -v.
R. Dworkin Law's Empire 31.
R. Dworkin Law's Empire 31.
See R. Dworkin Law's Empire 15-30.
R. Dworkin Law's Empire 46.
R. Dworkin Law's Empire 44.
R. Dworkin Law's Empire 45.
R. Dworkin Law's Empire 44.
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same circumstances. Yet in no practice can participants always disagree: they
must at least have the same critical-reflective attitude. Although they might
P badly y
differ as to the individual rules of which their practice consists, the kind of rules
that they accept must be identical. Their dispute supposes agreement on the
order of reasons by which they are motivated. But maybe philosophy as
lexicography requires more than such consensus. I now examine the possibility
that it is defeated by substantive conflict.
If a description of a practice ought to match the language of participants,
then a theorist must simply report substantive discord. Philosophy as
lexicography cannot discriminate between the competing beliefs that
"Hi •. CJ. tpi..' '
participants hold about their practice. When faced with substantive debate, an
' • ' \ . .- i
ordinary-language philosopher must copy the speech of all disputants.
According to Michael Bayles, legal theories that reproduce arguments between
lawyers concerning the grounds of law are 'uninteresting'.105 Matthew Kramer
also criticises descriptions of legal practice that record substantive disagreement.
He bemoans their failure to 'yield a fully uniform account that could be
associated with the internal perspective of the participant.'106 Theories of non-
105 See M.D. Bayles 'What is Jurisprudence About? Theories, Definitions, Concepts or
Conceptions of Law' 31, 38.
106 M.H. Kramer In Defense ofLegal Positivism: Law without Trimmings 169.
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legal practices that report substantive discord would presumably be subject to
the same objections.
U ■"pi.fvrudvt pi
Yet these attacks do not defeat philosophy as lexicography. They assume
(rather than establish) that a theorist should do more than record substantive
disputes. Whether a theory is interesting depends on the methodological criteria
that it ought to satisfy. That Bayles is not inspired by reports of arguments
between legal actors concerning the grounds of law follows from (rather than
causes) his rejection of philosophy as lexicography. Likewise, Kramer's
insistence on a coherent description of a practice supposes the inadequacy of
merely recording everyday speech. These theorists regard substantive disputes
as fatal to philosophy as lexicography only because they rely on a methodology
pqujpdejjpi:' :\LT-
that solves (rather than reproduces) disagreements of this type.
• •. ' >1'
One cannot prove that substantive conflict defeats philosophy as
lexicography by assuming the superiority of another mode of understanding.
But one might claim that substantive discord undermines philosophy as
lexicography from within. My critique of this methodology is, therefore, internal.
I argue that disagreement between philosophers about their practice contradicts
philosophy as lexicography. Because methodological rules state the means by
which one ought to comprehend a practice, every methodology must be self-
Lx ; ogv«p!-iy>.«> J;...
*
j 1 ~i ■ i ' • i
56
The Possibility of Pure Interpretation
justifying. To defend philosophy as lexicography, then, one must report the
language of philosophers. Yet this defence succeeds only if every philosopher
believes in philosophy as lexicography. In fact, not all philosophers treat
linguistic usage as decisive. They obviously disagree about the criteria that a
description of a practice ought to satisfy. Since philosophy as lexicography must
.J}..' '
reproduce their dispute, it cannot support itself. Philosophical debate is thus
fatal to philosophy as lexicography.
Given the existence of substantive conflict between philosophers, a
theorist of any practice must interpret (rather than simply report) the beliefs of
participants. The necessity of interpretation follows from the impossibility of
ordinary-language philosophy. When interpreting a practice, a theorist analyses
the concept of which participants speak. Such analysis produces a conception of
the concept.107 This conception is an attempt to isolate that which is significant
v '• f •fr'Hyy W TGj ) ;■
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about the concept. With the failure of philosophy as lexicography, a theorist
t . ;
must aim to reject the trivial elements of a practice. As Leslie Green states: 'A
[theory] of something is [...] never a statement of all the facts about it: it is a
selection of those facts that are taken to be for some purposes important, salient,
107 On the difference between concepts and conceptions, see J. Rawls A Theory of Justice
(Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 5.
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relevant, interesting, and so on.'108 The claims of significance of which
interpretation consists are, of course, evaluative. Raz acknowledges the need for
appraisal when he says that a legal theorist must 'engage in evaluative
judgment, for such judgment is inescapable in trying to sort out what is central
and significant in the common understanding of the concept of law.'109 John
Finnis also recognises that a theory of a practice must be an assessment of it:
'[Tjhe evaluations of the theorist himself are an indispensable and decisive
component in the selection or formation of any [conceptions] for use in
description of such aspects of human affairs as law or legal order.'110
Consider, for example, the impact on moral theory of this need for
interpretation. Due to the impossibility of ordinary-language philosophy, a
theory of moral practice must be 'critical'. Such a theory is an attempt to
improve the 'positive' morality of everyday speech.111 As MacCormick states:
'Critical morality seeks to exhibit and lay bare the value assumptions implicit in
108 L. Green 'The Concept of Law Revisited' 94 Michigan Law Review (1996) 1687, at 1713.
See also J. Coleman The Practice ofPrinciple: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 179;
J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) 25; J. Finnis Natural Law
and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 17; M.H. Kramer In Defense of Legal Positivism:
Law without Trimmings 179; M. Kramer 'Dogmas and Distortions: Legal Positivism Defended'
688; J. Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 41; J.
Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Revised edition)
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 237.
109 J. Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 237.
110 J. Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights 16. See also J. Coleman 'Methodology' 313.
111 On the distinction between 'positive' and 'critical' morality, see H.L.A. Hart Law, Liberty
and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) 20.
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positive morality, to reassess these [...] and thus to develop critical principles by
reference to which we can reappraise and re-orient our ordinary day to day [...]
standards of judgment.'112 A critical moralist analyses (and might eventually
alter113) positive morality. That a theory of morality must be critical is entailed
by the failure of philosophy as lexicography.
sv ■ TOSfr.'' < ,
Although philosophy as lexicography is defeated by the existence of
substantive disagreement between philosophers, a theorist cannot ignore
everyday speech. An interpretation of a practice must start from the language of
those who participate in it.114 Their use of words is the phenomenon that
requires analysis. Before interpreting a practice, then, a theorist must report the
beliefs of participants. In Dworkin's words: '[Tjhere must be a "preinterpretive"
stage in which the rules and standards taken to provide the tentative content of
the practice are identified.'115 Yet how far might conceptual analysis revise
k 'uhy ^ex'k'c-gi.'fpi■ ■.
ordinary speech? Were no modifications possible, interpretation would be
112 D.N. MacCormick H.L.A. Hart 50.
113 See D.N. MacCormick H.L.A. Hart 54. According to my analysis in section two of this
chapter, the impact of a critical theory on moral practice depends on the power of the theorist to
modify the behaviour of participants. Richard Posner denies that 'academic moralists' - among
whom he includes Dworkin - are able to achieve such change and claims that only 'moral
entrepreneurs' have the persuasive skills that are necessary to do so: see R.A. Posner The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999)
chapter one.
114 See, for example, P. Morriss Power: A Philosophical Analysis (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1987) 3.
115 R. Dworkin Law's Empire 65-66. See also J. Coleman The Practice of Principle: In Defense of
a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 199-200; J. Coleman 'Methodology' 336.
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equivalent to philosophy as lexicography. Excessive departure from the normal
use of words, however, would result in the creation of an imaginary (as opposed
to a theory of an actual) practice. As Dworkin states: '[An interpretation] need
not fit every aspect or feature of the standing practice, but it must fit enough for
the interpreter to be able to see himself as interpreting that practice, not
inventing a new one.'116 The extent to which a theorist might alter normal
language is limited, therefore, by consideration of the distinction between
interpretation and invention.
In this section, I have argued that philosophy as lexicography cannot
justify a description of a practice because - given the fact of substantive
disagreement between philosophers - it cannot justify itself. With the failure of
this mode of understanding, a theorist of any practice must interpret the beliefs
of participants (and thus produce a conception of the relevant concept).
Although the need for interpretation does not allow one to ignore ordinary
". The- exten '' to
language, the defeat of philosophy as lexicography does require evaluation of
the normal use of words. Numerous legal philosophers justify such an
assessment on moral grounds. Their approach is the topic of the next section.
116 R. Dworkin Law's Empire 66. See also J. Waldron 'Is the Rule of Law an Essentially
Contested Concept (in Florida)?' 20 Law and Philosophy (2002) 137, at 138.
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V
A theorist who relies on moral criteria to defend an understanding of a practice
provides a moralistic interpretation of it. Since many legal philosophers offer
moral support for their theories of law, I discuss this methodology with
reference to their work. Drawing on Julie Dickson's helpful examination of
jurisprudential method, I consider some attitudes of these philosophers towards
moralistic interpretation and conclude by isolating the belief whose rejection is
my aim in this chapter.
First, though, I must deal with a terminological matter. According to
Gerald Postema, theorists who subject legal practice to moral appraisal are
exponents of 'normative jurisprudence'.117 Yet his language is unhelpful. It
suggests that the only norms that a legal theorist might consult when analysing
the concept of law are moral and thus excludes the possibility of selecting the
important aspects of legal practice on non-moral grounds. Since my aim in this
.i:t;ddyri&onv; ,:■*,
chapter is to deny the need for moralistic interpretation, I reject Postema's
51 ' I ,1 . i' '
choice of words. Consequently, I also refuse to follow Jeremy Waldron's
See G.J. Postema Bentham and the Common Law Tradition 328-335.
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application of the label 'normative positivists' to theorists whose legal
positivism results from moralistic interpretation.118
Dickson identifies three distinct theses concerning moralistic
interpretation to which a legal philosopher might subscribe: the 'moral-
evaluation' thesis, the 'moral-justification' thesis and the 'beneficial-moral-
consequences' thesis.1191 consider each in turn.
The 'moral-evaluation' thesis states that a theorist cannot make sense of
law without reference to morality.120 As Dickson recognises, both Finnis and
'! e 'F .' .Tibiiiiy & I U : t ...
Dworkin embrace the moral-evaluation thesis. To understand law, says Finnis, a
L' C": f
theorist must consult its focal meaning.121 The (moral) requirements of 'practical
reasonableness' determine the central case of law for him. He states that a legal
philosopher must rely on these requirements:
If there is a viewpoint in which the institution of the Rule of Law
[...], and compliance with rules and principles of law according to
their tenor, are regarded as at least presumptive requirements of
practical reasonableness itself, such a viewpoint is the viewpoint
which should be used as the standard of reference by the theorist
describing the features of legal order.122
118 See J. Waldron Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 167; J.
Waldron 'Normative (or Ethical) Positivism' in J: Coleman (ed.) Hart's Postscript: Essays on the
Postscript to The Concept ofLaw;(Oxford:1Oxford1University Press, 2001).
119 See J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory 9, 29.
120 For discussion, see J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory chapter two.
121 Finnis defends the moral-evaluation thesis in chapter one of Natural Law and Natural
Rights.
122 J. Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights 15.
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While Finnis holds that a legaFphildsd^her must defend an understanding of
(FF 'Vd■:cWh' T
law in terms of the requirements of practical reasonableness, Dworkin promotes
the moral-evaluation thesis by insisting on the 'constructive interpretation' of
every practice. Such interpretation 'is a matter of imposing purpose on an object
or practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre
to which it is taken to belong.'123 A theory of a practice, says Dworkin, must fit
the language of participants and explain 'why a practice of that general shape is
worth pursuing, if it is.'124 This requires a theorist to 'propose[...] value for the
practice by describing some scheme of interests or goals or principles the
. :r »■. .. .
practice can be taken to serve or express or exemplify.'125 Dworkin claims that
'
■
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the function of law is moral:
[Tjhe most abstract and fundamental point of legal practice is to
guide and constrain the power of government in the following
way. Law insists that force not be used or withheld, no matter how
useful that would be to ends in view, no matter how beneficial or
noble these ends, except as licensed or required by individual
rights and responsibilities flowing from past political decisions
about when collective force is justified.126
R. Dworkin Law's Empire,52. ,
R. Dworkin Law's Empirej66.,Seje alsoJR..Dworkin Justice in Robes 15.
R. Dworkin Law's Empire 52.'
R. Dworkin Law's Empire 93.
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Dworkin regards the moral justification of governmental force or - to be more
succinct - the value of legality as the purpose of law.127 He says that a legal
philosopher must describe law according to this goal. Dworkin thus adheres to
the moral-evaluation thesis. He agrees with Finnis that a legal theorist must
subject law to moral appraisal.1 'The cutting edge of a jurisprudential argument/
declares Dworkin, 'is its moral edge.'128
Dickson also portrays Finnis and Dworkin as advocates of the 'moral-
justification' thesis, which states that a legal theorist must treat law as morally
justified.129 She says that both of them explain their adherence to the moral-
justification thesis using the same reasons as those for which they assert that a
legal philosopher must morally evaluate law. According to Dickson, Finnis
holds that a theory of legal practice cannot fail to satisfy the requirements of
practical reasonableness,130 whereas Dworkin's assent to the moral-justification
thesis is 'driven by his view of the function of law.'131
See R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 5, 168-171.
R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 178.
For discussion, see J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory chapter four.
See J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory 71-73.
J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory 107.
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But Dickson's attribution of the moral-justification thesis to Finnis and
Dworkin is not convincing.132 Finnis says that a legal philosopher must regard
the focal meaning of law as consistent with the requirements of practical
reasonableness. Although he is adamant that a theory of law must refer to these
requirements, he does not say that it must always fulfil them. For Finnis, an
unjust law is nevertheless a law (albeit'in a secondary sense).133 His distinction
between the central and peripheral cases of law would be redundant were he to
insist on the practical reasonableness of every legal norm. Similarly, Dworkin
does not suggest that a theorist for whom legal practice sometimes fails to
provide governmental force with a moral warrant is incapable of understanding
law. He acknowledges that the language of participants - which a constructive
interpretation must fit - can prevent a theory of legal practice from achieving
this purpose.
Whether or not Finnis and Dworkin hold that a legal philosopher must
3 hi *yafb'?;i'jii i
treat law as morally justified, Dickson is right to deny that the moral-
j .
justification thesis follows automatically from the moral-evaluation thesis. She
recognises that the former cannot be established simply by proving the latter
132 Indeed, she admits that Finnis might object to her interpretation of his work: see J.
Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory 74-78. See also M.H. Kramer 'Book Review' [2003] Cambridge
Law Journal 210, at 211-213; M. McBride 'Book Review' 66 Modern Law Review (2003) 661, at 663.
133 See J. Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights 363-366.
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when she notes that the moral-evaluation thesis 'is a methodological precept
which could be accepted by a critical race theorist who believes that in many
instances, law operates in a way which results in great injustice to persons of
colour.'134 Hence, the moral-justification thesis is merely a particular version of
(and thus entails) the moral-evaluation thesis. While dismissal of the moral-
evaluation thesis implies rejection of the moral-justification thesis, the converse
is not true.
According to the moral-evaluation and moral-justification theses,
A : ,.V V 1 i
moralistic interpretation of legal practice is necessary. The 'beneficial-moral-
consequences' thesis, however, states only that a specific type of moralistic
jurisprudence is possible. For philosophers who accede to this thesis, an
understanding of law can be supported by the moral advantages (and, I
presume, defeated by the moral disadvantages) to which it gives rise.135 Some
theorists defend legal positivism by claiming that their description of law
improves moral deliberation. These legal positivists - unlike mere positivity-
welcomers - subscribe to the beneficial-moral-consequences thesis. All of them
believe that the moral effects of legal positivism might vindicate (and are not
J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory 73.
For discussion, see J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory chapter five.
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just an incidental benefit of) their interpretations of law.136 They include Jeremy
xjki i u-' h r i. i
Bentham,137 Neil MacCormick,138 Frederick Schauer139 and Liam Murphy.140
i > i'c-1 V X"- ■ . .
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Whether Hart also belongs to this group is a moot point.141
Lon Fuller says that legal positivism fails to bring about the moral
advantages on which these theorists depend.142 Indeed, he regards its moral
consequences as a reason for dismissing it (in favour of another description of
legal practice). David Dyzenhaus repudiates legal positivism in the same way:
We should, I maintain, adopt the view of law that gives us the best
results in practice. Given that judges are at the centre of legal
practice, we should adopt the view of law that judges should
adopt if they are to make the best sense of practice. I have thus
largely limited my evaluation of the positivist theory of law to an
assessment of the consequence's :for morality and practice if judges
adopt positivist ideas in a particular wicked legal system. And I
have argued, on the ground ofisuch consequences, for the view
taken by the Common Law tradition. For what more could be
asked of the correct view of law than that it lead to morally good
136 They might also believe that a theory of law must be justified in terms of its moral
results. Yet whether they subscribe to this version of the moral-evaluation thesis is not my
concern here. I note only that they regard a moral-consequentialist justification for a theory of
law as possible.
137 On Bentham's methodology, see G.J. Postema Bentham and the Common Law Tradition
328-332.
138 See D.N. MacCormick 'A Moralistic Case for A-moralistic Law?'
139 See F. Schauer 'Positivism as Pariah' in R.P. George (ed.) The Autonomy of Law: Essays on
Legal Positivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
140 See L. Murphy 'The Political Question of the Concept of Law' in J. Coleman (ed.) Hart's
Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); L.
Murphy 'Concepts of Law' 30 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy (2005) 1.
141 See section three of this,chapter,,.-;;,,,,.,y?,,
142 See L.L. Fuller 'Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart' 71 Harvard
Law Review (1958) 630, at 657-661. " '
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results and that it make sense of and perpetuate healthy legal
practice?143
Insofar as their critique hinges on the moral results of legal positivism, Fuller
>,
. :■ M ■' ...
and Dyzenhaus assent to .the beneficial-moral-consequences thesis. Their
: .tffd.'Fit.h'i'
dispute with legal positivists like MacCormick is empirical, not philosophical.
Whether legal positivism (or any other description of law) generates moral
benefits is a (difficult) question of fact. Rather than speculating on its answer,
though, I wish to comment briefly on Dickson's rejection of the methodological
proposition on which all of these theorists agree.
Dickson contends that the beneficial-moral-consequences thesis is false.
She denies the possibility of justifying an interpretation of legal practice with
reference to its moral effects. Such an argument, she says, 'runs in the wrong
' •' - M-.pi ' 'UC'. V- lis ' v
direction, from premises consisting of a claim about the beneficial consequences
•: H-' d v t .
of espousing a certain theoretical understanding of law, to the conclusion that
this way of understanding the law is therefore correct.'144 Dickson accuses
philosophers who subscribe to the beneficial-moral-consequences thesis of
143 D. Dyzenhaus Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the Perspective of
Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) 269-270. See also D. Dyzenhaus Legality and
Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997).
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'reducing] legal theory to no more than an exercise in wishful thinking'.145 In
other words, she supposes that they invent (rather than interpret) legal
practice.146
But her assumption is not valid. There is no reason to think that an
adherent to the beneficial-moral-consequences thesis cannot respect ordinary
{x r ; v':
speech to the extent required for a theory of law to be an interpretation (as
opposed to an invention). An evaluation of legal practice based on its moral
results need not be less compatible with the language of participants than any
other sort of assessment. Dickson does not explain her claim that a philosopher
who justifies an understanding of law in terms of its moral consequences 'fails
to take seriously the enterprise of attempting accurately and adequately to
characterise what is distinctive about law as an actually existing institution.'147
She simply ignores the possibility that the distinctive aspects of law might be
a'-., o.yiy.:unk;'uu;!
identified by the moral advantages to which they give rise. Hence, Dickson is
Vr.i::i' a v ,' • •
mistaken: a description of law can - which does not mean that it must - be
'
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supported by the moral advantages that it produces.148
145 J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory 90. See also J. Dickson 'Methodology in
Jurisprudence: A Critical Survey' 148-149.
146 On this distinction, see section four.
147 J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory 92.
148 For Schauer's response to Dickson's critique, see F. Schauer 'The Social Construction of
the Concept of Law: A Reply to Julie Dickson' 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2005) 493.
69
The Possibility of Pure Interpretation
Despite such errors, Dickson provides a useful survey of moralistic
jurisprudence by setting out three different propositions on the subject of
moralistic interpretation to which a legal philosopher might assent. According
to the moral-evaluation thesisj a theorist cannot understand law without
subjecting legal practice to moral appraisal. This proposition might be expressed
another way: moralistic interpretation is necessary if a philosopher wishes to
make sense of law. Although both Dworkin and Finnis subscribe to the moral-
evaluation thesis, Dickson is wrong to say that they also believe in the moral-
justification thesis. By declaring the need for a legal theorist to treat law as
morally justified, this second proposition is no more than a specific version of
the moral-evaluation thesis. But it is not a version that Dworkin and Finnis must
'... . >. I. y U. 11 ,
or, in fact, do support. Moreover, they do not - although other theorists do -
V t»i >St5x, ■ '
endorse the beneficial-moral-consequences thesis, which asserts merely that a
'
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legal philosopher can refer to the moral effects of a particular description of law.
Consideration of Dickson's taxonomy of some jurisprudential attitudes
towards moralistic interpretation is, I hope, an effective way of exploring the
philosophical technique of relying on moral criteria to defend an understanding
of a practice. Of course, my quarrel is not with every moralistic philosopher. To
establish the possibility of pure theory, I need only deny the necessity of
i 1 o ; v'-v cfr, iD". I,':
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moralistic interpretation. My argument is, therefore, compatible with a belief in
the possibility of offering moral support (whether consequentialist or otherwise)
for an understanding of deliberate conduct. Nevertheless, it is at odds with the
claim - which Dickson calls the moral-justification thesis when made in a
jurisprudential context - that a theorist cannot describe a practice without
treating the behaviour of participants as morally justified. As a specific version
of the more general proposition that a philosopher must defend an
understanding of a practice on moral grounds, this claim is inconsistent with my
rejection of the need for moralistic interpretation. But why do I deny that a
theorist must cite moral norms in support of a description of a practice? I
'
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present my case against the necessity of moralistic interpretation in the next two
sections.
VI
Given the failure of philosophy as lexicography, a theorist cannot make sense of
a practice without analysing it.149 In the absence of a non-moral mode of
analysis, moralistic interpretation is necessary by default. Hence, I must start my
argument against the need for moralistic interpretation by describing a form of
, 5' <•; • , C' V* m
• •
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149 See section four.
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analysis in which morality has no place. That is my task in this section. Once
again, my discussion focuses on jurisprudence.
A number of theorists purport to evaluate legal practice without
reference to moral criteria. Matthew Kramer, for example, states:
Dworkin [...] argujes] on moral grounds for his moralized
conception of law and legal rights, whereas I have argued [...] on
analytical grounds for a positivist conception of law. My positivist
orientation is methodological as well as substantive. To be sure, a
reliance on analytical grounds must involve judgments about the
importance or unimportance of various aspects of the phenomena
that are being pondered. Much the same is true of any theory
about anything. But judgments' pf importance are not perforce
moral judgments; the considerations that have guided my focus
throughout this book are nonmoral considerations.150
Notwithstanding his use of confusing terminology - as Perry notes, a natural
lawyer might be a 'methodological positivist'151 - and his assumption that
'analytical grounds' cannot be moral, Kramer expresses a definite commitment
to pure interpretation. Similarly, Jules Coleman declares that his analysis of
legal practice 'answers to [...] theoretical or epistemic norms'.152 Raz - whose
interpretations of authority and liberty are far from pure153 - also denies that the
150 M. Kramer In Defense of Legal P&sitiyism: Law without Trimmings 179.
151 See S.R. Perry 'The i'drie'tfefe' of Tegal Positivism' 9 Canadian journal of Law and
Jurisprudence (1996) 361, at 361; S.R. Perry 'HarPs Methodological Positivism' 311.
152 J. Coleman The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 3.
153 I consider Raz's moralistic interpretation of authority in the second chapter of this
thesis. On his philosophical method for understanding freedom, see J. Raz The Morality of
Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 15-16.
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'evaluative considerations' on which his description of law is based are moral.154
His apparent rejection of moralistic jurisprudence is endorsed by Dickson, for
whom 'Raz's stance exemplifies the correct sort of methodological position for a
legal theorist to adopt'.155
Yet legal philosophers who portray themselves as pure theorists must
specify the non-moral values on which they claim to rely if their methodological
assertions are not to be empty. Only by naming such ideals can they disprove
the need for a theorist to consult morality when selecting the important aspects
' Y!p y (Y 1 1 *
of legal practice. With the exception of Dickson - whose critique of the moral-
evaluation thesis I discuss below - all of these philosophers identify criteria in
terms of which they defend their respective analyses of law. They cite different
(albeit overlapping) sets of norms in support of their theories. Rather than
discussing the work of each of these philosophers in turn, I simply examine the
values mentioned by them. In doing so, I offer my own understanding of the
methodology that they claim to practise.
Of the ideals to which they refer - but on the meaning of which they offer
surprisingly little - I regard 'clarity'.,155 'consistency',157 'comprehensiveness'158
. ?■yt'K.'qnoo' ;D>. ' ■'
■ v
154 See J. Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 235.
155 J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory 10.
156 See M.H. Kramer 'Dogmas and Distortions: Legal Positivism Defended' 688.
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and 'coherence'159 as primary. Whereas clarity requires the elimination of
ambiguity from a concept, consistency demands the removal of contradiction.
: % i, • 1 v., t» V ;/f' ''
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These two norms are distinct: the paradoxical nature of a conception might be
obvious and a vague understanding need not be illogical. A description of a
practice is comprehensive, meanwhile, insofar as it matches the beliefs of
participants and it is coherent to the extent that it forms connections between
those beliefs. According to the value of comprehensiveness, an interpretation
should fit ordinary language as much as possible (and not only to the degree
that separates interpretation from invention).160 Yet the ideals of clarity,
consistency and coherence might require modification of everyday speech. For
example, an understanding of ) a practice whose participants express
-.'fir Tldhehpr dv
contradictory beliefs cannot be both wholly comprehensive and entirely
.. v he •.
consistent. Conflict between the norms of coherence and clarity is possible too,
given that integration of the various aspects of a practice might depend on a
failure to correct their ambiguity. The goals of coherence and consistency,
157 See M.D. Bayles 'What is Jurisprudence About? Theories, Definitions, Concepts or
Conceptions of Law' 25; L. Green 'The Concept of Law Revisited' 1713.
158 See M.D. Bayles 'What is Jurisprudence About? Theories, Definitions, Concepts or
Conceptions of Law' 25; M.H. Kramer 'Dogmas and Distortions: Legal Positivism Defended'
688; J. Raz 'Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison' 4 Legal Theory
(1998) 249, at 272.
159 See J. Coleman The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory
3.
160 Dworkin also distinguishes between these minimal and maximal notions of fit: see R.
Dworkin Law's Empire 230-231, 255-257.'
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though, are fully compatible. Since contradiction is detrimental to unity, a
coherent understanding of a practice must be consistent. Yet the impossibility of
conflict between the norms of coherence and consistency does not imply their
equivalence. Although the eradication of paradox is necessary for coherence, it
is not sufficient.161
Each of the other values mentioned by these legal philosophers either
corresponds to one or more of the primary norms or is not a criterion by which a
theory can be assessed. The extent to which an understanding of a practice is
'broad'162 or 'in agreement with facts'163 depends solely on its respect for the
beliefs of participants and, therefore, its comprehensiveness. The ideal of
'precision'164 - according to which a conception ought not to be vague - is no
different from that of clarity. The 'consilience'165 of various elements of a practice
is synonymous with their coherence. Since contradiction, ambiguity and
m The absence of a link between two things - a desire to run a marathon and a preference
for the colour blue, say - does not make them contradictory. On the difference between
coherence and consistency, see D.N. MacCormick Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory 106-107.
162 See J. Coleman The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory
119.
163 See M.D. Bayles 'What is Jurisprudence About? Theories, Definitions, Concepts or
Conceptions of Law' 25.
164 See M.H. Kramer 'Dogmas and Distortions: Legal Positivism Defended' 688; J. Raz 'Two
Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison' 272.
165 See J. Coleman The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory
3.
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plurality generate complexity, the oft-cited goal of 'simplicity'166 - which Kramer
calls 'parsimony'167 - is realised only insofar as a theory is consistent, clear and
coherent. An understanding of a practice that displays the virtue of simplicity is
also 'elegant'168 or 'subtle'169 to the degree that it is comprehensive (and crude
inasmuch as it fails to account for the beliefs of participants). Finally, none of
'explanatory power',170 'depth of understanding',171 'charity'172 or 'fecundity'173 is
a methodological norm. These qualities result from the application of
philosophical standards and are not themselves values on which a description
of a practice might be based.174 The explanatory power of a theory, its depth, its
generosity towards those who take part in the practice under scrutiny and its
production of interesting hypotheses all depend on the methodological criteria
that it ought to satisfy. For example, a moralistic philosopher would not regard
166 See M.D. Bayles 'What is Jurisprudence About? Theories, Definitions, Concepts or
Conceptions of Law' 25; J. Coleman The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to
Legal Theory 3, 119; L. Green 'The Concept of Law Revisited' 1713; W.J. Waluchow Inclusive Legal
Positivism 19.
167 See M.H. Kramer 'Dogmas and Distortions: Legal Positivism Defended' 688.
168 see j Coleman The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory
3,119; M.H. Kramer 'Dogmas and Distortions: Legal Positivism Defended' 688.
169 See M.H. Kramer 'Dogmas and Distortions: Legal Positivism Defended' 688.
170 See M.H. Kramer 'Dogmas and Distortions: Legal Positivism Defended' 688.
171 See J. Coleman The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory
119.
172 See W.J. Waluchow Inclusive Legal Positivism 19.
173 See L. Green 'The Concept of Law Revisited' 1713.
174 Recall my criticism of Hart's apparent reliance on explanatory power (in the
penultimate paragraph of section three) and my rejection of the argument by Bayles and Kramer
against theories that reproduce substantive disagreement (in section four).
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an understanding of a practice that fails to discriminate between the beliefs of
participants on moral grounds as deep.
In my opinion, then, a pure theorist justifies a description of intentional
behaviour with reference to the meta-theoretical norms of clarity, consistency,
coherence and comprehensiveness. Although moralistic philosophers might also
accept these values, a pure theorist is concerned with them alone. A pure
interpretation of a practice is based exclusively on these meta-theoretical norms.
Julie Dickson, however, objects to this mode of analysis.175 She denies that
fl.e' i v.s. ibility or P,u> . i >
reliance on clarity, consistency, Coherence and comprehensiveness is a substitute
for moralistic interpretation of legal practice. I dismiss her objection and argue
that - when combined with her failure to identify other non-moral ideals to
which a philosopher of law might refer - her rejection of meta-theoretical norms
undermines her critique of the moral-evaluation thesis.
Dickson disputes the need for moralistic interpretation by claiming that a
legal theorist can 'indirectly' assess law.176 Whereas direct evaluation of legal
practice involves moral appraisal of the beliefs of participants,177 indirect
'' ! • •eiiity t,i Pu
ut coher. • ;c
175 Inexplicably, Brain Bix thinks that she endorses it: see B. Bix 'Book Review' 28 Australian
Journal of Legal Philosophy (2003) 231, at 233.
176 See J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory chapter three.
177 See J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory 51-52.
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evaluation merely classifies a particular aspect of law as significant.178 An
assessment of the latter kind need not be moral.179 Yet on which other standards
might such an evaluation of legal practice be based? Dickson denies that meta-
theoretical norms are an alternative means of selecting the important elements
of law. For her, these values relate solely to the effective communication of a
theory: '[Tjhey do not bear upon the truth of the particular substantive claims
which a given theory makes, but are rather concerned with optimal ways of
getting the message of the theory across, and are hence considerations which
apply irrespective of what the content of that message might be.'180
In rejecting meta-theoretical norms as potential grounds for treating
huv neAYtW b< .
certain features of law as significant, Dickson simply assumes that these values
• ,k! ,>!?. ;'i t'iMV
cannot support a theory because they relate to the efficacy of its communication.
She offers no reason not to think that meta-theoretical norms might be relevant
to both the successful communication and the validity of a theory. Even if she
does not say so, perhaps a conviction that these two issues must never to be
conflated prompts her to exclude this possibility. But it need not. Since effective
communication depends on more than clarity, consistency, coherence and
178 See J. Dickson Evaluation and. Legal Theory, 53. For criticism of this distinction, see M.H.
Kramer'Book Review'211.
Hi;, ' \,d ;•/'
179 See J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory 58.
180 J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory 34.
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comprehensiveness - a shared language, for instance, is vital - a theory might
satisfy meta-theoretical criteria and yet not be communicated successfully.
Hence, Dickson's belief that ambiguity, contradiction, plurality and selectivity
might impair communication does not preclude reliance on meta-theoretical
norms as a substitute for moralistic interpretation.
Indeed, Dickson seems to concede as much when she offers her second
argument against the possibility of a legal theory based entirely on these norms.
Although not characterised by Dickson as separate, this further argument
i he K siipfflty of'ftir-; At
actually contradicts the first by implying that meta-theoretical criteria might
vindicate analyses of some concepts. Whereas the first argument assumes that
these values can never justify a theory, the second allows for reliance on them in
various non-legal contexts. According to this alternative argument, the
impossibility of a legal theory supported only by meta-theoretical norms follows
from the distinctive nature of concepts such as law: 'I present [these norms] as
insufficient because of the kind of concept that law is, [namely,] a concept
people use to understand themselves and their social world.'181 But Dickson
provides no reason to suppose that a philosopher who seeks clarity, consistency,
: hp bv w: -
coherence and comprehensiveness must neglect the ways in which people use
181 J. Dickson 'Methodology in Jurisprudence: A Critical Survey' 137. See also J. Dickson
Evaluation and Legal Theory 37, 40-44.
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the idea of law to make sense of their lives.182 If meta-theoretical values alone are
■
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often sufficient - as this argument suggests - then Dickson must explain their
inadequacy whenever people have opinions about the concept under analysis.
Given her failure to do so, her second argument is no more successful than the
first.
Moreover, she does not propose any other ideals on which a pure theory
of law might be based. Since her distinction between direct and indirect
evaluation is contingent on the existence of non-moral values for selecting the
important aspects of legal practice, Dickson's rejection of the moral-evaluation
. > r'i .
thesis is subject to her idehtiflcation of norms to which a pure theorist can refer
in defence of an understanding of law. Rather than specifying these values,
however, she merely makes some vague remarks that either beg the question or
suggest dependence on norms to which she objects.183 Whereas her contention
that 'the features of the law which are important to explain are those which best
reveal the distinctive character of law as a special method of social
organisation'184 is empty - a moralistic philosopher, for example, would explain
the distinctive character of law in moral terms - her claim that 'sometimes a
182 For a similar point, see B. Leiter Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal
Realism and Naturalism in Legal Pfflosgphy%72*i7%<
183 For related criticisms, see B. Bix 'Book Review' 236; K.E. Himma 'Book Review' 11 Law
& Politics Book Review (2001) 567, at 569; M. McBride 'Book Review' 664.
184 J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory 58.
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legal theorist may judge that a givferi feature of the law is important to explain
; m jftpk 1/ 4'' '•! ■ii'*'
on the basis of the prevalence of certain beliefs concerning that feature on the
part of those subject to the law'185 seems to imply that a description of legal
practice ought to fit with the attitudes of participants or, in short, be
comprehensive. Dickson's tacit reference to the value of comprehensiveness is,
of course, at odds with her dismissal of meta-theoretical norms as potential
support for a pure theory of law. In addition, her assertion that 'certain [...]
features [of the law] can be adjudged important to explain because they bear
upon matters which are of practical concern to us in conducting our lives'186
i: by 1 f<) gl
contradicts her aversion to ' teleological reasoning by legal theorists - her
'wishful-thinking' objection indicates her opposition to such arguments187 - and
her declaration that 'one reason why certain features of the law are important to
explain is because an understanding of them is vital if we are to be able [...] to
subject the law to moral scrutiny'188 seems no different from the version of the
beneficial-moral-consequences thesis that is endorsed by philosophers -
J. Dickson Evaluation and'Legal. Theory 59.
J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory 60.
See J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory 89-90.
J. Dickson Evaluation and Legal Theory 135.
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including MacCormick, Murphy and Schauer189 - for whom a theory of law
might be justified in terms of its positive impact on moral deliberation.
Dickson thus fails to specify non-moral values by which she thinks the
• XS-
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significant elements of legal practice might be discerned. And - despite Kenneth
Einar Himma's kind suggestion to the'contrary190 - her omission is far from
minor: it is fatal to her critique of the need for moralistic jurisprudence. By
rejecting meta-theoretical values as reasons for treating certain aspects of legal
practice as important and by neglecting to identify other norms on which a pure
theory of law might be based, Dickson effectively - and in opposition to her
stated aspirations - supports the moral-evaluation thesis. Her failure to offer a
non-moral mode of analysis entails the necessity of moralistic interpretation.
■ f I u- < h
Although Dickson's argument against reliance by a theorist on the ideals
. 'A\i; "k . ,
of clarity, consistency, coherence and comprehensiveness does not succeed,
... -ji y •' jkV
perhaps my alternative to moralistic interpretation is nevertheless flawed
because I do not specify a mechanism for resolving conflicts between these
values. My failure to indicate their relative significance could prompt such an
objection. But conflicts between meta-theoretical norms can be settled in the
absence of a hierarchy among them. A philosopher might exercise judgment
189 See section five.
190 See K.E. Himma 'Book Review' 569.
; T'svj ».imeht hyn
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whenever they clash. Provided a theory of a practice is sufficiently
comprehensive to refute any allegations of invention, judgment can determine
the extent to which it should comply with a particular norm. I elaborate on this
idea in chapter three and simply mention it as a possibility here.191
By examining the non-moral values to which some legal philosophers
refer and articulating my version of their methodology, I offer a substitute for
moralistic interpretation. According to this alternative mode of analysis, a
description of intentional behaviour ought only to be clear, consistent, coherent
and comprehensive. Moralistic interpretation is not, therefore, necessary by
default. But my description of a philosophical approach that eschews morality is
just the first part of my argument against the need for a theorist of a practice to
discriminate between the beliefs of participants on moral grounds. I complete
my case for the possibility of pure analysis in the next (and final) section of this
chapter.
. / -V ■ ffir of it eh
191 Dworkin seems to acknowledge this option when he mentions the 'intuitive sense' on
which theorists rely to sort out conflicts between methodological norms: see R. Dworkin Law's
Empire 231. Yet - see 239 - he also employs the images of 'balancing' and 'trading-off' to describe
the choice between rival ideals. These metaphors suggest the existence of a common scale on
which methodological norms might be compared and thus a hierarchy among them.
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VII
My account of pure interpretation is not sufficient to disprove the need for a
philosopher to justify an understanding of a practice in moral terms. To show
that moral evaluation of a practice by a theorist is not essential, I must also reject
any arguments against the feasibility of this alternative methodology. I consider
three.
The first argument derives the necessity of moralistic interpretation from
the claim that pure theorists always disagree.192 It states that philosophical
disputes about practices are never settled with reference to meta-theoretical
norms alone and that, consequently, pure interpretation is impossible. But this
argument is problematic. Both its major premise - that philosophical consensus
is a necessary consequence (as opposed to a welcome side-effect) of a theory -
and its minor premise - that pure theorists disagree at all times - are (at least)
dubious. Given the prevalence of moral discord, moreover, the introduction of
morality is not likely to end philosophical debate. Hence, the allegation that
pure theorists never agree does not establish the need to supplement meta-
. 'uri ■ s . .nwa •• <"'
theoretical norms with moral criteria.
.■ t'tu.
192 For discussion (but not endorsement) of the jurisprudential form of this argument, see J.
Coleman The Practice ofPrinciple: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 173-174.
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The second argument for the necessity of moralistic interpretation is
based on the perception that pure theorists have no effect on the behaviour that
they describe. Whereas the first argument assumes that a philosophical
understanding of a practice must change the opinions of other theorists, this
reasoning supposes that it must alter the beliefs of its subjects.193 That these
practical consequences are a methodological requirement (or even desirable) is,
however, far from obvious. Furthermore, there is no evidence that moralistic
theories produce these results, while pure theories do not. The extent to which
philosophical reflection modifies a practice depends on the power of a
J hp I ' Mr ri il.' iY'ca
philosopher or philosophers over participants in it.194 Since a moralistic theorist
is no more likely to have practical influence than a pure theorist, the second
argument for the necessity of moralistic interpretation also fails.
According to the third argument, pure theorists cannot make sense of
practices with moral content. This argument is more limited than the previous
two. It does not say that pure interpretation is never possible. Rather, it says
merely that philosophers cannot rely exclusively on meta-theoretical norms
193 Richard Posner makes the latter assumption about moral philosophy when he derides
'academic moralists' for their alleged failure to reform positive morality: see R.A. Posner The
Problematics of Moral and Legal ■ T/zeory-Chapter one. Insofar as he condemns these theorists for
their practical impotence, his critique as pather Marxist, as Brian Leiter notes: B. Leiter 'Book
Review: Marxism and the Continuing Irrelevance of Normative Theory' 54 Stanford Law Review
(2002) 1129, at 1132.
194 See section two on possible "explanations for a specific mode of participation.
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when analysing concepts in which morality features. Despite its restricted scope,
its success might nevertheless entail the need for moralistic interpretation of the
forms of obedience and disobedience that I examine in subsequent chapters. To
vi ' i f/ Cndpiv. aik
demonstrate that pure thborisfs^ can'make sense of practices whose participants'
beliefs are (wholly or partly) moral, I discuss the jurisprudential version of this
argument.
Many legal philosophers - of whom Ronald Dworkin is the most
prominent - attribute the need for moralistic interpretation to the moral
character of law.195 Indeed, Coleman says that this defence of the moral-
evaluation thesis 'has nearly risen to the level of conventional wisdom.'196 Yet its
success is contingent on the beliefs of legal actors. Only if they regard law as
Li; : c .V. i-rtv k x >
morally valuable can these philosophers establish the necessity of moralistic
'
si '
jurisprudence. Whether the concept of law has moral value is a preinterpretive
matter of fact.
According to Coleman, however, Dworkin ignores this empirical
requirement and attempts to fix the morality of legal practice by stipulating that
195 For discussion of this argument, see B. Bix 'Conceptual Questions and Jurisprudence' 1
Legal Theory (1995) 465, at 473.
196 J. Coleman The Practice ofPrinciple: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 174.
■ hdst ;.T«fhs6wefs
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the concept of law is concerned with the ideal of legality.197 Coleman is mistaken
- Dworkin does recognise that the beliefs of legal actors determine the moral
character of law - yet his error is excusable. It is surely caused by the peculiarity
of Dworkin's claim that the concept of law is an interpretation of legal practice
. ' : i:; . ; UJ& < Hi
(as opposed to a preinterpretive fac,t); , f
The contrast between concept and conception is [...] a contrast
between levels of abstraction at which the interpretation of the
practice can be studied. At the first level agreement collects
around discrete ideas that are uncontroversially employed in all
interpretations; at the second the controversy latent in this
abstraction is identified and taken up.198
Dworkin's account here of the concept-conception distinction is eccentric.
Rather than treating a concept as a preinterpretive fact of which each conception
is an interpretation - this is the normal understanding of the difference199 -
Dworkin says that conceptions are 'subinterpretations of a more abstract idea.'200
He conceives of the concept of law,as an interpretive statement of the general
ideas that different theories (or subinterpretations) of legal practice share.
Elsewhere, he calls the ideal of legality the 'aspirational' concept of law and
distinguishes it from the 'doctrinal' concept to which - in my opinion - legal
197 See J. Coleman The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory
183-185; J. Coleman 'Methodology' 319-321.
198 R. Dworkin Law's Empire 71.
199 See my discussion in section four of the present chapter.
200 R. Dworkin Law's Empire 71.
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philosophers normally refer.201 As an abstract and uncontroversial interpretation
of the latter, the former - of which competing legal theories are conceptions -
supposes that the morality of law is a preinterpretive fact. By defining the
(aspirational) concept of law in terms of the ideal of legality, then, Dworkin is
not attempting to fix the moral character of legal practice. Contrary to
Coleman's reading of his case for the necessity of moralistic interpretation, he
attributes a moral purpose to law only because he thinks that it fits with the
convictions of legal actors.202
Yet are their beliefs moral? The answer is not readily apparent. Indeed,
W.B. Gallie - for whom disputes about concepts of moral significance are
inevitable - implicitly denies the morality of legal practice when he declares that
law is not an 'essentially-contested' concept.203 In any event, the moral nature of
law is not sufficient to prove the moral-evaluation thesis. To infer the need for
moralistic interpretation from the morality of a practice, one must suppose that
the beliefs of participants determine the methodological norms to which a
■ jse 'a law i." / 1
philosopher refers. Dworkin says that 'interpretation takes different forms in
different contexts only because different enterprises engage different standards
201 See R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 2, 5,12-13.
202 See R. Dworkin 'A Reply by Ronald Dworkin' 256.
2°3 gee w.B. Gallie 'Essentially Contested Concepts' in Philosophy and the Historical
Understanding (2nd edition) (New York: Schocken Books, 1968) 190. See also L. Green 'The
Political Content of Legal Theory' 17 Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1987) 1, at 18-19.
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of value or success.'204 But - to repeat my argument from section two - a theorist
of a practice need not share the: critical-reflective attitude of participants.
Interpretation is possible without acceptance of the sort of norms by which
participants are motivated. Hence, a philosopher might justify an understanding
of a practice whose participants imbue their behaviour with moral value in
purely non-moral terms. As Coleman says with regard to jurisprudence:
[A]n analysis of law should help us to understand what we find
morally attractive about it, and an analysis that failed to do so
would be lacking. But this condition does not imply that we must
appeal to moral argument in order to provide an adequate
analysis of law. It is sufficient if, at the end of the day, the analysis
we offer helps us to understand the morally attractive capacities of
law.205
Hence, none of the three objections to the possibility of pure interpretation is
successful. Neither the belief that pure theorists always disagree, the perception
that they have no impact on the conduct about which they write nor the
allegation that they are unable to make sense of practices with moral content
demonstrates the necessity of moralistic interpretation.
But - despite my rejection of these criticisms - one might still doubt that a
philosopher can accept meta-theoretical norms alone. One might protest, for
instance, that my argument in.; this,(.chapter is circular because it depends on the
204 R. Dworkin Law's Empire 53.
205 J. Coleman The Practice ofPrinciple: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 195.
See also H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law 244.
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very methodology whose feasibility it strives to establish. My response to this
objection can be (and, in fact, is) brief.
I do not deny that'I rely' dh thb-values of clarity, consistency, coherence
and comprehensiveness in various .sections of the present chapter. My
separation of obedience and disobedience from other responses to the law is
motivated by these philosophical virtues.206 1 also apply meta-theoretical norms
when defining the attitude of acceptance that characterises the internal view of a
deliberate action.207 Finally, my account of pure interpretation itself is prompted
by a desire for clarity, consistency, coherence and comprehensiveness.208
The charge of circularity is surely provoked by this last instance of pure
analysis. That I defend meta-theoretical norms in their own terms does not
defeat my argument for the possibility of exclusive reliance on them, however,
for the simple reason that a conception of philosophy cannot be other than self-
justifying. As Dworkin himself states: '[A] theory of interpretation is an
interpretation of the higher-order practice of using interpretive concepts. (So
any adequate account of interpretation must hold true of itself.)'209 To argue for
a particular sort of analysis - whether pure or moralistic - one must rely on it.
206 See section one. I rely on the importance of comprehensiveness, for example, in rejecting
Robert Paul Wolff's version of obedience.
207 See section two.
208 See section six.
. 'J \ (• '
209 R. Dworkin Law's Empire 49.
r : 1 AA'AA A:
the XMSibi.1:! • ' ' : :
90s
The Possibility of Pure Interpretation
Hence, the circularity of my case for the possibility of pure interpretation is
unavoidable (and far from unique).
From my description (in the previous section) of a philosophical
approach in which morality- has no place and my rejection (in the current
;j... "'Orribil '
section) of arguments for the necessity of moralistic interpretation, I conclude
that pure interpretation is possible. My two-stage denial of the need for a
theorist to cite moral values in support of an understanding of a practice is thus
complete. Perhaps one now expects me to make the further claim that pure
interpretation is necessary (as well as possible). But I do not believe that a
philosopher must (and not only might) rely exclusively on meta-theoretical
norms. Just as I can find no argument for the necessity of moralistic
interpretation, I am aware of none for the inevitability of pure interpretation.
; Uj. i U : 1st;:- ho.'
Both modes of analysis are possible and neither is essential.
i;\p;v i.
Moreover, I cannot even think of any arguments for the superiority (as
distinct from the possibility, on the one hand, and the necessity, on the other) of
pure analysis. Despite my belief that a description of a practice ought to satisfy
only meta-theoretical criteria, I cannot justify my preference for this means of
comprehension. Every attempt is undermined by its dependence on the very
norms whose superiority I seek to vindicate. Suppose I were to argue that pure
ct )
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interpretation is better than moralistic interpretation because the latter obscures
the distinction between the discourses of philosophy and morality. My
reasoning would persuade only those for whom the clarity of a practice is more
important than its moral enhancement. In other words, I would convince pure
theorists and no-one else. Moralistic philosophers would not be troubled by this
lack of precision. Indeed, they would cite it in support of moralistic
interpretation. But their case also assumes (and does not establish) the
■ ...... i
superiority of their methodology. They favour moralistic interpretation on
., •. »% * iwi -
moral grounds. Neither moralistic nor pure theorists, then, can justify their
respective philosophical beliefs.
The only possible explanations for these preferences are causes other than
reasons.210 The manner in which one practices philosophy might result from
one's character, the power of another person or other people and the use of
judgment. Although one's preference for a certain style of analysis is not




irrationality. The latter conclusion supposes that one's preference is denounced
■ ; ■/ : : k.
(and not merely unsupported) by reason. Yet - since participation in a practice
is prior to reason - condemnation of this sort is impossible. Cohen, therefore,
210 This paragraph draws on my discussion in section two of the present chapter.
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need not be disturbed by his suspicion that his philosophical approach to certain
questions is caused by his decision to study at Oxford University.211 His
awareness of the influence of Oxford dons on his version of philosophy is not a
reason against it.
My argument in this chapter - my claim that obedience and disobedience
are deliberate responses to legal demands; my consideration of the perspectives
from which a theorist can detect and then make sense of these responses; my
recognition of three different methods for understanding intentional behaviour;
.e 1:jsjpij.it/ ci K'i
my rejection of philosophy as lexicography; my elaboration of moralistic
interpretation; my description of a form of analysis that eschews morality; and
V
my refutation of three arguments for the necessity of moralistic interpretation -
establishes the possibility of pure interpretation. But I cannot justify my
preference for this methodology. Hence, the only way in which I can
demonstrate its superiority is by practising it. In subsequent chapters, I offer
pure analyses of some practices of obedience and disobedience. By contrasting
my interpretations with those of moralistic theorists, I try to show that one
ought to rely exclusively on meta-theoretical norms when justifying a
>phy as"' ie •> i i • ;gr
description of a practice. Each of my pure analyses, then, is not only an attempt
See G.A. Cohen 'Paradoxes of Conviction' 16-19.
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to improve understanding of a specific form of obedience or disobedience. I also
propose these descriptions in the hope that they illustrate the superiority of the
methodology on which they are based. Since my substantive and
methodological claims are mutually dependent, the rest of this thesis is
concerned with both.
v-'iy «. ,i::.t:(v ? :X
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Legal Reasons: The Authority of Law
Many people say that the law has authority and must, therefore, by obeyed.
Most of them add that the authority of the law is legitimate. In this short
chapter, I explore these two statements by examining an influential conception
of authority and proposing an alternative to it.1 The interpretation that I reject is
moralistic. It describes the behaviour of those for whom the law has authority in
moral terms. It does so by presuming that a philosopher cannot understand the
first of the two statements without comprehending the second. It thus connects
the meaning of authority to that of legitimacy.
My examination of this theory assumes that these two concepts are not -
as some theorists claim2 - mere rhetorical tools whose function is ideological (in
a Marxist sense). Even if they perform this role, I insist that analysis of them is
both possible and worthwhile. Moreover, my discussion supposes that the
ig ■:. ! "tcina'fi »■ e \
second statement is not tautologous and that an 'illegitimate authority' might
exist. The object of my scrutiny is not the 'crude' thesis that the concepts of
1 On the prominence of the conception to which I respond, see J. Waldron Law and
Disagreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) 84.
2 See W. McBride 'The Fetishism of Illegality and the Mystifications of "Authority" and
"Legitimacy"' 18 Georgia Law Review (1984) 863.
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authority and legitimacy are equivalent and so the expression 'legitimate
authority' is pleonastic.3 Rather, I focus on a theory whose connection of the two
notions is more complex. I study the moralistic interpretation of authority that
Joseph Raz provides.4 In the first section, I consider his understanding of the
relationship between authority and legitimacy. Then - in section two - I look at
the conception of legitimate authority on which his interpretation of authority
depends. Finally, I sketch a pure alternative to his account according to which
obedience to the law by those for whom legal norms are authoritative might
■o r - ~ ■!; .5 tv„
(and, I submit, ought to) be understood.
I
Raz distinguishes between two kinds of authority. He separates that which is
legitimate (or de jure) from that which is effective (or de facto).5 His recognition of
these two types implies his rejection of the 'crude' thesis. He denies that
legitimacy and authority are synonymous. Instead, he maintains that legitimate
n for whom
3 See R.A. Shiner Norm and Nature: The Movements of Legal Thought (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992) 124, at 134-135.
4 On the moralism of this account, see J. Raz The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986) 63-64.
5 See J. Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979) 4; J. Raz 'Introduction' in J. Raz (ed.) Authority (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) 3; J. Raz
Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Revised edition) (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995) 211.
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authority is 'primary'.6 'One can [...]/ he says, 'most clearly discern what
authority is by seeing what one acknowledges when acknowledging that a
■' TL . Lv v Lou.
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person has legitimate authority.'7 For him, the notion of effective authority
presupposes and cannot be explained without reference to the idea of legitimate
authority.8 Hence, he connects authority and legitimacy without equating them.
Yet Raz seems muddled about the precise association between the two
types of authority that he identifies. He offers various formulations of the way
in which effective authority relates to legitimate authority and so becomes more
than power over people.9 He often says that it must claim to be legitimate.10 He
contradicts this frequent statement, though, when he says that a widespread
■. lit tie . i
.
belief in its legitimacy is both necessary and sufficient:
' i i * • ■ * ' y. | i 5 V
A person has effective or de facto authority only if the people over
whom he has that authority regard him as a legitimate authority.
This would usually, though not necessarily always, imply that he
claims legitimate authority for himself. It is enough that others
regard him as legitimate authority.11
6 See J. Raz The Authority ofLaw: Essays on Law and Morality 8.
7 J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 28. See also L. Green The Authority of the State (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1988) 61.
8 See J. Raz 'On Legitimate Authority' in R. Bronaugh (ed.) Philosophical Law (London:
Greenwood Press, 1978) 11; J. Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 8-9; J. Raz The
Morality ofFreedom 27.
9 On the insufficiency of such power for effective authority, see J. Raz The Authority of
Law: Essays on Law and Morality 9; J. Raz 'Authority and Justification' 14 Philosophy and Public
Affairs (1985) 3 at 6; J. Raz The Morality ofFreedom 27-28, 65; J. Raz 'Introduction' 3.
10 See J. Raz 'Authority and Justification' 6; J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 27-28; J. Raz
'Introduction' 3.
pit ::rv11 J. Raz The Authority ofLaw: Essay's onLaw and Morality 28.
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If Raz thinks that an effective authority need only be generally accepted as
legitimate, then he cannot additionally think that it must always profess to be
so. These two propositions are ^mutually exclusive. Both, moreover, are
*
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incompatible with his further statement that effectiveness requires either a
declaration or a common perception of legitimacy.12 This third account of the
relationship between de facto and de jure authority is contrary to the first
(inconsistent) couple. It is also in tension with a fourth version. According to the
latter, both a claim to and a general belief in legitimacy are usually necessary for
an authority to be effective:
[T]he notion of a de facto authority depends on that of a legitimate
authority since it implies not only actual power over people but, in
the normal case, both that the person exercising that power claims
to have legitimate authprity and that he is acknowledged to have it
by some people. In some unusual cases one is willing to apply the
term when only oneiof these conditions obtains.13
Given the distribution of these various formulations throughout Raz's work and
his silence on the conflicts between them, I doubt the potential of closer analysis
to reveal his actual opinion on the nature of the connection between
effectiveness and legitimacy. Hence, I abstain from such exegesis and, instead,
12 See J. Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 9; J. Raz 'Authority and
Justification' 13-14; J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 46; J. Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in
the Morality ofLaw and Politics 211.
13 J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 65.
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turn to his discussion of the connection between the de facto and de jure senses of
the authority the state. This species of authority is my ultimate concern in the
present chapter and Raz's comments on the association between its effective and
legitimate forms are - unlike his corresponding remarks on authority in general
- surprisingly consistent. They are, though, nevertheless problematic.
Raz states repeatedly that every legal system claims to be legitimate and
so has de facto authority.14 This claim of legitimacy - which need be neither
■ 8
warranted nor sincere - is, he says, 'part of the nature of law'.15 He regards it as
b J "af.;,"
a crucial aspect of every legal practice and denies the possibility of a state that
does not make it (and that, therefore, lacks effective authority). Although he also
seeks to derive his brand of legal positivism - which he dubs the 'sources thesis'
- from this alleged declaration,16 I express no opinion on its jurisprudential
implications here. The claim itself is my topic. More specifically, I ask whether
the law must make it.
lam-
14 See J. Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 30; J. Raz 'Authority and
Justification' 5; J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 26; J. Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the
Morality of Law and Politics 215, 357; J. Raz 'Postema on Law's Autonomy and Public Practical
Reasons: A Critical Comment' 4 Legal Theory (1998) 1, at 3. For a similar view, see R. Alexy 'On
Necessary Relations between Law and Morality' 2 Ratio Juris (1989) 167.
15 J. Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 215. See also J.
Raz 'Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties' 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1984) 123, at 131.
16 See J. Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality chapter three; J. Raz Ethics in
the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics chapter ten.
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Since legal rules cannot speak - other than metaphorically - on their own
'
behalf, they can assert their legitimacy only if some person or body of persons
does so for them. Raz says that legal officials perform this task:
The law's claim to authority is manifested by the fact that legal
institutions [...] regard themselves as having the right to impose
obligations on their subjects, by their claims that their subjects owe
them allegiance, and that their subjects ought to obey the law as it
requires to be obeyed (i.e. in all cases except those in which some
legal doctrine justifies breach of duty). Even a bad law, is the
inevitable official doctrine, should be obeyed for as long as it is in
force, while lawful action is taken to try and bring about its
amendment or repeal.17
Hence, for Raz, a legal system (with effective authority) cannot exist unless its
• .n.j .. l sp^ajk >t[.
officials maintain - even if they neither correctly nor genuinely believe - that it
is legitimate. But does the existence of;the law really depend on institutional
declarations of its legitimacy? Consider the application by a judge of a legal
norm to a particular case. That he or she asserts the legitimacy of his or her
decision seems neither essential nor, indeed, probable.18 He or she might say
nothing about the morality of the rule that he or she applies. H.L.A. Hart
recognises this possibility:
Of course many judges, when they speak of the subject's legal
duties, may believe, as many ordinary citizens may do, in the
moral legitimacy of the [law], and may hold that there are moral
: h 1: ?y nen' r .
17 J. Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 215-216.
18 For similar point, see R. Dworkin Justice in Robes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 2006) 199-200.
100
Legal Reasons: The Authority of Law
reasons for complying with it[...l as such, independently of [its]
specific content. But I do not agree that [...] judges [must] either
believe this or pretend to do so, and I see no compelling reason for
accepting an interpretation of 'duty' or 'obligation' that leads to
this result. Surely, as far as the facts are concerned, there is a third
possibility; that at least where the law is clearly settled and
determinate, judges, in speaking of the subject's legal duty, may
mean to speak in a technically confined way. They speak as
judges, from within a legal institution which they are committed
as judges to maintain, in order to draw attention to what by way of
action is 'owed' by the subject, that is, may legally be demanded or
exacted from him. Judges may combine with this, moral judgment
and exhortation especially when they approve of the content of
specific laws, but this is not a necessary implication of their
statements of the subject's legal duty.19
Notwithstanding, then, the actual reason for which a judge applies a legal norm
•
• V-l j : i , .un hi . i,
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to a specific case - regardless,.,in other words, of whether the law provides him
or her with 'motivational' or mere 'epistemic' guidance20 - he or she need not
aver that his or her decision is legitimate. In fact, the occasions on which he or
she appends such a moral statement to his or her application of the law are
likely to be rare. Yet judges - even though Raz describes them as 'the authentic
representatives, the mouthpiece of the law'21 - are not the only officials through
19 H.L.A. Hart Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1982) 266. See also H.L.A. Hart Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1983) 10.
20 On this distinction - which I discuss in the second section of chapter one - see S. Shapiro
'On Hart's Way Out' in J. Colerhan (udi)ikf&rf's Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 173-174.
21 J. Raz 'Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties' 131. See also J. Raz The Authority of Law:
• ''
Essays on Law and Morality 30.
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whom a legal system communicates. Members of the legislature also speak
collectively on its behalf. Perhaps they - and judges insofar as the courts make
new (rather than apply existing) rules22 - must assert that the norms of the
•. i : li-lsr1 ;(ti: ■- P-v •




The proposition that legislators - including 'activist' judges - necessarily
declare the legitimacy of the rules that they create is, however, false. Although
their amendments are inevitably purposive, their objectives need not be moral.
They might (and, indeed, frequently do) enact rules for nonmoral - such as
economic - reasons. Moreover, their goals necessarily pertain to the substance of
the law, whereas principles of legitimacy - about which I say more in the fourth
chapter - are content-independent. The latter provide moral reasons to obey even
kbLT ,1
unjust norms. Hence, members of the legislature - in common with judicial
, T {■ i A'."
; • ' - Klf- y/ v
officers - need not proclaim the legitimacy of the system to which they belong.
Since neither those who devise nor those who apply the law must assert
that it is legitimate, Raz is wrong to deny the possibility of a state whose officials
fail to pronounce the legitimacy of its norms. His belief that every legal system
must claim to be legitimate (and so have effective authority) is false. At least,
22 According to Dworkin - see R. Dworkin Law's Empire (London: Fontana, 1986) 5-6 -
such invention occurs less often than public debate on the topic of 'fidelity' supposes.
23 This suggestion assumes that every law is the product of deliberate enactment (as
opposed to, say, custom). Since I reject it, I need not consider the truth of the assumption on
which it relies.
■ \ I pi;s. o.i • ' i < vie- ,
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though, his remarks on the relationship between the de facto and de jure forms of
state-authority are consistent - unlike his various statements on the way in
which authority in general connects to legitimacy. Because each of his
formulations of this link conflicts with some or all of the others, his actual
opinion is impossible to fathom.
Despite such falsity and muddle, I nevertheless proceed with my
examination of the conception of authority that Raz articulates. The problems
with his discussion of the way in which effective authority relates to legitimate
authority would not exist but for his insistence on the primacy of the latter. This
hierarchy is, I submit, the fundamental difficulty with his analysis of authority.
In the next section, I explore the version to which he grants priority.
II
The distinctive feature of an authoritative directive, says Raz, is its 'special
1 i nr,;.;dk
peremptory status.'24 In contrast to a request,25 an order provides a reason for
v.;/: ■
action that 'is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what
24 J. Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality ofLaw and Politics 212.
25 On this comparison, see J. Raz 'On Legitimate Authority' 24; J. Raz The Authority of Law:
Essays on Law and Morality 23.
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to do, but should replace some of them.'26 By supplanting a comprehensive
evaluation of the behaviour whose performance the authority demands, this
reason is 'pre-emptive'.27 But it is not absolute. Raz does not suppose that
authorities must be obeyed 'come what may.'28 Their commands, he says, are no
more than 'exclusionary' reasons, which he defines as 'negative second-order
reasons [...] to refrain from acting for a [first-order] reason.'29 Because these
reasons rule out others by type, they may not 'determine what is to be done in
certain circumstances but merely [...] what ought to be done on the basis of'
*' f ' ;
certain considerations.'30 They 'may exclude action for all or only for some kinds
of reasons.'31
According to Raz, then, an order forbids conduct on particular grounds.
He does not equate this pre-emption with an absence of thought, however.32
Since 'what counts [...] is not what the subject thinks but how he acts', then
26 J. Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 214. See also J.
Raz 'Authority and Justification' 13-14; J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 46.
27 J. Raz 'Authority and Justification' 10; J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 42; J. Raz Ethics in
the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 213.
28 J. Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 213. See also J.
Raz 'On Legitimate Authority' 23 . ;.
29 J. Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 17. See also J. Raz 'On Legitimate
Authority' 18; J. Raz Practical Reason and Norms (2nd edition) (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1990) 39. 1 :'
30 J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 46.
31 J. Raz 'On Legitimate Authority' 23. See also J. Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law
and Morality 22-23; J. Raz Practical Reason and Norms 40.
32 Compare Z.K. Bankowski 'Don't Think About It: Legalism and Legality' Rechtstheorie
Beiheft 15 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1993) 49.
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'[reflection on the merits of actions required by authority is not automatically
prohibited by any authoritative directive, though possibly it could be prohibited
, u'.h • • \c; 1
by a special directive to that effect.!3? Raz thus denies that (academic) criticism of
authority is impossible.34
He also dismisses Robert Paul Wolff's contention that the peremptory
character of a command necessarily precludes its legitimacy. For Wolff, a person
cannot recognise an authority without giving up the autonomy on which moral
evaluation of it depends.35 Given this apparent contradiction, Wolff concludes
that the notion of de jure authority is 'vacuous'.36 But, says Raz, this paradox
exists only 'if one conceives of all reasons as essentially first-order reasons and
!.: ,Ui' (h. -Ctivv 1
overlooks the possibility of the existence of second-order reasons.'37 Hence, he
■■ Hy/i-ryW ,,
insists that '[t]he question of the legitimacy of authority takes the form that it
was always assumed to take: an examination of the grounds that justify in
certain circumstances regarding some utterances of certain persons as
exclusionary reasons.'38 What are these grounds? Raz specifies two.
33 J. Raz 'Authority and Justification' 7; J. Raz The Morality ofFreedom 39.
34 See J. Raz 'On Legitimate Authority' 25; J. Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and
Morality 24-25; J. Raz 'Authority and Justification' 10; J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 42; J. Raz
Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 213.
35 See R.P. Wolff hi Defense of Anarchism (Berkeley, California: University of California
Press, 1998) chapter one.
36 R.P.Wolff In Defense ofAnarchism 19. . ■
37 J. Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 27.
38 J. Raz The Authority of.Law:"Essays on Law and Morality 27.
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The first - which he labels the 'dependence' thesis - maintains that '[a]ll
authoritative directives should be based, among other factors, on reasons which
, ' L.; ; u/s L yy
apply to the subjects of those - directives and which bear on the circumstances
covered by the directives.'39 An order, says Raz, is a 'dependent' reason as well
as a pre-emptive one.40 He depicts it as 'a reason for action which replaces the
reasons on the basis of which [the authority] was meant to decide.'41 Yet he does
not claim that it must actually be derived from the considerations that it
supersedes:
[T]he [dependence] thesis is not that authoritative determinations
are binding only if they correctly reflect the reasons on which they
depend. On the contrary, there is no point in having authorities
unless their determinations, are binding even if mistaken (though
some mistakes may disqualify them). The whole point and
purpose of authorities], djiria to preempt individual judgment on
the merits, and this will not be achieved if in order to establish
whether the authoritative determination is binding individuals
have to rely on their own judgment of the merits.42
The second ground of legitimacy is also consistent with (at least some)
erroneous commands. It states that '[t]he normal and primary way to establish
that a person should be acknowledged to have authority over another person
39 J. Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 214. See also J.
Raz 'Justification and Authority' 14; J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 47.
40 See J. Raz 'Authority and Justification' 9; J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 41; J. Raz Ethics in
the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality ofLaw and Politics 212.
41 J. Raz 'Authority and Justification' 10; J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 42; J. Raz Ethics in
the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 213.
42 J. Raz 'Authority and Justification' W; J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 47-48.
'iilife ■ .phvv -
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involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons
which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts
the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding, and tries to
follow them, than if he tries to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.'43
According to this 'normal-justification' thesis, the legitimacy of an authority
. i X : iYJfi'. • t> ■" -ixii
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typically depends on whether its application of the first-order reasons from
which its instructions should be derived is likely to be superior to that of its
subjects. Raz thus identifies an ability to 'improve conformity with reason' as
the principal determinant of legitimacy.44 Since '[pjeople differ in their
knowledge, skills, strength of character and understanding', however, he
believes that states generally lack this capacity and so are illegitimate.45
'[Bjecause of the bureaucratic necessity to generalize and disregard distinctions
too fine for large-scale enforcement and administration,' he says, 'some people
are able to do better if they refuse to acknowledge the authority of [the] law.'46
For Raz, therefore, an authority cannot be legitimate and its directives
cannot operate as exclusionary reasons unless it satisfies the requirements of
43 J. Raz 'Authority and Justification' 18-19; J. Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the
Morality of Law and Politics 214. For a formulation that is almost (but not entirely) identical, see J.
Raz The Morality ofFreedom 53.
44 J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 74.
45 J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 77-78. See also J. Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in
the Morality of Law and Politics 216.
46 J. Raz The Morality ofFreedom 78.
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both the dependence and normal-justification theses. In tandem, he says, 'the
two theses present a comprehensive view of the nature and role of legitimate
authority.'47 His summary of this view elucidates the connections between the
various aspects of his analysis - including the pre-emption thesis -and so merits
quotation in full:
[The dependence and normal-justification theses] articulate what I
shall call the service conception of authority. They regard
authorities as mediating between people and the right reasons
which apply to them, so that the authority judges and pronounces
what they ought to do according to right reason. The people for
their part take their cue from the authority whose pronouncements
replace for them the force of the dependent reasons. This last
implication of the service conception is made explicit in the pre¬
emption thesis. The mediating role of authority cannot be carried
out if its subjects do not guide their actions by its instructions
instead of by the reasons on which they are supposed to depend.
No blind obedience to authority is here implied. Acceptance of
authority has to be justified, and this normally means meeting the
conditions set in the justification thesis. This brings into play the
dependent reasons, for only if the authority's compliance with
them is likely to be better than that of its subjects is its claim to
legitimacy justified. At the level of general justification the pre¬
empted reasons have an important role to play. But once that level
has been passed and we. are concerned with particular action,
dependent reasons,-ore. replaced: by authoritative directives. To
count both as independent reasons is to be guilty of double
counting.48
J. Raz The Morality ofFreedom 55-56.
J. Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality ofLaw and Politics 214-215.
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This, then, is the conception of legitimate authority to which Raz grants priority
and in whose terms he portrays authority that is merely effective. It is a theory
that offers a moral explanation - via the dependence and normal-justification
theses - for the peremptory character of orders. Yet is it convincing?
Heidi Hurd does not think sp. She regards it as contradictory. In her
opinion, the normal-justification thesis conflicts with the pre-emption thesis. The
former, she says, necessitates reliance on the very reasons that the latter
excludes. She supposes that one cannot gauge the ability of an authority to boost
compliance with first-order reasons unless 'at each decision, one judges for
oneself the reasons for action, and compares one's judgment with that reached
by the authority.'49 Since this continuous assessment is at odds with the
exclusionary character for which it seeks to account, Hurd dismisses the
interpretation of authority that Raz advances.
But the premise of this (somewhat predictable50) objection is false. The
normal-justification thesis does not require evaluation of every directive that an
authority issues. Instead, it bases legitimacy on - to use Raz's expression -
'reasoned trust'.51 The assessment of relative expertise (or 'theoretical' authority)
for which it calls is - like a patient's judgment about the competence of a doctor
49 H.M. Hurd 'Challenging Authority' 100 Yale Law Journal (1991) 1611, at 1633.
50 On its inevitability, see H.M. Hurd 'Challenging Authority' 1633.
51 J. Raz Practical Reason and Norms 193.
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- an inference from limited knowledge (and thus partly a matter of faith) rather
than - as Hurd assumes - the product of incessant comparison. Given the rather
speculative - though far from whimsical - nature of the determination on which
it depends, it is wholly compatible with the pre-emption thesis for which Raz
claims that it provides support.
\ i- i J*"'' V \
Although Hurd's charge of contradiction fails, I submit that the service
conception nevertheless deviates from two of the other meta-theoretical ideals to
which I express my commitment in chapter one. By imposing moral constraints
on the pre-emption thesis, Raz flouts the values of clarity and
comprehensiveness. The limits that he places on exclusionary reasons are both
imprecise and at odds with everyday understandings of authority. My pure
critique of his moralistic theory brings the present section to a close.
Raz seeks to capture the peremptory nature of authority in the pre¬
emption thesis, which states that an order replaces 'some' of the reasons from
C'Y, •' gb' of oT'cr i i -
which it is - following the dependence thesis - meant to be derived. But which
!. ; ii Y i !W
first-order reasons does it supplant? What is the scale of its exclusion? If - as Raz
contends - pre-emption is contingent on legitimacy, then it cannot - despite his
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remarks to the contrary52 - take the place of all other reasons: it must at least
permit action on the considerations that relate to its own justification.
For Raz, relative expertise is the primary rationale for attributing
exclusionary force to the instructions of an authority. But he does not suppose
that the normal-justification thesis is the sole determinant of legitimacy. Among
other pertinent factors, he says, are reasons against treating authoritative
directives as pre-emptive.53 These reasons also limit the range of an order's
exclusion. Raz, though, is somewhat vague as to their identity and emphasises
that they differ from case to case.54 Nevertheless, he identifies two
considerations that he thinks are often relevant. The first is the existence of
'another person or institution with a better claim to be recognized as an
authority' and the second is 'the intrinsic desirability of people conducting their
own life by their own lights.'55
He regards certain injustices as reasons against pre-emption too.
Although he denies that every unjust directive is beyond the scope of exclusion
52 See J. Raz 'On Legitimate Authority' 23; J. Raz Practical Reason and Norms 40.
53 See J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 56; J. Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the
Morality of Law and Politics 214.
54 See J. Raz 'Authority and Justification' 14; J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 46; J. Raz Ethics
in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 214.
55 J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 57. On the latter, see also J. Raz 'Authority and
Justification' 29; J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 69; J. Raz Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the
Morality ofLaw and Politics 365-366.
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- if it were, he says, 'the advantage gained by accepting the authority as a more
reliable and successful guide to right reason would disappear'56 - he maintains
that 'some immoralities may be of a kind that no [person] has authority to
commit.'57 He describes the moral principles that these acts violate as 'general
limits' to authority.58 Yet what are these restrictions? Cursory references to
'individual liberty'59 and 'fundamental human rights'60 aside, he omits to say.
He cannot, moreover, resolve this ambiguity by asserting that jurisdictional - as
opposed to pre-empted - injustices are 'clear'.61 His mere declaration that they
i i vru^spfls,.. m - i.e. = r
are obvious is not sufficient to make them so.
''■? ■ - htf HI i •
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Because the moral constraints that Raz places on the exclusionary force of
commands are imprecise, he fails to articulate a clear account of the
peremptoriness that he considers the distinctive feature of authority. Yet this
lack of clarity is not the only problem with his moralistic interpretation: it also
deviates from conventional wisdom. In particular, it does not tally with the
common belief that peremptory instructions are absolute.62 By claiming that
56 J. Raz 'Authority and Justification' 25; J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 61.
57 J. Raz The Morality ofFreedom 79. '.'
58 J. Raz The Morality ofFl^dom^fTy ■ y'
59 J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 80.
60 J. Raz 'Authority and Justification' 14;. J.-.Raz The Morality of Freedom 46.
61 J. Raz 'Authority and Justification' 26; J. Raz The Morality of Freedom 62.
62 For evidence of this belief, see Oxford English Dictionary Online
<http://dictionary.oed.com>.
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orders are merely exclusive of some (because they are contingent on other)
'c '■-•i i:>. ! •
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reasons, Raz departs from the way in which authoritative directives are
normally understood. The moral conditions that he imposes on commands are
at odds with the finality that people generally ascribe to them.
His dismissal of popular opinion is apparent from his critique of Wolff.
According to the latter, orders are conclusive. They require, says Wolff, 'doing
what [someone] tells you to do because he tells you to do it.'63 In this sense, they
are doubly pre-emptive: they rule out practical consideration of their legitimacy
as well as their substance.64 Wolff thus follows Thomas Hobbes, for whom a
command exists 'where a man saith, Doe this, or Doe not this, without expecting
■ TV"!':. f'hs.' '■ w ' ■ 1 ' '
other reason than the Will of him that sayes it.'65 Hart agrees with Hobbes too:
[A] commander's expression of will [...] is not intended to
function within the hearer's deliberations as a reason for doing the
act, not even as the strongest or dominant reason, for that would
presuppose that independent deliberation was to go on, whereas
the commander intends to cut off or exclude it. This I think is
precisely what is meant by speaking of a command as 'requiring'
action and calling a command a 'peremptory' form of address.66
63 R.P.Wolff In Defense ofAnarchism 9.
64 On such double pre-emption, see P. Soper 'Legal Theory and the Claim of Authority' 18
Philosophy & Public Affairs (1989) 209, a: 216-217. ,,.
65 T. Hobbes Leviathan (Edited,, with an introduction by C.B. MacPherson) (London:
Penguin, 1985) 303.
66 H.L.A. Hart Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory 253.
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By defining orders as compatible with practical consideration of neither their
legitimacy nor their content, these philosophers offer an interpretation of
authority that better corresponds with everyday views than Raz's service
conception. Whereas they conceive of authority as absolute, he insists on its
moral limits and so disregards the ordinary meaning of peremptoriness. When
added to the imprecision of the conditions that he imposes on exclusionary
reasons, this lack of correspondence furnishes pure theorists with a second
ground on which to oppose his subordination of authority to legitimacy. For
y W. WiWWTv
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them, his moralistic theory is deficient in both clarity and comprehensiveness. In
i '■ i.V . i
the final section, therefore, I sketch a pure alternative to it. I believe that this
account provides a clear explanation for the sense of absoluteness that Raz
neglects.
Ill
Authority, I suggest, is a matter of acceptance.67 It depends on an actor's belief
that rules of a particular type include the ultimate justification for behaviour.
i». • . i -J' . i bC'i < ■ >
These norms are authoritative., By providing the actor with motivational - as
. rv i ■ IWinbi , y •.
opposed to mere epistemic - guidance, they exclude conduct on all (and not
67 The following remarks draw on (and suppose familiarity with) the account of
acceptance that I present in the second section of chapter one.
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merely some) other grounds. Since the decisive reason for action is among them,
the scope of their pre-emption is - pace Raz - unlimited. These norms are also
commands if they express the will of a person or persons other than the actor.
Hence, the peremptoriness of orders is due to their membership of a set of rules
that is the object of acceptance.
This alternative understanding captures the finality with which authority
is generally associated. Moreover, it elucidates the 'peculiar feeling of unease'
that Raz regards as a probable effect of conflict between authoritative norms and
those that they exclude.68 It relates this anxiety to the sense of absurdity that is
ifd. Sij-ce Si d■
liable to follow from the realisation that such pre-emption cannot be
rationalised.69 It is thus more comprehensive than the service conception, which
neither fits with the common belief that authority is conclusive nor accounts for
the disquiet that Raz observes.
Although the authoritative status - which is unlikely to be permanent -
of certain rules is not susceptible to justification, their exclusionary force might
be explained non-rationally. The temperament of the actor, the power of another
person or other people and the exercise of judgment are all possible causes of
it dds a
68 J. Raz Practical Reason and Norms 41. For discussion, see W.A. Edmundson 'Rethinking
Exclusionary Reasons: A Second Edition of Joseph Raz's Practical Reason and Norms' 12 Law and
Philosophy (1993) 329, at 333-336.
69 On this feeling of absurdity, see T. Nagel 'The Absurd' in Mortal Questions (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979).
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acceptance. Whether individually
^ or jointly, these facts might occasion the
* 1 '■ , ' , V : 1 ■
authority of a particular order of norms. They might, for instance, explain
someone's attribution of authority to the law.
Legal norms are authoritative whenever - which may not be often - they
include the decisive reason for action. Hence, the law itself motivates obedience
to it by a person for whom it has authority. He or she treats a legal obligation as
the ultimate justification for his or her behaviour and so complies with the law
for its own sake. Were the motivation for his or her obedience of any other kind,
he or she would ascribe authority to non-legal norms instead. To be consistent
' i'lft L lu.allV jrvj :
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with state-authority, then, judgments of legitimacy cannot be more than
hypothetical. Reliance on them implies participation in moral practice and
precludes the authority of the law.
From the incompatibility of legal authority with actual - as opposed to
virtual - engagement in moral discourse, Wolff thinks that anarchism results.70
Yet someone for whom the law is authoritative need not deny the legitimacy of
the state. Whether he or she does is determined by his or her reflection - as
distinct from action - on relevant principles of morality. A declaration of
"i(i • i t v ic r.f:)'
illegitimacy is no less dependent on consideration of these values than a claim
i. 'IK T
70 See R.P. Wolff In Defense ofAnarchism 19.
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that the law is legitimate. Both require the application of ideals whose practical
- but not academic - significance the authority of the law negates. I examine
some of these principles in chapter four. They supply content-independent
reasons for obedience and disobedience' to the law. Before looking at them,
'iu: ■ v
however, I try - in the next chapter - to make sense of moral values that justify
obedience and disobedience to the law on account of its substance.
'?v
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In the previous chapter, I tried to make sense of obedience to the law that results
from a belief in its authority by suggesting an alternative to Raz's moralistic
reading of such conduct. According to my pure analysis, the law has authority
insofar as it provides motivational guidance to its subjects. I define authority in
terms of acceptance: the set of rules to which the decisive justification for an
action belongs is authoritative. Hence, the law has authority for a man whose
refusal to commit an assault is ultimately motivated by the legal prohibition on
the use of actual or the threat of imminent physical force. Were the critical
reason for his restraint of another kind - were he primarily concerned to avoid
punishment, for example - then the law would, for him, lack authority.
■: ' .'"bA AM A.-'- "
This alternative conception precludes a rational explanation for the
■ r . •- ; ' . '• fTt
authority of a particular set of rules. Hence, someone for whom the law
(currently1) has authority must regard questions about the morality of a legal
demand as no more than hypothetical. Although this person might ask whether
1 Since constant participation in a single practice is unnecessary (and improbable) - see
chapter one - a person might (and is likely to) treat various sorts of rules as authoritative over
time.
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his or her fulfilment of a legal duty is morally justified, only hermeneutic
observation of moral practice and an answer without practical implications can
follow. Yet not every moral assessment of the law lacks categorical force: the
ultimate justification for deliberate compliance with or violation of a primary
rule is often moral.2 Many (and probably all3) people are (at least sometimes4)
inspired by morality to obey or disobey the law. For them, moral norms
(frequently, if not always) have authority and the guidance that the legal system
provides is merely epistemic. Their behaviour (on these occasions) is my topic in
this and the next chapter.
To understand such responses to the law, a philosopher - regardless of
the methodology on which he or she relies - must make sense of the values that
moral actors cite in defence of their obedience and disobedience to legal
demands. The justifications that these ideals provide are of two sorts: a moral
reason for satisfying or breaching a legal obligation is either dependent on or
independent of the substance of the obligation.5
2 I discuss the distinction between primary and secondary rules (and the impossibility of
obedience or disobedience to the latter) in the first section of chapter one.
3 On the implausibility of a life that is wholly amoral, see B. Williams 'The Amoralist' in
Morality (Canto edition) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
4 Constant acceptance of moral norms is no more likely than their complete rejection: see
section two of chapter one.
5 Many theorists deny that obedience extends to compliance with the law for a content-
dependent moral reason. For them, a moral justification for obedience to the law must be
content-independent: see, for example, A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral
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The existence of a reason of the former type is determined exclusively by
moral evaluation of the specific actioh.whose performance the law requires. This
of . T; f.iiat'!■ .'h
is normally a matter of justice. If the action is consonant with a principle of
justice, there is a content-dependent reason to comply with the legal rule that
prescribes it. If the action is contrary to such a principle, though, there is a
reason of the same kind not to do so. Moreover, the value of compassion -
which is known as mercy when it requires a departure from justice - sometimes
furnishes a moral agent - whether male or female6 - with a content-dependent
reason to adhere to or infringe a primary rule. Obedience is warranted by the
substance of a legal norm if the deed that it enjoins its subjects to perform
: TO it ivU.T&V.'vK
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happens to be compassionate/ whereas a content-dependent reason for
disobedience exists if conduct that the law forbids has this quality. Justice,
however, is the typical source of these moral reasons - hence the title of the
present chapter, which focuses on them.
Duties' in C.H. Wellman & A.J. Simmons Is There a Duty to Obey the Law? (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005) 95. Yet these theorists - see 190-191 of Simmons's paper - do
not place a similar restriction on the meaning of disobedience. Since neither the value of
comprehensiveness nor any other meta-theoretical norm requires the asymmetry on which they
insist, I reject it.
6 Although Carol Gilligan associates the 'ethic of care' with women, she admits that the
correlation is not absolute: see C. Gilligan In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development (Cambridge, Mass.Y'Harvard-University Press, 1982) 2.
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I examine moral reasons that belong to the second category in the next
chapter. The existence of a reason of.this type is contingent on moral appraisal
. ijjgsn 'hi ? Li!
■ ' ' V'i* ' ■ '.tii.-uvfj.V:-;!; ••
of something other than the action on which the law insists. It depends, I
suggest, on the moral significance of either the simple fact that the law requires
the action or, instead, the process from which the legal duty results. I explore
both of these options in chapter four. I argue that contemplation of whether the
mere existence of a legal demand - as distinct from its content or its genesis -
affords a moral reason to comply with it is equivalent to reflection on the issue
of 'political obligation'. My chief concern, therefore, is the very nature of such an
obligation. In contrast, my discussion of the procedural explanation that moral
. ■ a, . .-.jii'j'ii ..'d
agents often give for their obedience to the law is more specific: I ask whether
; ft' ;
the supposedly 'democratic' creation of a primary rule generates a moral reason
•i f ,.i
to act in accordance with it.
My immediate objective, however, is to make sense of the moral values
that supply content-dependent reasons for obedience and disobedience to the
law. My understanding of these ideals is contingent on the general theory of
morality to which I subscribe. Many philosophers endorse an account of moral
practice called 'value-monism'. They hold that one value or a small group of
.. by,ti
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compatible values is the origin of all others.7 I delineate their theory in the
opening section of this chapter. Then - in the second section - I outline Isaiah
Berlin's rejection of it. Berlin denies the existence of a sovereign value or values
from which the rest are derived. He advocates 'value-pluralism'.
Ronald Dworkin claims that Berlin's alternative to value-monism lacks
philosophical support. According to Dworkin, a theory of morality must be
moralistic. He insists on a moral explanation for the meaning of each value and
dismisses value-pluralism for failing to meet this requirement (or, more
precisely, a modified version of it). Yet he ignores pure interpretation as a
means by which Berlin (or, indeed, any philosopher) might defend value-
pluralism. In section three, I argue that Berlin's account of moral discourse
satisfies the meta-theoretical standards of clarity, consistency,
comprehensiveness and coherence and, therefore, that methodological
■- fa MYtnhrh. Hh ' 1
arguments exist for both descriptions of morality.
Given my commitment to pure interpretation, I obviously think that
value-pluralism is a better theory of moral practice and thus the proper source
of content-dependent reasons for obedience and disobedience to the law. Yet
one might protest that it is often unable to solve conflicts between moral ideals
7 Given the second option, the label 'value-monism' might seem inappropriate. I
comment on this apparent misnomer in the next section.
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in the absence of an ultimate value or values from which the rest originate.
Notwithstanding my recognition of both the need for a means of settling these
clashes and the failure of value-pluralism to specify a reliable method for doing
so, I dismiss this objection. It is based on the false premise that the solution to
every moral problem must be entirely theoretical. In section four, I present
another way of dealing with conflicts between moral ideals. Then - in the final
section - I further clarify value-pluralism by reflecting on the popular opinion
that it entails liberalism.
I
An understanding of the values that provide moral agents with content-
dependent reasons to obey and disobey the law follows from an overall
description of morality. A common position in moral philosophy is value-
monism, which I examine in the current section. My objective here is limited: I
aim merely to introduce the principal elements of this theory. Only later - in
:>■' fi1 .v-p.'utfj]',.? bi¬
section three - do I consider (methodological) arguments for and against it.
Philosophical descriptions of moral practice often depict one or a
restricted and coherent set of the values on which participants rely as the origin
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of all others.8 Perhaps the' most prominent example of this stance is
utilitarianism, which looks upon utility - whether calculated in terms of
pleasure-maximisation or preference-satisfaction - as the supreme value from
which every other results.9 But utilitarianism is not the sole brand of value-
monism. Alternative versions include that espoused by Ronald Dworkin, for
whom the two principles of 'ethical individualism' - namely, 'equal importance'
and 'special responsibility' - are primary.10 Although Dworkin rejects the
supremacy of utility, he agrees with utilitarians (and others) about the general
. $. A
structure of morality.
4 ■ A tqqd, '''PA
I say much more about Dworkin's theory in section three. An immediate
k.'w .
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explanation of its classification as a species of value-monism is necessary,
however, given that it assigns sovereignty to more than one value. To
characterise Dworkin's account of morality as 'monistic' might seem odd. Yet
the compatibility of the two values that constitute ethical individualism justifies
8 On this phenomenon, see C. Larmore Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987) 10.
9 For a classical statement of utilitarianism, see J. Bentham An Introduction to the Principles
ofMorals and Legislation (Edited by J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart) (London: Athlone Press, 1970).
10 See R. Dworkin 'Do Liberty and Equality Conflict?' in P. Barker (ed.) Living as Equals
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) 42-43; R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and
Practice of Equality (Cambridge, Mass:: Harvard'University Press, 2000) 5-7. Dworkin also refers
to these norms (individually) as the principle of 'intrinsic value' and the principle of 'personal
responsibility' and (collectively) as the 'dimensions of human dignity': see R. Dworkin Is
Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2006) chapter one.
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the application of this epithet to his theory. By 'acting in concert',11 these values
function as one. Their equivalence to a single ideal accounts for Dworkin's
status as a value-monist.
}.; ■ : I .ijli-J ' 1
From my initial description of value-monism, one might infer that its
I ,v 1 ru ' V '
proponents doubt the reality of the ideals that they deem subordinate. Yet they
do not dispute the existence of these values. Their theories of moral practice
acknowledge the many values to which participants refer. Nevertheless, value-
monists ascribe mere instrumental worth to all but a sovereign value or - as in
Dworkin's case - values. Utilitarians, for instance, claim that utility alone is
desirable for its own sake and that the remaining values - liberty, equality and
so on - are desirable only for the sake of utility.12 Value-monists thus recognise
numerous ideals, but attribute intrinsic worth to almost none of them.
. dps,.; UN?'
Due to their belief in a value or values to which each of the rest is simply
a means, these theorists offer a solution to every moral problem. They hold that
all moral behaviour is ultimately - even if not directly - justified by this value or
11 R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 6. See also R. Dworkin Is
Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate 11.
12 See, for example, John Stuart Mill's analysis of justice: J.S. Mill 'Utilitarianism' in On
Liberty and Other Essays (Edited with an Introduction and Notes by John Gray) (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1991) chapter V.
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these values. For value-monists, then, no moral dilemma is real.13 They treat
ostensible conflicts between values as no more than evidence of a failure to
grasp the instrumental nature of all but a sovereign value or values. A genuine
clash is impossible between a value and another or others from which it
originates. Moreover, the common source from which secondary values
allegedly derive permits their comparison whenever they require inconsistent
actions. Their purported homogeneity renders them commensurable and allows
for a rational choice between them.
Hence, value-monists assert the compatibility of every moral ideal. This
harmony follows from their contention that a single value or a small bunch of
congruent values is the source of the rest. Yet the unity that these theorists
perceive is not universally acknowledged. Indeed, Isaiah Berlin regards it as
tfivi; vyaha-'' ur
'demonstrably false'.14 His rejection of value-monism is my topic in the next
section.
13 On the prevalence of this view, see C.W. Gowans 'Introduction: The Debate on Moral
Dilemmas' in C.W. Gowans (ed.) Moral Dilemmas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) 4.
14 I. Berlin 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in Liberty (Edited by H. Hardy, with an essay on
Berlin and his critics by I. Harris) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 214.
V'Vllf',!* v
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II
According to Berlin, moral ideals are often incompatible. Whereas value-
monists dismiss such conflicts as merely apparent, Berlin insists on their
authenticity. He states:
I cannot conceive of any world in which certain values can be
reconciled. I believe, in other words, that some of the ultimate
values by which men live cannot be reconciled or combined, not
just for practical reasons, but in principle, conceptually. Nobody
can be both a careful planner, and, at the same time, wholly
spontaneous. You cannot combine full liberty with full equality -
full liberty for the wolves cannot be combined with full liberty for
the sheep. Justice and mercy, knowledge and happiness can
collide. If that is true, then the idea of a perfect solution of human
problems - of how to live - cannot be coherently conceived. It is
not that such a perfect harmony cannot be created, because of
practical difficulties, the very idea of it is conceptually incoherent.
Utopian solutions are in principle incoherent and unimaginable.
Such solutions want to combine the uncombinable.15
Berlin denies that practical obstacles - which presumably include limited time
and deficient knowledge - cause genuine clashes between moral ideals. To the
extent that congruence is a theoretical {even if not an immediate) option, real
1 . ea but ic p . > ' ■
conflict is absent. Instead; says 'Berlin, the frequent incompatibility of values is
15 I. Berlin in R. Jahanbegloo Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (London: Phoenix Press, 2000)
142.
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due to the nature of morality. More specifically, he thinks that the impossibility
of 'perfect harmony' follows from value-pluralism.16
This theory of moral practice entails regular conflict between the values
that participants accept. It is, therefore, distinct from (but nevertheless
consistent with) the 'reasonable pluralism' that John Rawls discusses in his later
work.17 Whereas value-pluralists speak of tensions between moral ideals, Rawls
is concerned with disputes between moral agents. Reasonable pluralism, for
Rawls, means a diversity of moral opinions. In contrast, Berlin's pluralism is a
lb ' ■ r '\ ruV-v- | '
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theory of the values from which these assorted views develop. Were such
dissensus an inevitable consequence of Berlin's version of morality, then the two
forms of pluralism would, of course, not be separate. Yet an account of moral
practice - namely, value-pluralism - to which many participants do not
subscribe obviously cannot be an explanation for disagreement between them.
Whatever causes their disputes, it is not value-pluralism. So - despite George
Crowder's claim to the contrary18 - the two types of pluralism are distinct.
16 For discussion, see J. Gray Ppst-lib.eralipm:Studies in Political Thought (London: Routledge,
1993) 67; S. Morgenbesser & J. Lieberson (Isaiah Berlin' in E. & A. Margalit (eds) Isaiah Berlin: A
Celebration (London: The Hogarth Press, 1991) 6; B. Parekh Contemporary Political Thinkers
(Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982) 35; B. Williams 'Introduction' in I. Berlin Concepts and
Categories: Philosophical Essays (Edited by H.' Hardy, with an introduction by B. Williams)
(London: Pimlico, 1999) xviii.
17 The principal text is J. Rawls Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press,
1996).
18 See G. Crowder Liberalism and Value Pluralism (London: Continuum, 2002) 165-171.
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Berlin's theory can also be differentiated from relativism. That values
often clash does not mean that they exist only within particular (and not across
Gy\" 'ijUpera-f (ipi • 1 •
all) cultures. Indeed, Berlin insists 'on the universality of some ideals.19 But one
■111,.
can separate value-pluralism and relativism without rejecting the latter. To
make this distinction, one might simply note that value-pluralism is consistent
with both universalism and relativism.20 One need not choose between these
possibilities. My refusal to do so in this thesis - I cannot hope to make a
satisfactory contribution to the debate between relativists and universalists here
- is indicated by the absence of both the definite and the indefinite article
whenever I use the expression 'moral practice'.
I I !. Il l - ''0j ! ..
If value-pluralism implies, neither moral disagreement nor relativism,
did y'Tkfte \ ■
then what does it signify? How does it explain the collisions between moral
ideals in which its proponents believe? Value-pluralists allege not only that
morality consists of numerous values - this opinion is consistent with value-
monism - but also that a large number of values have inherent worth.21 The
distinctive claim of value-pluralists is that various ideals are intrinsically
19 For an excellent summary of Berlin's (often imprecise) views on this topic, see G.
Crowder Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) 19-20, 116-123, 132-
134. See also G. Crowder Liberalism and Value Pluralism 3-4, 45-46; S. Lukes Liberals & Cannibals:
The Implications ofDiversity (London: Verso, 2003) 100-106.
20 One might say the same about value-monism. The values that such a theory combines
might be either peculiar to a specific culture or common to all cultures.
„ it \ j net-21 See G. Crowder Liberalism and Value Pluralism 48-49.
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desirable. While value-monists place no more than one or a few of the values to
which moral agents refer in this category, theorists such as Berlin hold that
many values are ends-in-themselves.22 Insofar as some of the ideals to which
• •' 1 ;f ' ■■
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value-pluralists attribute.^ih^ripisjtC'-"'wprth actually share the same name,
moreover, their total number is even greater than one might initially suppose.23
But it is fewer that the sum of all moral ideals. Value-pluralists need not regard
every value as ultimate and, in fact, classify several as purely instrumental.
Crucially, no rational comparison is possible between values whose
worth is intrinsic. Such appraisal requires a 'covering' value in terms of which
their relative significance might be explained.24 But the necessary homogeneity
cannot exist between values that are ends-in-themselves. Since the worth of
these ideals is not conditional on the degree to which they meet a further
- ti|V/$i/; • :
standard, they are incommensurable. The absence of a common value by which
to assess them entails that none can be better than or equal to any other.25
22 See, for instance, I. Berlin in S. Lukes 'Isaiah Berlin: In Conversation with Steven Lukes'
120 Salmagundi (1998) 52, at 101.
23 According to Berlin, for instance, at least two such values are called 'liberty': see I. Berlin
'Two Concepts of Liberty'.
24 See R. Chang 'Introduction' in R. Chang (ed.) Incommensurability, Incompatibility and
Practical Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
25 On incommensurability as incomparability, see J. Raz The Morality of Freedom (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1986) 335-345. See also J. Gray Berlin (London: Fontana, 1995) 49-53; J. Gray
Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age (London: Routledge, 1995)
69-70; S. Lukes Liberals & Cannibals: The Implications ofDiversity 63-64.
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This incomparability accounts for the persistent conflict between moral
ideals that value-pluralists describe. The authenticity of these clashes follows
from the incommensurability of the values involved.26 No covering value can
resolve the incompatibility of values that are desirable in themselves. Berlin thus
dismisses the possibility of reconciliation between, for example, liberty and
• *' ill. .v ? . H.V- j • :
equality. By ascribing intrinsic worth to both of these values, he denies that a
third value might prevent genuine conflict between them.
Yet value-pluralists do not suppose that all values collide. In fact, Berlin
notes that '[a] good many values are perfectly compatible'.27 Conflict obviously
cannot exist between an instrumental value and its source. Moreover, some
ultimate values might always fit together. Notwithstanding their
incommensurability, they may never actually be at odds with one another. Were
they to clash, however, their inherent worth would ensure the authenticity of
the conflict between them. Finally, collisions between instrumental values with
a common origin are merely apparent. For secondary values really to clash, they
must be means to different and contradictory ends. Their incompatibility is
parasitic on (and, therefore, might be translated into) friction between the
incommensurable values from which they derive.
26 See C.W. Gowans 'Introduction: The Debate on Moral Dilemmas' 29.
27 I. Berlin in S. Lukes 'Isaiah Berlin: In Conversation with Steven Lukes' 101. See also C.W.
Gowans 'Introduction: The Debate on Moral Dilemmas' 13.
131
Moral Reasons I: Justice
To the extent that moral ideals conflict, they might do so in two distinct
ways. The incompatibility of some values may be absolute. These values can
never be realised simultaneously. According to Onora O'Neill, clashes of this
kind are 'intrinsic'.28 Alternatively, conflict between values might be limited to
specific circumstances. O'Neill calls tension of this sort 'contingent'.29 It is, she
says, 'the stuff of life and literature: telling the truth will sometimes (but not
always) injure somebody; rescuing somebody from danger can sometimes (as in
Kant's example, but not always) require a lie.'30 Although dependent on
particular circumstances, conflict of this type - including that between equality
and liberty - is still due to the incomparability of the values involved. Its cause
is theoretical, not practical. Whether intrinsic or contingent, the incompatibility
of values always results from their incommensurability.
AA \) Y ■ T? '■ I--.,
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Such incomparability means that loss is a necessary consequence of both
■ ' \:i
species of conflict. A 'trade-off' is impossible between two values whose worth
is inherent: more of one cannot compensate for less of another. Instead, one of
28 See O. O'Neill Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 158-159; O. O'Neill Bounds of Justice
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 59.
29 See O. O'Neill Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning
159; O. O'Neill Bounds ofJustice 59.
30 O. O'Neill Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account ofPractical Reasoning 159.
i tor: > i heir inobam : t
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these values must be 'sacrificed' if they clash.31 It must be relinquished (rather
than exchanged) for the other. Berlin recognises that both of these values cannot
be preserved and that the unavoidable loss of one might even (but need not32) be
tragic:
Liberty and equality, spontaneity and security, happiness and
knowledge, mercy and justice - all these are ultimate human
values, sought for themselves alone; yet when they are
incompatible, they cannot all be attained, choices must be made,
sometimes tragic losses accepted in the pursuit of some preferred
ultimate end.33
Berlin, then, denies the possibility of moral unity. He holds that many (and not
merely one or a few) of the values on which moral agents rely are ends-in-
themselves. The incommensurability of these ultimate ideals explains his belief
in the authenticity of clashes between them. His value-pluralism thus
contradicts an account of morality to which many philosophers subscribe. In the
next section, I consider Dworkin's response.
31 On the metaphors of 'trade-off' and 'sacrifice', see S. Lukes Liberals & Cannibals: The
Implications of Diversity 66-67.
32 I say more about the contingency (as opposed to the inevitability) of such tragedy in
section four.
33 I. Berlin 'My Intellectual Path' in The First and the Last (London: Granta Books, 1999) 77.
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III
According to Dworkin, value-pluralists fail to justify their understanding of
morality. They cannot, he says, simply assume that values conflict: to do so
'begs the question'.34 He warns them against 'any lazy conclusion' about the
character of moral practice and declares that they 'must do the work' on which
their theory depends.35 More precisely, he claims that they must provide a moral
J : • • cU:.S f* i; ' v i '}') '
explanation for the meaning of each value. Since they do not meet this
requirement (or, rather, a modified version of it), he concludes that their critique
of value-monism lacks philosophical support.
Although Dworkin is correct about the need for justification, he is wrong
to conclude that none other than moralistic interpretation is available. In this
section, I point out that he ignores the option of pure interpretation and suggest
that this alternative methodology actually supports value-pluralism. My
argument is in three parts. I start by examining Dworkin's case for value-
. . cr pY, eisely. m.c : > ; 1
monism. I then contemplate a methodological puzzle that he and all like-
< . . A
minded theorists must solve. Finally, I present value-pluralism as a pure
interpretation of moral practice.
34 R. Dworkin Justice in Robes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006) 113.
35 R. Dworkin 'Do Values Conflict? A Hedgehog's Approach' 43 Arizona Law Review (2001)
251, at 259.
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Dworkin asks how a value-pluralist might account for conflict between
moral ideals. Given the persistent lack of consensus about the meaning of these
values, he denies that the language of moral actors - whether historical or
contemporary - can be decisive.36 Hence, he dismisses lexicography as a method
on which a value-pluralist might rely and stresses the need for a critical theory
of morality.37 Moreover, he rejects the possibility - which he rightly calls
'nonsense' - that scientific analysis of moral values reveals their essence.38
Instead, he insists on interpretation of a different sort. He believes that the
meaning of a moral value is necessarily a moral issue.39 To make sense of such
an ideal, he says, a philosopher must 'understand what is good about it.'40
Hence, value-pluralists 'must confront the difficult question of how to identify a
value's value.'41
.■ \ I.-.: /»• :en.-c i
Does Berlin engage in analysis of this sort? His methodology is not
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obvious - as Crowder remarks, 'he nowhere provides any extended defence of
36 See R. Dworkin 'Do Values Conflict? A Hedgehog's Approach' 254-255; R. Dworkin
Justice in Robes 113-114,150-152,153-154.
37 On the need for interpretation and the idea of critical morality, see section four of
chapter one.
38 R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 152-153. See also R. Dworkin 'Do Liberty and Equality
Conflict?' 41; R. Dworkin 'Do Values Conflict? A Hedgehog's Approach' 255; R. Dworkin Justice
in Robes 113.
39 See, for example, R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 113.
40 R. Dworkin 'Do Values Conflict? A Hedgehog's Approach' 255. See also R. Dworkin 'Do
Liberty and Equality Conflict?' 40.
41 R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 156.
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pluralism's truth'42 - but one might think that he practises a consequentialist
form of moralistic interpretation when he contends that a value-pluralist is less
likely than a value-monist to bring about tyranny.43 Then again, he might simply
regard this alleged effect as an incidental benefit of (as distinct from a
justification for) his moral theory. Besides - as Steven Lukes observes44 - Berlin
offers no reason to associate a belief in value-monism more closely with this
political outcome. He does not establish a necessary connection between the
tyrannical inclinations of the value-monists to whom he refers and the type of
moral theory that they endorse. In addition, he says nothing about the terrible
conclusions with which value-pluralism is arguably consistent. According to
Dworkin, a value-pluralist might tolerate extreme poverty due to a perceived
conflict between its eradication and the liberty of the rich.45 Even if Berlin
.. ;.'i:
employs moralistic interpretation, then, he does so unconvincingly.
Dworkin does not make sense of moral values by investigating their
practical consequences. Rather, he purports to explain each of them in terms of
at least one other. Take, for instance, the value of liberty. Dworkin defines it as
42 G. Crowder Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism 131.
43 See, for example, I. Berlin 'Two Concepts of Liberty' 212.
44 See S. Lukes in 'Discussion: Hedgehogs and Foxes' in M. Lilla, R. Dworkin & R. Silvers
(eds) The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin (New York: New York Review Books, 2001) 61. See also G.
Crowder Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism 129-130.
45 See R. Dworkin 'Do Values Conflict? A Hedgehog's Approach' 259; R. Dworkin Justice
in Robes 106.
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'freedom to spend your own rightful resources or deal with your own rightful
property in whatever way seems best to you.'46 By construing liberty with
reference to moral entitlements, Dworkin merges it with his theory of material
equality, which gauges sameness according to people's resources (as opposed
to, say, their welfare or their opportunities).47 He regards liberty as an 'aspect' of
... * i. ■'
this version of equality.4& Yet he also thinks that the latter is 'sensitive' to the
former.49 In his opinion, liberty and equality are 'interconnected'.50 Moreover, he
combines both of them with the rest of the ideals of which political morality
consists. He provides 'interpretations of each of these values that reinforce the
others - a conception of democracy, for example, that serves equality and
liberty, and conceptions of each of these other values that serves democracy so
understood.'51 Dworkin thus portrays the ideals of political morality 'in the light
of each other.'52
. i.'.'i >i.pc,■ am :•:■:
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46 R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 112. See also R. Dworkin 'Do Liberty and Equality Conflict?'
53; R. Dworkin 'Do Values Conflict? A Hedgehog's Approach' 254; R. Dworkin Is Democracy
Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate 69-70.
47 For an extended statement of this theory, see R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and
Practice ofEquality.
48 R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 121.
49 R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 122.
50 R. Dworkin in 'Discussion: Pluralism' in M. Lilla, R. Dworkin & R. Silvers (eds) The
Legacy of Isaiah Berlin (New York: New York Review Books, 2001) 135.
51 R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 161. See also R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and
Practice of Equality 4; R. Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate
134.
52 R. Dworkin in 'Discussion: Pluralism' 135.
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How does he explain such unity? He justifies his account of these values
(and their compatibility) with reference to a further notion of equality. More
specifically, he obtains the meaning of each of them from the principle that
government ought to display the same concern for every citizen. He claims that
equality of this type is 'the sovereign virtue of political community'.53 Dworkin
elevates equal concern above the other ideals of political morality and relies on
it to support his understanding of them. Just as he declares that the value of
legality is the function of law and the moral criterion by which the success of a
legal theory must be determined,54 so he holds that equal concern is the purpose
of political morality - 'without it government is only tyranny'55 - and the
essential justification for a political theory. On the assumption that competing
•; i J . i, -v '
analyses of a political ideal fit sufficiently with the existing convictions of moral
■ tne Sv,n '. y ■
actors - an interpretation must not be 'artificial or alien'56 - then Dworkin
•
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discriminates between them according to the value of equal concern. He looks
upon different conceptions of material equality, for example, as 'rival answers to
the question of what system of property would meet that standard.'57 He also
53 R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice ofEquality 1.
54 For discussion, see section five of chapter one.
55 R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 1.
56 R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 162. See also R. Dworkin 'Do Liberty and Equality Conflict?'
41-42; R. Dworkin in 'Discussion: Pluralism' 135; R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 114.
57 R. Dworkin Law's Empire (London: Fontana, 1986) 296.
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uses the norm of equal concern to assess proposed definitions of liberty.58
Hence, Dworkin defends his account of political morality (and dismisses
alternative theories, including utilitarianism59) by appealing to 'the abstract
responsibility [of government] to treat each citizen's fate as equally important.'60
If a philosopher cannot describe a moral ideal without reference to at
least one other, then Dworkin must specify the value or values on which his
understanding of equal concern depends. He complies with this (self-imposed)
requirement by situating his political theory within 'a general moral outlook'
that he calls 'ethical individualism'.61 In doing so, he 'connects the political
structure not only to morality more generally but to ethics as well.'62 He thus
rejects the division in Rawls's later work between 'political' and
'comprehensive' theories of morality.63
'Ethical individualism' comprises the principles of 'equal importance'
■ .iuv'i.-i 'dikilifbtjo
and 'special responsibility'. The first of these precepts declares that 'it is
58 See, for instance, R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 114-115.
59 See R. Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (New Impression with a Reply to Critics)
(London: Duckworth, 1978) 275; R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality
11.
60 R. Dworkin Law's Empire 296.
61 R. Dworkin 'Do Liberty and Equality Conflict?' 42. See also R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue:
The Theory and Practice of Equality 4.
62 R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 161.
63 See R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 4-5; R. Dworkin
Justice in Robes 161; R. Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate 63-
66. On this distinction, see J. Rawls Political Liberalism.
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important, from an objective point of view, that human lives be successful rather
than wasted, and this is equally important, from that objective point of view, for
each human life.'64 The second principle qualifies the first: '[Tjhough we must all
recognize the equal objective importance of the success of a human life, one
person has a special and final responsibility for that success - the person whose
life it is.'65 Dworkin acquires the import of equal concern from 'these two
principles acting in concert.'66 He states:
The first principle requires government to adopt laws and policies
that insure that its citizens' fates are, so far as government can
achieve this, insensitive to who they otherwise are - their
economic backgrounds, gender, race, or particular sets of skills
and handicaps. The second principle demands that government
work, again, so far as it can achieve this, to make their fates
sensitive to the choices they have made.67
Dworkin's political theory is 'shaped by these twin demands.'68 He thinks that
they combine to give meaning to equal concern and so to every other political
ideal (given his subordination of the latter to the former). Hence, he seeks 'an
interpretation of liberty and equality that shows that these ideals respect and
!. 11 <t stu fds ■ •
64 R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 5. See also R. Dworkin
'Do Liberty and Equality Conflict?' 42; R. Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a
New Political Debate 9-10.
i
65 R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory' and Practice of Equality 5. See also R. Dworkin
'Do Liberty and Equality Conflict?' 43; R. Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a
New Political Debate 10.
66 R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 6. See also R. Dworkin
'Do Liberty and Equality Conflict?' 44.
67 R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 6.
68 R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 7.
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enforce the two principles of ethical individualism'.69 According to Dworkin,
only his account of liberty and equality passes this test. Berlin's description of
these values, he says, does not: 'Liberty and equality, properly understood as
protecting the principles of ethical individualism, are not conflicting ideals.'70
Indeed, Dworkin's reliance on the norms of equal importance and special
responsibility leads him to accuse value-pluralists of transforming liberty and
equality from goods into evils.71
Dworkin, then, makes sense of political morality with reference to the
ideal of equal concern, whose definition he attains from the complementary
requirements of ethical individualism. But whence does he derive his reading of
the principles of equal importance and special responsibility? His belief in the
need to explain every moral ideal in terms of at least one other obliges him to
specify the value or values from which they emanate. Their apparent status as
the ultimate moral norms, however, precludes such analysis. To avoid an
infinite regress, Dworkin must qualify his stated methodology and exempt the
tenets of ethical individualism from the moralistic interpretation to which he
subjects every other value. The need to locate these principles beyond moral
69 R. Dworkin 'Do Liberty and Equality Conflict?' 42.
70 R. Dworkin 'Do Liberty and Equality Conflict?' 57-58.
71 See R. Dworkin 'Do Liberty and Equality Conflict?' 41; R. Dworkin 'Do Values Conflict?
A Hedgehog's Approach' 255-256; R. Dworkin Justice in Robes 115-116.
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appraisal requires him to supply an alternative rationale for them. But he fails to
indicate the non-moral support' oh which his defence of value-monism rests.
Given this deficiency, I now review some ways in which he might explain the
moral values that he regards as sovereign. My consideration of these
possibilities is not only relevant to Dworkin's theory: every form of value-
monism depends on a solution to the methodological puzzle of how to justify
the value or values of which the others are supposedly mere aspects.
Since the hierarchy that value-monists propose cannot be deduced from
any moral norm - as both Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill realise72 - then
perhaps it can be established by induction. According to Mill, the primacy of
sup 'Art on . m
utility is implied by the psychological fact that people want only to be happy.73
h-
From his claim that happiness is the sole aspiration of every human being, he
infers that utility is the supreme value from which all others originate. But Mill's
reasoning is problematic. Even if one accepts its logic - and many do not - its
factual basis is at least doubtful.
Although distinct, a natural-law explanation for the sovereignty of a
value or values is no more promising. In contrast to Mill's empirical argument, a
72 They acknowledge that no moral reason can be given for the prior status of utility: see J.
Bentham An Introduction to the Princtyles;ofiMorals;and Legislation chapter I, paragraph 11; J.S. Mill
'Utilitarianism' chapters I, IV.
73 See J.S. Mill 'Utilitarianism' chapter IV. For discussion, see R. Crisp Mill on Utilitarianism
(London: Routledge, 1997) chapter four.
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natural lawyer declares that the structure of morality is embedded in the fabric
of the universe. Yet this metaphysical (and somewhat mystical) proposition is
no more compelling than the pre\mise on which Mill relies.
Due to the implausibility of these two explanations, a value-monist might
instead argue that the supremacy of a value or values fits with pervasive (even if
merely implicit) beliefs about morality. In other words, he or she might regard
the opinions of moral actors (rather than psychology or natural law) as proof
that a specific value or a limited combination of values ranks above all others.
One might think that Dworkin takes this approach when he asserts that the
principles of equal importance and special responsibility 'are very widely
accepted in contemporary humanist societies'.74 Yet he never purports to justify
these norms in terms of the agreement on them that he perceives. Instead, he
maintains only that such apparent unity provides a 'common ground' from
which political disputes ought to start.75 His discussion of the extent to which
people believe in the principles of ethical individualism is motivated exclusively
by his distress at the current state of American politics and his desire to 'find
shared principles of sufficient substance to make a national political debate
74 R. Dworkin 'Do Liberty and Equality Conflict?' 42.
75 See R. Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate chapter
one.
■ :h agreep", ml o
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possible and profitable.'76 Nowhere does he suggest that these principles are
actually justified by the consensus that he depicts.
Even though Dworkin does not practise this method of explanation,
another value-monist might do so. Moreover, he or she might illustrate the
moral agreement on which it depends by telling a story. Reference to fictional
circumstances is a common tactic among moral philosophers for whom a value
or a small number of values is prior to every other. Because such hierarchy is
consistent with the intrinsic worth of non-sovereign ideals - as John Rawls
recognises, a solution to the 'priority problem' need not be 'single-principled'77 -
these philosophers might reject value-monism. In addition, their story-telling
strategy can be employed by other theorists whose aims are less ambitious than
a comprehensive understanding of morality.
Robert Nozick, for instance, devises a scenario involving Wilt
Chamberlain, a famous basketball player, in support of his elevation of a
. !( ■.;. • rn'Oi i ■ '
particular conception of freedom over other political ideals.78 Unlike value-
\ ?.t ».:• Jp I i
76 R. Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here ? Principles for a New Political Debate 6.
77 See J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)
36-40.1 say more about his theory below.
78 He also appeals to the notion of self-ownership, but I need not consider this aspect of his
case for libertarianism here. For discussion of it, see G.A. Cohen Self-Ownership, Freedom, and
Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) chapter three; A.H. Goldman 'The
Entitlement Theory of Distributive Justice' 73 Journal of Philosophy (1976) 823; W. Kymlicka
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (2nd edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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monists - whose interest is morality as a whole - Nozick is concerned merely
with the political elements of moral discourse. Yet the sort of defence that he
provides for his libertarianism might also be offered by moral theorists -
including value-monists - for whom a value or values is prior to all (and not
only some) of the rest. I thus consider this method of explanation by looking at
his use of it.
Nozick begins by asking his reader to imagine a society in which the
distribution of property is - according to his reader's definition - just. He calls
"a! Rearor. s
this allocation Di. He then States:
' ■ V'ilv ;,y; ; •
Now suppose that Wilt Chamberlain is greatly in demand by
basketball teams, being a great gate attraction. (Also suppose
contracts run only for a year, with players being free agents.) He
signs the following sort of contract with a team: In each home
game, twenty-five cents from the price of each ticket of admission
goes to him. (We ignore the question of whether he is 'gouging'
the owners, letting them look out for themselves.) The season
starts, and people cheerfully attend his team's games; they buy
their tickets, each time dropping a separate twenty-five cents of
their admission price into a special box with Chamberlain's name
on it. They are excited about seeing him play; it is worth the total
admission price to them. Let us suppose that in one season one
million persons attend his home games, and Wilt Chamberlain
winds up with $250,000, a much larger sum than the average
income and larger even than anyone else has. Is he entitled to this
income? Is this new distribution D2, unjust?79
2002) 107-127; M. Neumann 'Side Constraint Morality' 12 Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1982)
131.
79 R. Nozick Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974) 161.
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Nozick's response to the first question is positive and his answer to the second is
r . ; f y
negative. To conclude otherwise, he says, would be to endorse 'continuous
interference with people's lives'.80 He holds that any attempt to prevent D2 (by
banning payments to Chamberlain) or to restore Di (by taxing Chamberlain)
would be contrary to individual freedom. Liberty, for Nozick, includes the right
to use one's property as one wishes. By subordinating every other political ideal
to this conception of freedom, he concludes that D2 is just.
Nozick thinks that the elevation of this ideal is consistent with
widespread (even if not explicit) moral convictions. His story about Wilt
' f'CV: 3$jC. ..
Chamberlain appeals to these alleged beliefs. It is not itself an argument for the
priority of absolute property-rights over other political values, but merely an
illustration of the opinions that Nozick 'attributes to moral actors. By telling it,
he hopes to prompt recognition of these supposed convictions. His anecdote is -
to borrow Daniel Dennett's expression - an 'intuition pump'.81
Hence, Nozick's argument depends on the accuracy with which he
characterises political morality. Yet numerous moral actors do not hold the
beliefs that he ascribes to them. They reject the primacy of absolute property-
rights. Their reasons for doing so are various: some agree that liberty is
80 See R. Nozick Anarchy, State, and Utopia 163.
81 See D.C. Dennett 'The Milk of Human Intentionality' 3 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
(1980) 428-430.
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supreme, but disagree with Nozick's understanding of it; some - egalitarians,
for instance - give priority to a different value altogether; and some - arguably
U':- b
most - think that no value takes precedence over the rest of political morality.
Nozick disregards this complexity. He misrepresents the opinions from which
he purports to infer the justice of D2. Such distortion - which Bernard Williams
calls 'an enormous exaggeration of at best one aspect of our moral ideas'82 -
results in the failure of Nozick's argument.
The moral discord whose existence Nozick ignores also defeats any
attempt to demonstrate the priority of a value or values over all (and not merely
some) others simply by pointing to the convictions of moral actors. The obvious
fact of moral disagreement means that a value-monist must seek to prove this
■ < wiivrpi;,-Vr .'/a ;
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hierarchy by alternative means. John Rawls suggests yet another way in which
1 ;
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he or she might do so. Although Rawls rejects value-monism - he does not
regard every subordinate ideal as merely instrumental - and is concerned only
with justice - in contrast to value-monists, he does not articulate a
comprehensive theory of morality - he nevertheless proposes a method for
ranking moral ideals that a value-monist might adopt.
82 B. Williams 'The Minimal State' in JdPaul (ed.) Reading Nozick: Essays on 'Anarchy, State,
and Utopia' (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 19&2) 34.
: } > • [V'; -W • • .
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Like Nozick, Rawls bases his approach on familiar convictions about
justice. Unlike Nozick, however, Rawls does not regard his theory of justice as a
straightforward deduction from these beliefs. He knows that his theory does not
fit perfectly with such opinions - he recognises their variety - and makes the
: : ' is V i j i it/'
different claim that it is in 'reflective equilibrium' with them.83 To achieve this
balance, Rawls both modifies his theory and rejects some of the convictions from
which he starts. He 'workjs] from both ends.'84 By doing so, he arrives at
'principles of justice which match our considered judgments duly pruned and
adjusted.'85
In an attempt to make this outcome 'vivid',85 Rawls asks his reader to
envisage the rational response of someone in an 'original position' that models
these revised judgments.87 He maintains that such an individual would choose
two principles of justice and would arrange them in 'lexical order'.88 According
j '.U '
to Rawls, a person in the original position would put the first principle (which
gives everyone the same fundamental liberties) before the second (which is
83 See J. Rawls A Theory of Justice 17-19, 42-45; J. Rawls Political Liberalism 8, 28, 45, 384n; J.
Rawls Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001) 29-
31.
84 J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 18.
85 J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 18.
86 J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 16.
87 For an introduction to this hypothetical situation, see J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 10-19.
88 On the nature of lexical order, see J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 37-38.
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concerned with social and economic inequalities) and would also regard one
element of the second principle (which regulates access to offices and positions)
as prior to the other (whose subject is the distribution of wealth).89
Rawls insists that this hierarchy results from his search for reflective
equilibrium between his theory and widespread convictions about justice.
Although he does not regard the first principle as the source of every other
moral ideal, value-monists might nevertheless implement his approach in their
pursuit of a value or a blend of values that generates the rest of morality.
. W AAijib-"
Indeed, Rawls's method is the most promising way of arguing for the
supremacy of one or a limited combination of the ideals on which moral actors
rely. While I am sceptical that Dworkin and other value-monists can employ it
successfully - see my remarks in the next section - its apparent potential means
that they have no choice but to do so when seeking to vindicate their contention
that a value or an amalgamation of values is the origin of all others.90
With this recognition of the need for Dworkin to attain reflective
equilibrium between the norms of ethical individualism and the opinions of
i ' '} J,
moral actors, my elucidation of his case for value-monism is finally complete.
89 For a summary of these principles and the relationship between them, see J. Rawls
Theory ofJustice 266.
90 Dworkin practises this method elsewhere - see, for example, R. Dworkin Law's Empire
424, note 17 - but he must use it here too.
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His argument - notwithstanding its ultimate dependence on Rawls's method -
V. Ill . • : ;i.h;'ncv/c.-.h'
is moralistic. By analysing moral practice in terms of the sovereign principles of
equal importance and special responsibility, Dworkin denies the existence of
conflict between the values that participants accept. His interpretation of their
convictions with reference to the complementary requirements of ethical
individualism generates a hierarchical theory that supplies an answer to every
moral question. He thus claims that moralistic analysis fails to endorse value-
pluralism. When combined with his belief in the necessity of this methodology,
the conclusion that Berlin's alternative to value-monism lacks philosophical
support inevitably follows.
>g >.r «r • : ;s.'"
If a theory of morality must be moralistic, then Dworkin is surely correct
vi .
to dismiss value-pluralism. But the condition on which his rejection depends is
false: a moral philosopher need not practise moralistic interpretation. Having
rightly dispensed with both lexicography and scientific analysis as means by
which a description of morality can be explained, Dworkin is wrong to think
that moralistic interpretation is the sole remaining option. He ignores pure
interpretation as another way in which a philosopher might defend an account
of moral practice.
< i ■ c ■ ' , 1





Moral Reasons I: Justice
In chapter one, I established the possibility of this alternative
methodology. My argument had two stages. First, I specified four non-moral
criteria to which a pure theorist refers when selecting the important aspects of a
practice: clarity, consistency, comprehensiveness and coherence. Second, I
countered some attacks on the feasibility of exclusive reliance by a philosopher
on these meta-theoretical norms. In doing so, I disproved the need for moralistic
interpretation of any practice - even one with moral content.
So a pure theory of morality is possible and Dworkin cannot dismiss
value-pluralism simply because of its manifest lack of success as a moralistic
interpretation. Of course, one cannot assume that it instead satisfies the
." tei i had' two sla ' •• • t.
standards of clarity, consistency, comprehensiveness and coherence. That a
philosopher might explain an account of morality on these non-moral grounds
does not imply that value-pluralism actually receives support from them.
Hence, I now consider whether a pure analysis of moral practice denies the
compatibility of all values.
One might infer that Berlin rejects this methodology when he renounces
'neutral conceptual analysis' and stresses the 'anti-marxist' implications of his
value-pluralism.91 But a description of morality whose justification is non-moral
i.; • i'1 . .. i iiu
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91 See S. Lukes 'Isaiah Berlin: In Conversation with Steven Lukes' 92-93.
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might nevertheless be controversial. To suppose otherwise is to repeat the error
that Dworkin commits in deriding external theorists for their alleged inability to
contribute to non-philosophical debates.92 In fact, Berlin occasionally alludes to
meta-theoretical norms. He seems to invoke the value of comprehensiveness
. Vc). I &Ti t'Wv ' S*r«
when he points to the 'ordinary experience' of moral dilemmas.93 Moreover, he
appears to cite the value of clarity as a reason for his understanding of 'the
essence of the notion of liberty'.94 Despite these ostensible references to meta-
theoretical criteria, however, his case for value-pluralism is - like H.L.A. Hart's
defence of legal positivism95 - ambiguous. Whether Berlin relies on these norms
alone or appeals to them as part of an unsuccessful moralistic interpretation -
recall his speculative comments on the tyrannical inclinations of value-monists -
is not evident. Given this uncertainty, he fails to provide sufficient evidence that
i 'i.: : k\_ ii. s" h) i ■ v1'
a pure interpretation of morality endorses value-pluralism.
Yet the fact that Berlin does not seem to base his moral theory exclusively
on the norms of clarity, consistency, comprehensiveness and coherence does not
preclude such support for value-pluralism. Indeed, I think that a philosopher
92 See chapter one, section two.
93 I. Berlin 'Two Concepts of Liberty' 213-214. See also I. Berlin 'The Pursuit of the Ideal' in
The Proper Study ofMankind: An Anthology of Essays (Edited by H. Hardy & R. Hausheer, with a
foreword by N. Annan and an introduction by R. Hausheer) (London: Pimlico, 1998) 11.
94 I. Berlin 'Two Concepts of Liberty' 204.
95 See chapter one, section three.
'
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whose understanding of morality complies solely with these meta-theoretical
criteria ought to deny that a single value or small bunch of congruent values is
the source of the rest.
A pure theorist should regard value-monism as insufficiently
comprehensive, for instance, due to its rejection of the dilemmas that many (and
perhaps all) moral actors sometimes endure. Only value-pluralism respects this
prominent feature of moral practice, as George Crowder indicates: 'It fits with
salient aspects of modern moral experience, in particular with our sense of the
multiplicity of genuine values, and of the distinctness of those values which is
highlighted by those cases where we have to choose among them.'96
A value-monist might (and Dworkin definitely would) respond that a
philosopher must analyse (and cannot merely record) these apparent dilemmas.
Yet comprehensiveness is not the sole ambition of a pure theorist: he or she also
strives for clarity, consistency and coherence. I submit that value-pluralism -
notwithstanding differences between particular versions of it - satisfies these
criteria too. It is clear insofar as it refines the ideals to which moral actors
subscribe - Berlin's distinction between positive and negative liberty is an
96 G. Crowder Liberalism and Value Pluralism 6. See also W.A. Galston Liberal Pluralism: The
Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002) 33-34; C. Larmore Patterns ofMoral Complexity 152-153.
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obvious example of such precision97 - and it is no less likely than value-monism
to be consistent.98 Because value-pluralists combine some values - they deny
that ideals always collide - their theory is also coherent to the extent that they
do so.
Of course, their understanding of morality would be even more coherent
were they simply to renounce value-pluralism and to treat all (and not just
some) values as compatible. A pure theorist ought to resist this move, however.
To conclude that moral ideals never conflict, he or she must exaggerate the
■i'.yaj Rp
methodological significance of coherence and underrate that of
*' ' <•' * ^ ' V'- .
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comprehensiveness. In other words, he or she could only defend value-monism
by failing to exercise proper judgment when applying these two norms. I say
more about the notion of judgment in the next section. On the assumption that
my examination of it is convincing, then a pure theorist ought to favour a
conception of morality in which ideals frequently conflict.
Given Dworkin's moralistic case for value-monism and my non-moral
explanation for value-pluralism, philosophical arguments exist for both
descriptions of moral practice. The dispute between theorists about these
97 For a pithy statement of the difference between these two values, see I. Berlin 'Two
Concepts of Liberty' 169.
98 The fact that value-pluralism warrants incompatible actions in various situations does
not mean that the theory itself is contradictory.
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competing accounts of morality can thus be explained methodologically. I
■ '>'0; . ..v; i-l'l'i ■
expressed my preference for pure analysis at the end of chapter one. In my
opinion, therefore, value-pluralism is the appropriate source of content-
dependent reasons for obedience and disobedience to the law. I now explore
some implications of this conclusion.
IV
A predictable objection to value-pluralism - and so to my belief that one should
rely on it when morally evaluating conduct whose performance the law requires
- states that it is undermined by jits inability to remedy the frequent conflicts
i : ' f.V' pure rv.ilv^ i
between moral values to which it gives rise. This objection assumes that moral
\ i \ i"'
dilemmas need solutions, that value-pluralism cannot supply the requisite
answers and that no moral theory can survive such a failure. Although I agree
with the first and second of these premises, I dismiss the third - and, hence, the
entire objection - by denying that responses to moral problems must be wholly
theoretical and proposing another way of settling clashes between
incommensurable ideals. Before examining this alternative method, I confirm
the need for solutions to moral dilemmas and the inability of value-pluralism to
i vy i .?y fifub.1 lk
provide them. ■ pv,y' v iv
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In the absence of a process for choosing between conflicting ideals, moral
evaluation of conduct - including that which the law prescribes - would often
be impossible. When two or more values clash, each justifies behaviour that is
implicitly condemned by the other or others. Without a way of discriminating
between these values, the different actions that they endorse would be
simultaneously right and wrong. The manifest need to avoid this paradox
entails the necessity of a method for dealing with situations in which moral
values warrant incompatible actions.
One might think that Berlin provides the requisite means for solving
moral dilemmas when he decrees that the appropriate responses to them
depend on 'the kind of trade-offs which are required by a decent society.'99
. j,-si pi ., yam ..y
These trade-offs, he says, prevent 'the occurrence of desperate situations, of
'/■ ;i • oifref;, <
intolerable choices' by 'minimising' clashes between incommensurable moral
values.100 He describes such compromises as 'the first requirement for a decent
society.'101 Rather than solving moral dilemmas, though, they simply deny the
existence of the conflicts that they purport to end. A trade-off presupposes the
99 I. Berlin in R. Jahanbegloo Conversations With Isaiah Berlin 150.
100 I. Berlin 'The Pursuit of the Ideal' 15-16.
101 I. Berlin 'The Pursuit of the Ideal' 15. Compare A. Margalit The Decent Society
(Translated by N. Goldblum) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).
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availability of - in Steven Luke's words - a 'common currency'.102 For Berlin,
this is the notion of decency. Yet to treat moral ideals as facets of decency is
necessarily to deny their incommensurability. So Berlin must decide: either
decency is the covering value that explains the relative significance of the rest or
'the belief that some single formula can in principle be found whereby all the
diverse ends of men can be harmoniously realized is demonstrably false.'103 He
cannot affirm both propositions without contradiction.
Indeed, no philosopher can solve a genuine (as distinct from a merely
apparent) moral dilemma by specifying an ideal or ideals of which every other
is an aspect. But this impossibility does not prevent a theorist from ranking
incommensurable values in an effort to settle conflicts between them. On the
condition that at least some moral values do not emanate from the ideal or
ideals to which they are deemed subordinate, then value-pluralism is
compatible with a hierarchy that provides answers when they collide.104
. >i be ' ;.r. rhphipesly >
In the previous section, I outlined Rawls's attempt to overcome clashes
■ • ..• ' : ' i-} ■ • '
between moral criteria of a particular type. His theory of justice indicates the
order in which these norms ought to be satisfied without denying the
102 S. Lukes 'Making Sense of Moral Conflict' in N.L. Rosenblum (ed.) Liberalism and the
Moral Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989) 134. See also S. Lukes Liberals &
Cannibals: The Implications ofDiversity 66-67.
103 I. Berlin 'Two Concepts of Liberty' 214.
104 Compare G. Crowder Liberalism and Value Pluralism 51-52.
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authenticity of the dilemmas that they generate. It elevates two of them above
the rest and gives priority to the first over the second and - within the latter - to
equality of opportunity over material equality. According to Rawls, this
arrangement is in reflective equilibrium with familiar opinions on the topic.
Just as a value-monist must adopt Rawls's approach when seeking to
defend the structure of his or her theory,105 a value-pluralist whose goal is to
rank incommensurable values must strive for reflective equilibrium between the
configuration that he or she proposes and the beliefs of moral actors. Rawls's
method is the most promising way of justifying an account of morality that
arranges values hierarchically and so it must be implemented by both of these
philosophers. Yet can its potential be realised?
Even if one is convinced by Rawls's (knowingly imprecise106) use of it to
support his version of justice - and such endorsement requires, for example,
acceptance of his controversial claim that the priority of individual liberties over
material equality accords sufficiently with everyday convictions about justice -
one might nevertheless query its ability to validate a description of morality as a
:>b ' pi'Op.O; V V"
whole. Indeed, I believe that attainment of the desired equilibrium is
jeopardised by the sheer complexity of moral practice. A theory that specifies
105 See section three.
106 See J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 18, 43.
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the position of every single value in relation to every other and that coincides
'! • !:'■' '1'-:':
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adequately with the diverse opinions of moral actors is, I think, quite unlikely.
Given this implausibility, I conclude that neither a value-monist nor a value-
pluralist - both of whose accounts of morality are unrestricted in scope - can
justify a hierarchy among moral ideals.
My scepticism about the prospect of a Rawlsian remedy to the problem of
priority that confronts value-monists means that I doubt the viability of their
theory. Rather than exploiting the apparent vulnerability of value-monism,
however, I wish to consider the implications for value-pluralism of the probable
• git v.jjH'e in julai.
failure of Rawls's method to identify the order in which all incommensurable
norms ought to be realised. If moral dilemmas need solutions and if value-
pluralism cannot provide the necessary answers due to the absence of a reliable
means of doing so - if, in other words, the first two premises of the objection are
correct - then what follows? Is value-pluralism inevitably doomed?
Its inability to settle clashes between incommensurable values leads to its
demise only if replies to moral questions must be entirely theoretical. The third
premise of the objection supposes that answers of any other kind are arbitrary
i ; y is ■ -
and thus neglects the possibility of a method for solving dilemmas that is
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pluralism. In my opinion, however, such an alternative means is available to
participants in moral practice. When the ideals of which they speak require
incompatible actions, they can - and actually must - decide on the appropriate
response by exercising judgment. Their ability to choose in this way denies the
assumption on which the third premise of the objection depends and is,
therefore, my topic until the end of the present section.
Judgment involves the application of general norms to specific facts.
When moral actors rely on it to discriminate between conflicting ideals, they
• l '• Y if '
focus on - to use Charles Larmore's phrase - 'the particularity of a given
situation'.107 Hence, they comply with the principal tenet of casuistry that
'circumstances alter cases'.108 Yet they eschew the 'probabilism' of which many
casuists are guilty (and to which the poor reputation of casuistry is surely
attributable).109 Whereas a probabilist sanctions any conduct for which a moral
justification is merely (and perhaps not very) likely, these moral actors
discriminate between the (possibly numerous) ideals whose relevance to a
particular set of circumstances is no less than plausible and select the value
> -6i; ' i f(V dVVYrrh
107 C. Larmore Patterns ofMoral Complexity 20.
108 H.A. Bedau Making Mortal Choices: Three Exercises in Moral Casuistry (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997) 102.
109 For discussion, see H.A. Bedau Making Mortal Choices: Three Exercises in Moral Casuistry
104; A.R. Jonsen & S. Toulmin The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkeley,
California: University of California, 1988).
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whose application is most appropriate. Their attention to the precise context of
each moral dilemma enables them to choose between the incommensurable
values involved.
Indeed, Berlin - notwithstanding his comments on decency - seems to
regard adoption of this method as indispensable whenever moral ideals clash.
The concrete situation,' he declares, 'is almost everything.'110 Although he does
not elaborate on the role of judgment in moral practice, his discussion of its use
by politicians can be modified to compensate for his omission.111
In respect of politics, he claims that 'what matters is to understand a
particular situation in its full uniqueness, the particular men and events and
dangers, the particular hopes and fears which are actively at work in a
particular place at a particular time: in Paris in 1791, in Petrograd in 1917, in
Budapest in 1956, in Prague in 1968 or in Moscow in 1991.'112 He identifies
successful politicians - whose moral status might be less impressive113 - by their
\ je.. J-,- , ■
capacity to 'grasp the unique combination of characteristics that constitute this
particular situation - this and no other.'114 Their ability to do so, he insists, is
110 I. Berlin 'The Pursuit of the Ideal' 15.
111 See G. Crowder Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism 140.
112 I. Berlin 'Political Judgement' in The Sense of Reality: Studies in Ideas and their History
(Edited by H. Hardy, with an introduction by P. Gardiner) (London: Pimlico, 1997) 44-45.
113 See I. Berlin 'Political Judgement' 47.
114 I. Berlin 'Political Judgement' 45.
161
: i i, iv. Lr
. tin. Comb;: b
Moral Reasons I: Justice
: P |
different from other qualities that both they and less competent politicians
might possess:
It is a sense for what is qualitative rather than quantitative, for
what is specific rather than general; it is a species of direct
acquaintance, as distinct from a capacity for description or
calculation or inference; it is what is variously called natural
wisdom, imaginative understanding, insight, perceptiveness, and,
more misleadingly, intuition (which dangerously suggests some
almost magical faculty), as opposed to the markedly different
virtues - very great as these are - of theoretical knowledge or
learning, erudition, powers of reasoning and generalisation,
intellectual genius.115
The technique whose exercise Berfin deems vital for the proper application of
political norms also enables participants in moral practice to settle clashes
between incommensurable ideals. By paying attention to the precise
circumstances of each dilemma, the latter can overcome the paradox that would
otherwise defeat value-pluralism.
Of course, the particular facts of which moral actors take account when
they judge between conflicting values can be neither listed nor limited in
advance. Previous events in their own lives are, however, likely to be part of the
context in which they decide. According to Charles Taylor, their choices are
..•re • < 'e^» '<
liable to be affected by the recognition that certain ideals 'play different roles
Iji: upl¬
and have different places (and this also may mean different times) in [their]
I. Berlin 'Political Judgement' 46.
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lives.'116 He ascribes the potential impact of these biographical details to the
wish of every person for a coherent life: 'Ip the end, what we are called on to do
is not just carry out isolated acts, ea:ch one being right, but to live a life, and that
means to be and become a certain kind of human being.'117 Given this aspiration,
participants in moral practice might discriminate between conflicting values
with (some, but not exclusive) reference to 'the way [these ideals] fit, or fail to
fit, together in the unfolding of [their] lives.'118 The biographical unity that
humans desire can thus help them to deal with clashes between the diverse
values of which morality consists.
George Crowder agrees that the 'background commitments [...] of the
individuals concerned' might provide such assistance.119 Yet he is mistaken
, . , {It*:! • f.f sf*
about the way in which the past conduct of moral agents can influence their
responses to dilemmas. For Crowder, the specific circumstances of each case
generate 'decisive reasons to choose in one direction rather than another'.120
Hence, he maintains that 'background commitments, like those of the judge or
116 C. Taylor 'Leading a Life' in R. Chang (ed.) Incommensurability, Incompatibility and
Practical Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997) 180.
117 C. Taylor 'Leading a Life' 179.
118 C. Taylor'Leading a Life'180.
119 G. Crowder Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism 140.
T>ii ■£ jptQWii Hi 1.120 G. Crowder Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism 140.
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the official or the loving son, may help us to resolve conflicts rationally.'121 But
the assistance that the particular context affords to moral actors when values
clash can never be rational. Since their concern is the application of reasons to
the precise circumstances of the case, they cannot logically treat the latter as a
: 'hi'.H I 'buphu . ;
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source of the former.122 To the extent that they purport to do so, they actually
apply a further norm to the specific facts and not one of those between which
they claim to decide. Crowder is wrong, therefore, to describe their choices as
susceptible to 'reasoned justification'.123
Moreover, the application of norms to particular facts cannot be
theorised.124 Berlin's distinction between the practical and the intellectual skills
of politicians follows from such an impossibility, as does his denial that
judgment 'can literally be taught.'125 Charles Larmore also recognises '[tjhis
. vhvSC • n f " tj* : . •
inability to arrive at a general theory of judgment' and notes the corollary that
v"
i > • ' '■■>] •
'[w]e appear able to say only what judgment is not, and not what it /s.'126 Yet the
absence of a philosophical description of judgment is likely to prompt the
121 G. Crowder Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism 140.
122 See, for example, O. O'Neill Bounds ofJustice 55.
123 G. Crowder Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism 140-141.
124 On the limits of philosophical reflection on decision-making, see I. Berlin 'An
Introduction to Philosophy' in B. Magee (ed.) Men of Ideas: Some Creators of Contemporary
Philosophy (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1978) 32-33; J. Raz The Authority of Law:
Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) v-vi.
125 I. Berlin 'Political Judgement' 45.
126 C. Larmore Patterns ofMoral Complexity 20. (Emphasis in original.)
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criticism that it is too mysterious to be a plausible means of solving moral
dilemmas.127 My reply to this objection occupies the rest of the current section. I
begin by stressing the frequent need for judgment and then illustrate the falsity
of the complaint with reference to a couple of examples.
Far from being obscure, judgment is necessarily involved in every
decision to treat a specific norm as the ultimate justification for an action.128
Notwithstanding the order to which this norm belongs, the actor must exercise
ii; '■ I ''•
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judgment in choosing to act on it. The reason that he or she picks as decisive
might be moral or political or a member of some other category. It might even
be philosophical.129
The actor may select this reason from two or more of the same type.
Perhaps the norms between which he or she discriminates are moral, for
instance. If so, the judgment on which his or her choice depends can be labelled
as such. Then again, the actor might prefer the decisive reason to one or more of
a different kind or of different kinds. The judgment that is required in this
..er ,i i v /iysJi t i >,
127 For recognition (and subsequent rejection) of this criticism, see C. Larmore Patterns of
Moral Complexity 152.
128 My remarks in these paragraphs draw on my analysis of acceptance in the second
section of the first chapter.
129 On the role of judgment in philosophy, see the penultimate section of chapter one.
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alternative scenario - which includes the actor's decision to accept (and thereby
grant authority to130) a particular set of rules - might be called 'ethical'.131
Of course, the norm that motivates a deliberate action need not always be
chosen (and thus result from the use of judgment) by the actor. His or her
temperament and the power of another person or other people are also possible
explanations for the precise reason that he or she regards as decisive. Whether
individually or jointly, these facts are able to effect the actor's participation -
including the way in which he or she takes part - in a specific practice.
But his or her action can never be caused by the decisive reason itself. To
suppose that norms determine their own application is to imagine that they
control human action. If they were capable of doing so, then that would be
mysterious. Their inability to exclude human agency is recognised by Onora
O'Neill. Norms, she says, 'are abstract entities; they do not act or cause; they are
at most guide-lines for those who act or cause.'132 Whether a norm provides the
ultimate justification for a particular action cannot depend on it alone. Instead,
the actor's reliance on it must caused by something else. Alongside his or her
130 See chapter two on the connection between the ideas of acceptance and authority.
131 By claiming that ethics leads to (rather than presupposes) participation in a specific
practice, I define it neither as equivalent to morality nor as a professional code of conduct. For a
similar view, see B. Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985) 6.
132 O. O'Neill Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning 81.
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temperament and the power of another person or other people, judgment is a
L
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potential explanation for the actor's belief that it is decisive.
Note that reference to one or mdre of these facts is necessary to account
for the participation in moral practice of a value-monist no less than that of a
value-pluralist. Simply because a norm always (and not merely sometimes)
motivates a moral actor does not mean that it alone can bring about his or her
conduct. Its ability to control behaviour is not related to the frequency with
which he or she relies on it. That a reduction in the number of intrinsic values to
one or a few - rather than many - cannot eliminate the indeterminacy of a moral
w v qthy p
theory is illustrated by the difficulties that utilitarians often experience when
t'v B'bf'S:! . r
seeking to ascertain the practical implications of the value on whose sovereignty
..' ' ' * ' [ i*);': f1
they concur. Something except utility - such as judgment - is required to
explain its support for a particular action (and not another).
The indeterminacy of norms does not render them otiose, however. Their
irrelevance follows from the impossibility of their self-application only if they
must function as sufficient causes of action or not at all. According to this
additional premise, a decision to act must be a norm-free response to a
particular set of facts. Yet the inability of a norm to generate conduct on its own
he i liriicUitie- fit . i ;
does not mean that it cannot harve any impact on a choice to behave in a specific
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manner. Indeed, a decision to act that ignores all norms is quite implausible.
Without norms, observes O'Neill, 'we would drift through the flotsam of
•a ■ iii , I ! i ■
available descriptions and perceptions, unable to orient ourselves on a course of
, -if'
action or life, to navigate among existing possibilities or institutions, to chart our
way to new ones, or to reason with those with whom we are not already in
agreement.'133 So norms - despite their inability to effect conduct by themselves
- are essential for practical decision-making. Although they do not provide 'an
auto-pilot for life', says O'Neill, they nevertheless 'structure and constrain it.'134
Since every decision to act necessarily involves consideration of general
norms as well as specific facts, then judgment - which applies the former to the
latter - must often be exercised. Various philosophers acknowledge this need.
Aristotle does so in his account of practical wisdom,135 as does Kant when he
■ i. 'IVV-g ■■
distinguishes between 'the faculty of rules' and 'the faculty of subsuming under
rules'.136 Both of these theorists - notwithstanding the significant differences
between them - recognise that judgment is necessary whenever the norm that
motivates a deliberate action is chosen by the actor. Given the frequency (and
133 O. O'Neill Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account ofPractical Reasoning 88-89.
134 O. O'Neill Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account ofPractical Reasoning 78.
135 See Aristotle The Nicomachean Ethics (Translated by W.D. Ross) (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1925) Book VI.
136 See I. Kant Critique of Pure Reason (Translated by N. Kemp Smith) (London: Macmillan,
1963) 177.
■ V-i ! .yphvi';.- '.Sr.:
qci* ;-'Ht *>i,' iij"'
168
Moral Reasons I: Justice
the appreciation by numerous philosophers) of this requirement, the claim that
judgment is mysterious seems dubious. Moreover, a brace of fictional examples
confirms its falsity. The first of the pair is my invention; the second is from a
novel by Ian McEwan.
Sarah promises to meet one of her friends in a local restaurant for dinner.
They agree to meet at eight o'clock, Sarah decides to walk to the restaurant via a
nearby park. When she leaves her house, she has plenty of time to make the
journey. While in the park, however, she sees three men attacking a young
woman. As Sarah approaches, the men run away. The woman is injured and
very frightened. Sarah tries to comfort her. Unfortunately, no one else is around
and Sarah feels unable to leave the woman in such distress. A passing jogger
eventually contacts the emergency services. When help arrives, Sarah leaves for
the restaurant. She gets there just after nine o'clock, but her friend has already
left.
. v w • .jswafi-
On the assumption that Sarah decides to break her promise to her friend
because of her desire to care for the victim of the assault, then she exercises
moral judgment.137 She discriminates between the conflicting values of
compassion and promise-keeping by considering the particular circumstances.
137 I also assume that her compassion is genuine and that she is not motivated by a selfish
(and thus non-moral) aspiration to avoid feelings of guilt.
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Given that her selection of the former as the ultimate justification for her action
is plainly correct, her use of judgment is anything but mysterious. That she
judges appropriately does not entitle her to forget about her broken promise,
however, and she should contact her friend at the earliest opportunity to explain
her late arrival at the restaurant.138
My contention that Sarah's case demonstrates the normality of judgment
might be criticised in at least three different ways. First, one might protest that
the ease with which she decides on the right action indicates the absence of a
genuine conflict between the moral ideals with whose application to the
particular situation her judgment is allegedly concerned. This objection
supposes that every moral dilemma must be difficult to solve. Although the
proper application of incommensurable values is often challenging (and
perhaps so demanding that any criticism of the decision-maker would be
inappropriate139), it might sometimes be easy.140 The loss that inevitably results
from sacrificing one value or several values for the sake of another does not
. . i . i,i; j.' ' i
mean that the choice between them must be painful. Tragedy is not inevitable
i ■ -l... ...., , , x'l
when incomparable norms clash. In some circumstances, the solution might be
138 On the importance of such rectificatory action, see O. O'Neill Towards Justice and Virtue:
A Constructive Account ofPractical Reasoning 160; O. O'Neill Bounds ofJustice 62-63.
139 See I. Berlin in S. Lukes 'Isaiah Berlin: In Conversation with Steven Lukes' 107-108.
ho see w.A. Galston Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory
and Practice 35.
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obvious. Far from revealing that the values involved are actually coherent, this
fact merely demonstrates that judgment can be straightforward.
Alternatively, one might argue that Sarah should keep her promise and
neglect the victim of the assault. Rather than questioning the normality of
judgment, though, this objection merely disputes Sarah's use of it. By denying
that she ought to break her promise, one presupposes that judgment can solve
her dilemma. To believe that Sarah should ignore the woman and meet her
friend for dinner, however, is to exercise judgment badly. Although such a
conclusion is rational - it. is justified by the value of promise-keeping - it is
K 'if; '■ he . > .. t
certainly not reasonable.
Finally, one might attack the fictional nature of the example.141 According
to this third objection, Sarah's use of judgment is suspect because the greater
complexity of reality might produce another outcome. Yet her judgment is
hardly undermined by pointing out that she might choose differently in altered
circumstances. Since judgment involves focusing on a particular context, it
requires sensitivity to changes in that context. Hence, one must assume that no
relevant details are missing from Sarah's case when assessing her use of
• jj.1.S.I.'it.lt.Vi. yV
judgment. One cannot suppose that she is able to prevent the conflict between
141 For discussion of such criticisms, see B. Williams 'A Critique of Utilitarianism' in J.C.C.
Smart & B. Williams Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1973) 96-97.
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the values of compassion and promise-keeping by calling the emergency
services on a mobile phone, for instance. In the example, Sarah does not have a
•••
... V.,". • •
mobile phone. If she did, of course, then she ought to use it. Only a person
vL : joOhhyi. \>v
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whose judgment is poor would refuse to avert a moral dilemma when given an
adequate opportunity to do so.142
I now turn to the second example. Whereas the norms between which
Sarah chooses are both moral, the values that conflict in this case belong to
different orders. The judgment involved is, therefore, ethical. The decision¬
maker is Clive Linley, a character in Ian McEwan's Amsterdam.143
Clive is a composer whose current project is to write a government-
commissioned symphony that commemorates the end of the twentieth century.
.' i, h e VuM^ihu
Lacking inspiration for the theme of the finale, he goes walking in the Lake
:l'v- : ' 'H
District. While on top of a crag, he hears a bird call that suggests the melody for
which he has been searching. He starts to write out the tune that he hopes will
be 'the dead century's elegy',144 but is distracted by an argument between a man
and a woman that is taking place just below him. He tries to ignore their
dispute, but the woman's voice becomes louder and he looks down to see the
142 See O. O'Neill Toioards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning
160; O. O'Neill Bounds ofJustice 60-62.
143 I. McEwan Amsterdam (London: Vintage, 1998).
144 I. McEwan Amsterdam 20.
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man grab the woman's arm. As they tussle, Clive wonders whether he should
intervene:
The woman shouted again and Clive, lying pressed against the
rock, closed his eyes. Something precious, a little jewel, was rolling
away from him. [...] The jewel, the melody. Its momentousness
pressed upon him. So much depended on it: the symphony, the
celebration, his reputation, the lamented century's ode to joy. He
did not doubt that what he heard could bear the weight. In its
simplicity lay all the authority of-'a lifetime's work. He also had no
doubt that it was not a piece of music that was simply waiting to
be discovered; what he had been doing, until interrupted, was
creating it, forging it out of the call of a bird, taking advantage of
the alert passivity of an engaged creating mind. What was clear
now was the pressure of choice: he should either go down and
protect the woman, if she needed protection, or he should creep
away round the side of Glaramara to find a sheltered place to
continue his work - if it was not already lost. He could not remain
here doing nothing.145
Although the man now has hold of the woman's wrist and is trying to drag her
to a nearby area that is more sheltered, Clive decides not to help her. Instead, he
r... nhfck' TAG
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climbs down the crag to ^ quieter spot-and tries to recall the melody. He is sure
• jK? | ■. h •
that his action is correct:
If he had approached the couple, a pivotal moment in his career
would have been destroyed. The melody could not have survived
the psychic flurry. Given the width of the ridge and the numerous
paths that crossed it, how easily he could have missed them. It was
as if he wasn't there. He wasn't there. He was in his music. His
fate, their fate, separate paths. It was not his business. This was his
I. McEwan Amsterdam 87.
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business, and it wasn't easy, and he wasn't asking for anyone's
help.146
Whatever the probability that the tune will transform the symphony into a
masterpiece - Clive hopes to be as great as Beethoven,147 but his inability to
produce more than a 'shameless copy' of the 'Ode to Joy' leads eventually to the
cancellation of the premiere148 - and notwithstanding the fact that the woman
actually escapes from the man,149 Olive's decision is obviously wrong. Whether
the ultimate cause of his action is a wish to create a great work of art or a desire
for the fame that artistic success might bring, his failure to act morally
demonstrates poor judgment. That he should try to help the woman is
obviously the correct response, ethically as well as morally. Although Clive
focuses on the particular circumstances of the case - including his own life and
the place of the symphony in it150 - his judgment is defective. He denounces
other people for 'assuming the licence of the free artistic spirit' to justify their
absence from events that they have previously agreed to attend,151 yet the
,y. u,d.; lived (
criticism that he deserves for choosing his symphony over the plight of the
;V:b:A v a \
woman is much greater. Furthermore, his subsequent failure to report the
I. McEwan Amsterdam 88-89.
See I. McEwan Amsterdam 76
See I. McEwan Amsterdam 176.
See I. McEwan Amsterdam 118.
See also I. McEwan Amsterdam 26, 82.
See I. McEwan Amsterdam 61-62.
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incident to the police simply .increases the extent to which he is blameworthy.
By not performing this rectificatory action, Clive denies the police a possible
opportunity to prevent the 'Lakeland Rapist' from attacking a final victim.152
Since the correctness of Sarah's decision to help the young woman in the
park and the wrongness of Clive's preference for artistic labour are readily
apparent, these examples show that judgment is not mysterious and can be used
to discriminate between incommensurable norms (whether of the same or
different kinds). The availability of this method for dealing with clashes
between moral ideals refutes the objection that value-pluralism is unable to
's .\p \ ' .tp
solve the dilemmas to which it gives rise. It might, therefore, provide content-
dependent reasons to obey and disobey the law.
V
Some philosophers regard liberalism as a necessary consequence of value-
pluralism. For them, a commitment - such as mine - to the latter as the source of
content-dependent grounds for obedience and disobedience to the law implies a
belief that a moral actor has a reason to violate any primary rule whose
. '• 1 .
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substance the former condemns. In this final section, I briefly examine the link
./hie1 it give ;i- ■
152 See I. McEwan Amsterdam ll8.
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between value-pluralism and liberalism on which these philosophers insist. By
doing so, I hope to clarify (and thus prevent misinterpretation of) the account of
moral practice that I defend in the present chapter.
Isaiah Berlin is the foremost proponent of the thesis that value-pluralism
entails liberalism. Despite his apparent rejection of any logical connection
between the two theories,153 he maintains that 'toleration and liberal
consequences follow' from the pluralist conception of morality to which he
subscribes.154 Negative liberty - which he defines as the absence of human
interference155 - is essential, he says, because participants in moral practice must
be able to choose between incommensurable values when they conflict.156 Yet he
jj; i, j > '
denies that liberty of this type must be 'the sole, or even the dominant, criterion
of social action.'157 He claims merely that value-pluralism requires 'a minimum
degree of toleration'.158
Berlin is wrong, however, to suppose that liberalism must result from the
regular need for moral actors to choose between values of intrinsic worth. He
commits a non sequitur, as Crowder realises:
153 See I. Berlin in R. Jahanbegloo Conversations With Isaiah Berlin 44.
154 I. Berlin 'My Intellectual Path' 53.
155 See I. Berlin 'Two Concepts of Liberty' 169-178.
156 I. Berlin 'Two Concepts of Liberty' 214.
157 I. Berlin 'Two Concepts of Liberty' 214.
158 I. Berlin in R. Jahanbeglooi Conversations with Isaiah Berlin 44. See also I. Berlin 'Two
Concepts of Liberty' 216.
.1 • • • < i It'll '
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This argument, at least in the form in which Berlin presents it, is
clearly flawed. It is essentially an instance of the naturalistic
fallacy, since it passes directly from the fact that choice is
unavoidable to the value of freedom of choice. But the mere fact
that choice is unavoidable does not make it (or the freedom with
which to make it) valuable. Berlin himself observes that many
choices among incommerisurables are painful, even tragic. Why,
then, should we value such .choices or the freedom with which to
i t ' C , i ;1 : .
make them? A better solution might be to avoid these choices as
far as possible, and one way of doing so may be deliberately to
reduce our negative liberty. The necessity of moral choice, alone, is
compatible with authoritarian as well as with liberal politics.159
Although Berlin's 'argument from choice' fails, Crowder believes that it 'can be
reconstructed to take us from pluralism to liberalism, but by way of positive
liberty, not negative.'160 According to Crowder, moral actors must be capable of
individual self-direction if they are to choose between incompatible values and
they are most likely to develop this capacity in a (certain kind of) liberal
society.161 He seeks to derive; liberalism from value-pluralism by associating
ill i• liUch
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personal autonomy - as distinct from the mere absence of human interference -
with both. : ■ r
Yet his adaptation of Berlin's argument is no more successful than the
original version. Even if the ideal of self-rule (or - as Berlin terms it - positive
159 G. Crowder Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism 144. See also G. Crowder Liberalism and
Value Pluralism 81-82.
160 G. Crowder Liberalism and Value Pluralism 210. See also G. Crowder Isaiah Berlin: Liberty
and Pluralism 168.
161 See G. Crowder Liberalism and Value Pluralism 201-211; G. Crowder Isaiah Berlin: Liberty
and Pluralism 167-168.
i ? isC : i !
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liberty162) is advanced most effectively by liberal institutions, it is not equivalent
to the autonomy on which value-pluralism depends. A moral agent is unable to
choose between conflicting values unless he or she can decide (and is not simply
caused by his or her temperament or the power of another person or other
people) to treat a particular value as the ultimate justification for his or her
action. But such formal (or Kantian) autonomy - which is a precondition for all
practical decision-making - is different from the ideal of self-determination that
•' <' i -:
Crowder associates with liberalism. Indeed, a moral actor might choose a value
other than self-rule as the decisive reason for his or her conduct in particular
circumstances. Due to the distinct types of autonomy that value-pluralism
requires and that liberalism allegedly promotes, Crowder's argument from
choice founders too.
Perhaps liberalism can be obtained from value-pluralism by another
means. Of the alternative strategies whose implementation he ponders,
IV • ; »i.l - V
Crowder rejects all but a couple. He quickly discards Joseph Raz's attempt to
g-V Vefffen '.ik.
connect the theories,163 for instance, because it is 'a liberal case for pluralism, not
J. T.
a pluralist case for liberalism.'154 He dismisses William Galston's argument that
value-pluralism calls for and liberal institutions are best suited to the promotion
162 See I. Berlin 'Two Concepts of Liberty' 177-181.
163 See J. Raz The Morality ofFreedom chapter fourteen.
164 G. Crowder Liberalism and Value Pluralism 204.
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of cultural diversity/65 moreover, since Galston's brand of liberalism protects
ways of life that value-pluralism condemns.166 Although Crowder offers
convincing reasons against the adoption of these and other ways of trying to
prove that value-pluralism entails liberalism, he does not perceive the critical
flaws in the two arguments on which he actually relies. The first of the pair - the
argument from diversity167 - wrongly supposes that the array of different ideals
that value-pluralists describe is best accommodated by liberal institutions and
not by a political system whose design is informed by every (rather than
Graf Rehsans .
principally or entirely by one) incommensurable value, whereas the second -
the argument from reasonable disagreement168 - ignores the logical distinction
between the fact of moral disagreement to which liberalism is allegedly the most
appropriate response and the theory of value-pluralism.169 Given the failure of
Crowder's arguments from choice, diversity and reasonable disagreement as
well as the apparent lack of any plausible alternatives to them, I presume that
liberalism need not follow from the frequent incompatibility of moral values.
, 1 di 1 .
165 See W.A. Galston Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory
and Practice chapter five.
166 See G. Crowder Isaiah'Berlin: liberty and. Pluralism 162-164.
167 See G. Crowder Liberalism and Value Pluralism chapter six; G. Crowder Isaiah Berlin:
Liberty and Pluralism 156-159.
168 See G. Crowder Liberalism and Value Pluralism chapter seven; G. Crowder Isaiah Berlin:
Liberty and Pluralism 159-161.
169 See section two of the present chapter on this distinction.
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Even if not implied by value-pluralism, however, certain liberal theories
might be consistent with it. An account of morality in which freedom alone has
intrinsic worth obviously denies that.ideals conflict, but not every version of
\L *; -il. ' £/■>?'. >
liberalism must do so. A theorist for whom liberty is the origin of merely some
(as opposed to all) other values - the ideals of political morality, perhaps - does
not reject value-pluralism. The priority of freedom over the rest of morality is
also compatible with value-pluralism as long as not every subordinate value is
purely instrumental. The best-known combination of liberalism and value-
pluralism, though, is provided by John Rawls. His theory ranks principles of
justice without denying that moral ideals often clash.170
Therefore, the interpretation of morality that I regard as the proper
.• <i d:f.f
source of content-dependent reasons for obedience and disobedience to the law
v ;■. ■ y.
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neither implies nor inevitably precludes liberalism. With this clarification, my
argument is finished. If I am right that a pure analysis of moral practice is
possible, that value-pluralism results from exclusive reliance by a moral
philosopher on the norms of clarity, consistency, comprehensiveness and
coherence and that moral dilemmas can be solved by exercising judgment, then
a theory of the values that moral agents use to assess the substance of legal
170 For discussion of his theory, see section three.
uer. reasons ' >r / >
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obligations need not depict one or a few of those values as the origin of every
other. Instead, it might regard many of them as ends-in-themselves. Due to my
preference for pure analysis, moreover, I believe that it ought to look upon them
i ?■ <£t>v-«.•• v A-.t- ' !
as such. Hence, I conclude that value-pluralism makes most sense of the moral
ideals that supply content-dependent reasons for obedience and disobedience to
the law.
wi.4V :• (ill- VcMU
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If - as I contend in chapter three - value-pluralism is the best interpretation of
the ideals that moral actors cite as content-dependent reasons to obey and
disobey the law, then this theory - since it is a general account of morality - is
also the proper source of other moral grounds for compliance and
noncompliance with primary rules. It thus provides the context within which I
continue to examine obedience and disobedience to legal requirements by
people for whom moral norms have authority. More precisely, it is the starting-
point for the pure analysis of content-independent moral reasons to obey and
disobey the law that I expound in the present chapter.1
The existence of such a reason is contingent on evaluation of something
! i:, , «... i-'
other than the behaviour on which the law insists. Whereas moral appraisal of
•iaOti' .'orv
the substance of a legal duty is typically - but not always2 - a matter of justice,
.' i T:: c •
principles of legitimacy supply participants in moral practice with content-
independent reasons to obey and disobey the law. These principles are
1 Although my discussion focuses on content-independent moral reasons for obedience to
legal rules, I do not rule out the possibility of disobedience to the law by moral actors whose
motivation is content-independent.
2 See my brief remarks on compassion at the start of chapter three.
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obviously distinct from the standards on which a social scientist is likely to rely
when he or she describes a particular state as legitimate. They do not define
legitimacy - as the principal social-scientific criteria do - in terms of the feelings
of people towards the system of law under which they live. As John Simmons
observes, 'this [empirical] account implies[...] that states can acquire or enhance
their [legitimacy] by misleading or by indoctrinating their subjects, or on the
strength of subjects' extraordinary stupidity, immorality, or imprudence.'3 The
• r.u. ivfh ■
norms that furnish moral agents with content-independent reasons for
i s
obedience and disobedience to the law instead refer - in Simmons's words - 'to
more [...] morally significant features of the state's history, character, or
relations with its subjects.'4
Yet these principles are not identical - although they might be related - to
those that moral agents employ when assessing the substance of a legal duty. In
common with most other political philosophers, Ronald Dworkin acknowledges
this lack of equivalence: 'What test must a government meet to be legitimate?
■ wo u n ' stu.. * •
We cannot say that it is not legitimate unless it is perfectly just: that would be
,ov' ''Ygen; v* : , •
3 A.J. Simmons 'Political Obligation and Authority' in R.L. Simon (ed.) The Blackwell Guide
to Social and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002) 23.
4 A.J. Simmons 'Political Obligation and Authority' 23.
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too strong a requirement [...].'5 For Dworkin - as I explain in the third section of
chapter three - the justice of a legal system is determined by 'the best, most
accurate understanding of the two principles of [ethical individualism].'6 But he
denies that state-legitimacy requires flawless implementation of the specific
brand of value-monism of which - in his view - the finest understanding of the
sovereign moral values of equal importance and special responsibility consists.
Whether the law is legitimate, he says, hinges on the answer to a different
question: 'What behavior of government would indicate that it has either not
accepted the two principles as constraints on its conduct or that it is acting
• i': •!' i
inconsistently with its own understanding of what they require?'7 He thus
■ • i : t s
...... • • V •
regards the legitimacy of a legal system as contingent on the extent of the
government's commitment to a sincere - even if mistaken - reading of the
supreme political ideal of equal concern. The government lacks legitimacy, he
claims, insofar as it fails to 'act as if the impact of its policies on the life of any
citizen is equally important.'8 Moreover, he charges a government that
disregards the ideal of equal concern (and, consequently, the two principles of
(.! .conW. bu
5 R. Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2006) 95. ^ : !
6 R. Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate 96.
7 R. Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate 96.
8 R. Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate 97.
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ethical individualism) with breaching the 'human' (and not merely the
'political') rights of its citizens.9
Dworkin, then, separates the issues of justice and legitimacy. He allows
that an unjust state might be legitimate. Note, however, that he rejects the
possibility of a legal system that is illegitimate yet just. He precludes such
incompatibility by defining legitimacy as devotion to and justice as optimal
realisation of the twin ideals of ethical individualism. Since allegiance to the
sovereign values of equai importance and special responsibility is a necessary
condition for seamless implementation of the best interpretation of them, he
regards the legitimacy of a just legal system as unavoidable. But a value-
pluralist - whose point of view I adopt in this chapter - can deny that every just
state must be legitimate and that a moral actor inevitably has a content-
independent reason to obey legal rules with which he or she has a content-
dependent reason to comply. Although Dworkin's distinction between the
justice and the legitimacy of the state enables him to ask whether participants in
! i . . Hi .. i ti,c .• i
moral practice ought to obey an unjust law, his moralistic interpretation of their
b ' r'~\o c.
conduct means that he cannot envisage any situation in which principles of
See R. Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate 30-36.
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legitimacy condemn a legal norm whose substance is just. From the perspective
of a value-pluralist, though, this scenario need not be invisible.
Philosophers tend to suppose that a moral actor refers to principles of
legitimacy only when seeking to ascertain whether he or she has - in the
philosophers' jargon, though not in ordinary language - a 'political obligation'
to fulfil a particular legal duty. According to Simmons - who endorses this
'traditional' view - these philosophers define state-legitimacy as a 'logical
correlate' of a political obligation.10 I agree with them that the existence of a
political obligation is a matter of legitimacy. I do not, however, share their
assumption that the law cannot be legitimate in the absence of such a duty. By
outlining the analysis of content-independent moral reasons for obedience and
disobedience to legal norms that I develop in the current chapter, I can explain
my disagreement with these philosophers (and, of course, provide some
necessary guidance on the general direction of my enquiry).
!.V." 1 : ' ■ • Vi V
My discussion focuses on two species of content-independent moral
S A ) ' . Ti>
reasons to obey the law and, hence, consists of two parts. In the first section, I
scrutinse the concept of political obligation and argue that moral appraisal of
the mere existence of a primary rule determines whether there is a content-
10 A.J. Simmons 'Philosophical Anarchism' in Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights
and Obligations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 106.
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independent reason of this kind for participants in moral practice to comply
with it. Due to my rejection of certain additional elements that other theorists
include in their accounts of political obligation, my analysis is rather
controversial. Even so, I judge that my 'thin' conception better satisfies the meta-
theoretical requirements of clarity, consistency, comprehensiveness and
coherence (and thus increases understanding of the notion of political obligation
to a greater extent) than their 'thicker' alternatives.
I then contemplate - in section two - another type of content-
.r \ \;i ReayuivIJ
independent moral reason for compliance with a legal demand by examining
v
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the frequent assertion of (or about) participants in moral practice that they have
a duty to obey the law because of the way in which it originates. More
specifically, I reflect on the common belief that the allegedly 'democratic'
creation - as opposed to the substance or the mere existence - of a primary rule
supplies a moral reason to act in accordance with that rule. My study of this
procedural sort of content-independent reason for obedience to the law by
moral agents is, therefore, more limited - in one respect, at least - than the
. i.e. - ji. se..':j.-r
analysis of the very notion of political ; obligation that I develop in the first
. OT COiTlj. . k
section. Notwithstanding the difference in scope between these two
: ! j 1 ' j j 1 r"
investigations, however, both deal with whether the law is legitimate. Unlike
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the afore-mentioned philosophers for wl}om this topic is equivalent to that of
political obligation, I hold that moral appraisal of the source of the law also
depends on principles of legitimacy. Just as legal norms that there is a political
obligation to obey are legitimate, so too is a primary rule whose origin gives
moral actors a justification for compliance with it. Although I examine two
kinds of content-independent moral reasons to obey the law in this chapter, my
concern throughout is legitimacy.
I
Most contemporary philosophers use the term 'political obligation' to refer
KM ■ ,
exclusively to the species of content-independent moral reason for obedience to
the law that is my subject in the present section, but some - as Leslie Green
observes - maintain that 'it concerns both the responsive and active components
of good citizenship, not merely [a content-independent moral] duty to obey the
law, but also duties of participation, support for the government, and so forth.'11
I employ the expression in its narrow and - among philosophers, at any rate -
11 L. Green The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 222. See also W.A.
Edmundson 'State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law' 10 Legal Theory (2004) 215, at 217; P.
Harris 'The Moral Obligation.^ Obey tji^ Law' in P. Harris (ed.) On Political Obligation (London:
Routledge, 1990) 151; R.C.A. Higgins The Moral Limits of Law: Obedience, Respect, and Legitimacy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 1; J. Horton Political Obligation (London: Macmillan,
1992) 15-17.
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more popular sense. My stipulation is entirely for the sake of convenience and
not because I reject the positive requirement to engage in politics - whether by
taking part in a democratic process or otherwise - that also figures in the wider
definition.
If there is a political obligation, a content-independent moral reason for
obedience to the law must exist.12 The same proposition can be put another way:
participants in moral practice for whom there are no content-independent
, -;y *, h '$*4 I'M
grounds for compliance with1 primary rules necessarily lack a political
u L «tK fwt
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obligation.13 Even in the narrow sense of the term that I adopt, however, a
'
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political obligation cannot be inferred merely from the fact that a moral agent
has a content-independent reason to obey the law. No theorist claims that the
existence of a reason with these characteristics alone is sufficient to establish a
political obligation. But what further attributes must a content-independent
moral reason for obedience to the law exhibit for a political obligation to obtain?
This is a conceptual question on whose answer philosophical consensus
is limited. Notwithstanding their agreement that a political obligation - as a
!■ . . b ■ iih [■ imvrv
reason to obey the law - is both moral and content-independent, theorists differ
somewhat as to the additional properties that it must possess. In the current
12 This statement is, of course, true on both definitions of a political obligation.
13 For a similar formulation, see L. Green The Authority of the State 223.
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section, I consider a number of qualities that are prominent candidates for
inclusion in a description of political obligation and reject all but two of them.
By doing so, I put forward an account that contradicts the incorporation of
several of these contenders in every other theory with which I am familiar.
Although my conception of political obligation is to this extent at odds with
philosophical convention, I believe that the pure methodology whose feasibility
I defend in chapter one - and of which the value-pluralism that frames my
present discussion is a product - supports the particular interpretation that I
—/ /'J* h',;p . v-; .; ••
offer.
Much of my analysis proceeds via engagement with the influential work
of John Simmons. Unlike many of the contemporary theorists of political
obligation with whom I share this common strategy, however, I do not seek to
refute Simmons's 'philosophical anarchism' by directly contesting his wholesale
rejection of or by proposing at least one alternative to the specific arguments for
the existence of a political obligation that he contemplates.14 Instead, I examine
pro . AC!- '.Vol
',/> r':v: . A
14 On the nature of 'philosophical anarchism', see A.J. Simmons 'Philosophical Anarchism'
103-112. See also A.J. Simmons 'Associative Political Obligations' in Justification and Legitimacy:
Essays on Rights and Obligations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 67; A.J. Simmons
'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' in C.H. Wellman & A.J. Simmons Is There a
Duty to Obey the Law? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 190-191.
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the criteria in terms of which - given the contingent features of existing states15 -
he dismisses all of these arguments as inadequate. Rather than asking (and thus
assuming the particular standards that determine) whether a political obligation
exists (or - to express the same enquiry differently - whether philosophical
anarchism is true), I explore the nature of this content-independent moral
reason for obedience to the law. Although my 'structural' investigation
inevitably has 'substantive' implications,16 I merely indicate some (and do not
provide a thorough account) of the latter here. My immediate project is
H re I . •£ ' !.'• ■. .
conceptual and its outcome differs from the understanding of political
obligation on which Simmons's philosophical anarchism depends. In spite of his
convincing rejection of certain elements that appear in other conceptions of this
moral duty, Simmons believes that every political obligation must - even if none
actually does - fulfil a couple of requirements that are absent from my account.
Insofar as he dismisses attempts to establish a political obligation due to their
failure to meet these conditions, I thus challenge his philosophical anarchism.
.-pi i'i', oi ;h< ■ ic
15 Whereas Robert Paul Wolff - see R.P. Wolff In Defense ofAnarchism (Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1998) chapter one - regards a political obligation as impossible,
Simmons contends merely that none exists as a matter of fact. On the difference between these 'a
priori' and 'a posteriori' strains of philosophical anarchism, see A.J. Simmons 'Philosophical
Anarchism' 104-105; A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 101.
16 On this distinction, see P. Soper 'The Obligation to Obey the Law' in R. Gavison (ed.)
Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence of H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1987) 127.
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Because I situate my interpretation of political obligation within the
context of value-pluralism, someone for whom Simmons's critique of 'pluralist'
n • •; • O»- 1 i
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theories is compelling might simply discount my analysis of this content-
independent moral reason for obediencfe to the law. Yet the 'pluralism' to which
Simmons responds is not mine. He does not openly deny - and, indeed, much
and perhaps even all of his case for philosophical anarchism seems consistent
with17 - the incommensurability of various moral ideals. The real target of his
attack on 'pluralism' is, instead, the claim that philosophical anarchism can be
defeated by adding together arguments for a political obligation that -
according to a particular conception of this duty - do not yield a content-
•. : , . n . uY. t e f 1 •
independent moral reason to obey the law on their own.18 Chaim Gans, for
. mi. .
example, declares that 'a single complex combining [...] four arguments
supplies the firmest and most successful basis for political obligation.'19 Yet
Simmons denies that philosophical anarchism can be overcome by 'cobbl[ing]
together' several ineffective attempts to do so.20 He insists that such pluralism-
17 See below.
18 For discussion of this type of pluralism, see J. Wolff 'Pluralistic Models of Political
Obligation' 56 Philosophica (1995) 7, at 15.
19 C. Gans Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992) 89. See also G. Klosko Political Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005) 98-102.
20 See A.J. Simmons 'Philosophical Anar.chisp' 115-116; A.J. Simmons 'Political Obligation
and Authority' 35-36.
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as-aggregation still fails to satisfy at least one necessary condition - namely, the
requirement of 'generality'21 - for the existence of a political obligation.22
Although I omit this condition from my conception of political obligation, I do
not thereby endorse the brand of pluralism that Gans promotes. His version is a
substantive response to Simmons's philosophical anarchism, whereas mine
provides the location for my analysis of the structural beliefs about political
obligation on which Simmons relies.
Before examining the various qualities that contemporary philosophers
regard as the distinctive elements of a political obligation, I wish to reflect
briefly on two attributes that scarcely figure in their accounts of this content-
independent moral reason to obey the law. Notwithstanding the almost
complete lack of enthusiasm among philosophers for incorporation of these
: "fa 11 ' ;
traits in the meaning of political obligation, contemplation of them enables me
•
i . ph. ■■
to indicate the pluralist perspective from which I reject all but one of the
features that are prevalent in current definitions. The first 'unwanted'
characteristic that I consider is 'singularity' and the second is 'absoluteness'.
If singularity is necessary for the existence of a political obligation, then
there cannot be more than one such content-independent moral reason for
21 I say more about this criterion below.
22 See A.J. Simmons 'Political Obligation and Authority' 36.
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obedience to the law. Simmons - in his swift rejection of this proviso - remarks
that 'a presumption in favor of singularity seems, in the absence of a special
argument, unwarranted.'23 The most plausible rationale for its appearance in a
theory of political obligation is that clashes might result if there were various
content-independent moral reasons of this type to obey the law. As Jonathan
'• ' V! i ' »"(*.t if • '«•
Wolff observes, however, 'whether the different grounds [would] generate
. "%'ki '! t ■<■'! V- wpT
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conflicts, and, if so, whether there [would be] any difficulty in resolving them
[remains to be seen].'24 Indeed, a value-monist for whom a political obligation
need not be unique would write off any conflicts as merely apparent. Although
the refusal of a value-pluralist to treat singularity as an essential feature of a
political obligation might (but need not) produce genuine clashes between
content-independent moral reasons for obedience to the law, the use of
judgment - see the penultimate section of chapter three - would enable
resolution of these potential dilemmas. Neither a value-monist nor a value-
. . • r, i.etUer'' bye.
pluralist, then, must accept the requirement of singularity. Both can recognise
various political obligations and the latter - whose position I assume here -
allows for conflict between these multiple duties. Singularity is, therefore, not a
property that a political obligation needs to possess.
23 A.J. Simmons Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1979) 35.
24 J. Wolff 'Pluralistic Models of Political Obligation' 14.
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Exclusion of the condition of singularity from the meaning of political
obligation entails rejection of the second 'unwanted' element. If there might be
various political obligations, then a theorist cannot insist that each of them is
absolute (or - to use an equivalent term - conclusive). Omission of this
requirement from an account of political obligation also results from the widely-
held conviction that something else might determine the moral correctness of
obedience to the law. That Simmons leaves the quality of absoluteness out of his
theory is thus a necessary implication of his repeated claim that neither the
'■M jteqcO'. yji
existence nor the lack of a political obligation has direct practical consequences.25
His dismissal of this attribute due to the existence of moral reasons of
alternative kinds for obedience and disobedience to the law means that his
anarchism is less radical than one might expect: '[Tjhere is a significant
difference between the practical stances of a philosophical anarchist - who denies
[a political obligation] to obey but in no way sanctions routine legal
nonconformity, active resistance, or revolution - and a political anarchist
committed to the overthrow of existing states (and to the ultimate replacement
of states with alternative forms of social organization).'26
•• i> ■VucJ.H 1
25 See, for example, A.J. Simmons Moral Principles and Political Obligations 11, 29-30, 193;
A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 191.
26 A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 191-192. See also A.J.
Simmons 'Philosophical Anarchism' 104, 109.
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The philosophical nature* oh Simmons's anarchism, then, indicates the
'
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absence of the requirement of absoluteness from his understanding of political
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obligation. Yet his concurrence with the notion that moral agents have reasons
of more than one type to obey and disobey the law is not sufficient to make him
a value-pluralist. Proponents of value-monism can also accept this proposition.
Contrary to value-pluralism, though, they insist on the compatibility of all
moral obligations. Indeed, Simmons appears to state his agreement with their
belief in the unity of morality when he says that moral duties - including those
to obey and disobey the law - can be 'balanced' or 'weighed' against one
another.27 These metaphors -Together with the image of a 'trade-off' between
x y * 'l ' y- -,} t ..
competing moral requirements that Isaiah Berlin employs28 - suppose the
existence of a sovereign moral value in terms of which others might be
compared. They imply the homogeneity of all (and, consequently, the
impossibility of clashes between any) moral reasons. Yet perhaps Simmons does
not intend to use these metaphors so precisely. If he means only that moral
actors can choose between competing obligations in particular contexts, then he
does not necessarily reject value-pluralism. Although one ought not to assume
such imprecision, the possibility, that his language notwithstanding - he
■ v,rf; ■-AogeCWv.C :
27 See especially A.J. Simmons 'Philosophical Anarchism' 108-110.
28 For discussion, see the penultimate section of chapter three.
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recognises genuine conflicts between moral reasons for obedience and
disobedience to the law - of which political obligations are a species - still
remains.
No matter whether Simmons omits the conditions of singularity and
•
: * ■ i • ' * i*:v. .1
absoluteness from his conception ;of political obligation as a value-monist or a
value-pluralist, I leave them out of mine from the perspective of the latter. I
reject these characteristics by admitting the prospect of real clashes both
between different political obligations and between political and other sorts of
moral obligations. If not singular and absolute, however, then what must a
reason for obedience to the law be - other than moral and content-independent,
of course - to qualify as a political obligation? I now examine six properties for
whose inclusion in the definition of this moral duty many philosophers contend.,;'v v sA?yo - hv"
0 s
Not every philosopher endorses all of the attributes that I consider, but each of
t . *; ! • hV i': , ■
these traits is nevertheless prevalent in the literature on the subject. The
extensive support that they receive explains my contemplation of them. Yet
their philosophical popularity does not cause me to incorporate any more than
two of the half-dozen conditions in my account of political obligation. Despite
widespread approval for the requirements of 'minimal justice', 'universality',
'generality' and 'particularity', I accept none of them and maintain that a
dr ,H'>Ni. ■ ■
h.iir i ten of tin: ni
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content-independent moral reason to obey the law need only be 'non¬
procedural' and 'complete' to constitute a political obligation.
For numerous theorists, there can be no political obligation unless the
mere existence of a legal duty to perform a specific action provides a moral
reason for doing so. Leslie Green is prominent among these philosophers. He
recognises such a condition When he says that a political obligation depends on
whether 'the fact that the state requires something of us itself changes our moral
position [ ] ,'29 Green is mistaken, though, to describe this feature of a political
obligation as 'content-independence'.30 A participant in moral practice might
have a reason to comply with a primary rule as a result neither of its subject-
matter nor of its very status as law, but due instead to the way in which it
originates. Given the possibility - whose exploration I undertake in the next
section - that a moral agent has a reason to obey a legal norm because of the
nature of the process that generates it, then (the meta-theoretical ideal of clarity
: ' oVi *i hiM ht' ' I
requires that) a moral reason for obedience to the law must be 'non-procedural'
as well as content-independent to amount to a political obligation.
29 L. Green The Authority of the State 225. See also R.C.A. Higgins The Moral Limits of Law:
Obedience, Respect, and Legitimacy 1; J. Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 234.
30 See L. Green The Authority of the State 225-226. For another instance of the same error, see
W. Edmundson 'State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law' 216.
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A moral duty to obey the law that is based on the mere fact of legal
validity must also possess the quality that I entitle 'completeness'.31 None of the
philosophers whose definitions of political obligation feature this attribute use
my label. Instead, they employ terms such as 'comprehensiveness',32
'universality'33 and 'generality'34 to signify it. My desire to avoid any confusion -
however improbable - with the meta-theoretical ideal of the same name
prompts my eschewal of the first of these alternatives, whereas I reject the
second and third of them because they are my designations for two of the other
elements that frequently appear in theories of political obligation.
To be complete, a political obligation - as a moral reason to obey the law
qua law - must apply to every duty that a state imposes. A content-independent
moral reason for compliance with fewer than all of the primary rules of a legal
system does not fulfil this requirement and so cannot be a political obligation.
Hence, as Simmons says, one cannot have such 'a moral obligation to refrain
from legally prohibited theft because of a promise made to one's mother to so
31 Discussion with Jonathan Crow,ejynd Dale Smith improved my understanding of this
condition.
32 See G. Klosko Political Obligations 12; L. Green 'Legal Obligation and Authority' in E.N.
Zalta (ed.) The Stanford- Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2004 edition)
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/legal-obligation/ section 3.
33 See L. Green The Authority of the State 228-229; R.C.A. Higgins The Moral Limits of Law:
Obedience, Respect, and Legitimacy 31.
34 See J. Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 234; A.J. Simmons 'Political
Obligation and Authority' 18.
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refrain.'35 Only a promise to ot?e^(lthe, law as a whole would supply a moral
reason for obedience to the law that satisfies the requirement of completeness.36
I suggest that incorporation of these two conditions in a theory that
otherwise defines a political obligation as a content-independent moral reason
to obey the law is not only necessary, but also - and here I depart from
philosophical consensus - sufficient. On my conception, a political obligation is a
ground for compliance with a legal duty that is entirely contingent on moral
appraisal of the fact that the law insists on the behaviour in question. I claim - to
put the same point differently - that a moral reason to obey the law need not be
more than content-independent, non-procedural and complete (and that
possession of none of the other four recommended qualities is necessary) for a
political obligation to obtain. Hence, I spend the remainder of the present
section arguing - in exclusively meta-theoretical terms - for the adequacy of my
'thin' conception of political obligation and so against the need to supplement
the conditions to which Ted Honderich's definition implicitly refers:
Political obligation [...] is a supposed moral obligation to act
legally, a moral obligation to act in accordance with ordinary law,
the law of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany,
_i ■ -mat a n ■ >
35 A.J. Simmons 'Political Obligation and Authority' 18.
36 Arguments whose failure is1 liable to result from a lack of completeness include those
that seek to ground a political obligation in utility - since non-compliance with at least some
primary rules is often likely to promote overall welfare. See L. Green The Authority of the State
230; R.C.A. Higgins The Moral Limits ofLaw: Obedience, Respect, and Legitimacy 38.
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France or the like. More precisely, members of a society are
morally obliged to act in certain ways for a reason involving the
fact that these are the legal ways. Members of a society ought to
act so as to obey the laws of the society for a reason having to do in
some way or other with the existence of the laws. They are not to
act in other ways for a reaspn haying to do with their illegality.37
T ■> ''■k' .,y-'
What, though, if the primary rule to which a moral agent contemplates
obedience is not part of the law of, say, the United Kingdom - to use one of
Honderich's examples - but belongs, instead, to the legal system of South Africa
during the period of apartheid? If a political obligation to obey the rule is at least
possible in the first situation, might a moral reason of this kind for obedience to
the same rule also obtain in the second? For many philosophers, there can be no
political obligation to comply with any duty that is imposed by such an unjust
regime. They regard 'minimal justice' as a prerequisite for the existence of a
' V'T 1 Wii'&fi.!'- T'1
political obligation.38
. I . .
< t . iy
Although I reject this proviso, my reason for doing so is not - as one
might suppose - because it imposes a content-related limit on a content-
independent moral reason for obedience to the law and thereby confuses the
issues of justice and legitimacy. Were implementation of the requirement of
37 T. Honderich Terrorism for Humanity: Inquiries in Political Philosophy (London: Pluto
Press, 2003) 172.
38 Green describes the belief that 'a threshold condition of justice [must be] met' as
'common ground' among theorists of political obligation: see L. Green 'Legal Obligation and
Authority'.
i 1 l.i i •• • •'
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minimal justice wholly contingent on moral evaluation of the substance of the
specific legal norm to which a question of obedience pertains, then a political
obligation would no longer be a content-independent moral reason to obey the
law. Yet the morality of a particular action that the law demands is relevant to
the proviso only insofar as such an assessment has an impact on whether the
legal system as a whole is suitably - which, I assume, does not mean perfectly -
just. Since an entire state (and not an individual norm) is the subject of the
condition of minimal justice, a philosopher does not compromise the content-
independent status of political obligation by including the requirement in his or
her understanding of this moral reason for obedience to the law.
Despite the lack of contradiction between the notions of content-
independence and minimal justice, I still omit the latter from my account of
political obligation. George Klosko provides a moralistic case for its inclusion in
( as i u ■
his theory. He cites 'basic moral principles' in defence of his claim that 'an
•
, ■ v'Ti.V-
acceptable (legitimate) government must be democratic, must be tolerably just,
and not engage in wholesale violation of rights.'39 But a pure conception of
political obligation ought not to feature the condition of minimal justice. Even if
- since the proviso is concerned with a complete system of law and not a specific
39 G. Klosko Political Obligations 9.
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primary rule - the meta-theoretical value of consistency does not justify its
exclusion, then that of clarity surely does.
Philosophers of whose accounts of political obligation the requirement is
an element mix up a substantive issue with a structural one. Rather than treating
the extent to which a legal system conforms to standards of justice as merely a
particular argument for the existence of a political obligation, they additionally
or alternatively look upon it as a criterion by which to evaluate all such
arguments. John Rawls regards it as both. He holds not only that the 'natural
duty of justice' gives a moral agent a content-independent and non-procedural
reason to obey all of the rules of a legal system that is reasonably just,40 but also
that sufficient conformity to principles of justice is a prerequisite for the
existence of any political obligation whatsoever. For Rawls, no-one can be
bound to a state that 'exceedjs] the limits of tolerable injustice'.41 He maintains,
therefore, that a political obligation can be established by neither voluntary
acceptance of benefits from nor consent to an unjust system of laws.42
j'.'f. 3 ? .*1 .r
Yet an account of political obligation from which the requirement of
minimal justice is absent realises the meta-theoretical ideal of clarity to a greater
extent than an interpretation of which this proviso is an aspect. By limiting the
40 See J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice (Revised ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 99.
41 J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 96.
42 See J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 96-97.
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relevance of state-justice to the success of a particular attempt to ground a
political obligation, a philosopher distinguishes more precisely between
structural and substantive matters. He or she thus agrees with Simmons - in
whose theory of political obligation the condition of minimal justice does not
figure - that people might 'have obligations of fair play to co-operate within
unjust schemes'43 and might 'bind [themselves] to an unjust institution through
a deliberate act of consent.'44 Although - as Simmons recognises45 - the potential
for conflicts - whether genuine or merely apparent - between moral obligations
follows from the possibility of a content-independent reason for a moral agent
i vii> i i ri di>H'fcLsLJrtt < •
to obey the rules of an unjust system of law, a pure theorist - on the assumption
that he or she endorses value-pluralism - ought not to be troubled by the
prospect of these clashes.
Of the six conditions that are popular supplements to the basic notion of
a political obligation as a content-independent and moral reason for obedience
to the law, the requirement of minimal justice is not the only one to which a
pure theorist should object. He or she ought also to deny the need for a political
obligation to possess the characteristic of 'universality'. Recall Simmons's
43 A.J. Simmons 'The Principle- of,(Fair Play' in Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights
and Obligations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 9.
44 A.J. Simmons Moral Principles and Political Obligations 79.
45 See A.J. Simmons Moral Principles and Political Obligations 78-79.
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example of a promise to one's mother to comply with the legal prohibition on
theft. Now suppose that one's pledge extends to every duty that the state
imposes and so provides a moral reason to obey the law that satisfies the
. ,p-'
requirement of completeness. Many philosophers would still deny that this
. *':i •
promise generates a political obligation because very few - if any - other people
actually - and not just hypothetically - have the same reason to obey the law.
For these philosophers, a political obligation must be universal.46 It must, they
contend, be a moral reason for either everyone or no-one to obey legal demands.
But moral obligations do not normally depend on the number of people
to whom, as a matter of fact, they apply - Sarah's duty to meet her friend in a
local restaurant for dinner is not contingent on whether an identical requirement
'kS .1 LlprjcH iv! :lSO i >
lb'. el*
actually binds anyone else47 - and I am not aware of any reason for a pure
theorist to depart from ordinary understandings of morality by inserting the
condition of universality in the meaning of political obligation. I thus refuse to
accept that a content-independent reason for a moral agent to obey the law
cannot be a political obligation unless it is universal too.
46 See, for instance, L. Green The Authority of the State 228-229; L. Green 'Legal Obligation
and Authority' section 3; R.C.A. Higgins The Moral Lirnits of Law: Obedience, Respect, and
Legitimacy 31; J. Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 234.
47 I discuss Sarah's case in the fourth section of chapter three.
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My response to the common suggestion that every political obligation
must feature the attribute of universality is similar to the reaction of Simmons to
such a proposal. He states:
i .. 1. •it;" '
I suggest that this "all-or-nothing" attitude is confused primarily
because I can see no obvious objections to a theory which allows
that some people have political obligations while others[...] do
not. A theory of political obligation ought to tell us what class of
people are bound to their governments, and why; if it tells us that
only certain people are so bound, people who have, say,
performed some special act, the theory is not obviously defective
because it tells us this.48
Although he dismisses the need for a political obligation to be universal,
Simmons claims that it must nevertheless apply to 'most persons in most
states'.49 He thus replaces the condition of universality with that of 'generality'.50
His alternative proviso - which other theorists also recommend51 - is the fifth of
K-?. s > ;f;i v- '
the six qualities that I consider forHincotporation in the definition of political
'.Mimas ' A:.
obligation. Having endorsed the view that this content-independent reason for a
moral actor to obey the law must be non-procedural and complete yet opposed
the addition of the requirements of minimal justice and universality to its
48 A.J. Simmons Moral Principles and Political Obligations 36. See also G. Klosko Political
Obligations 10; J. Wolff 'Pluralistic Models of Political Obligation' 15-16.
49 A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 190.
50 For explicit acceptance of the need for a political obligation to be general, see A.J.
Simmons Moral Principles and Political Obligations 56; A.J. Simmons 'Political Obligation and
Authority' 18.
51 See, for example, G. Klosko Political Obligations 10.
!. vVb; ■
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meaning, I now ask whether generality is a characteristic that a political
obligation needs to exhibit.
This condition is central to Simmons's case for philosophical anarchism.
He dismisses various arguments for the existence of a political obligation due to
their failure 'to apply to [...] most real citizens of real states.'52 The pluralistic
means by which Chaim Gans strives to overcome philosophical anarchism is not
the only potential strategy for establishing a political obligation of whose
generality Simmons is critical.53 He also objects to arguments based on consent
due to the fact that hardly anyone agrees - whether explicitly or tacitly54 - to
obey the law.55 Every attempt to root a political obligation in consent, he says,
'fails to give a suitably general account of our political obligations'.56 Moreover,
he regards 'fair-play' arguments that seek to ground a moral reason of this kind
in voluntary acceptance of benefits from a co-operative scheme as similarly
flawed:
Most citizens will, I think, fall into one of these two classes: those
who have not "accepted"'because they have not taken the benefits
52 A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 101.
53 See above.
54 On this distinction, see A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties'
117.
55 See especially A.J. Simmons Moral Principles and Political Obligations 79, 93-94; A.J.
Simmons 'Political Obligation and Authority' 33-34; A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our
Natural Duties' 117-118.
56 A.J. Simmons Moral Principles and Political Obligations 95.
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(with accompanying burdens) willingly, and those who have not
"accepted" because they do not regard the benefits of government
as the products of a co-operative scheme. But if most citizens
cannot be thought to have voluntarily accepted the benefits of
government from the political co-operative scheme, then the fair
play account of political obligation will not be suitably general in
its application [...].57
But the 'transactional' arguments - as he labels them58 - of consent and fair-play
are not the only casualties of Simmons's insistence on generality: natural-duty
and utilitarian arguments are victims too.59 With respect to the former, he
observes that 'a natural duty to promote justice or to support just institutions
Jv : jsLRxe-afvo-st?
[...] would not appear to yield anything much like a uniform duty to obey the
'
: 'V i, A ; I ' .
law even in a reasonably just society', because 'obedience or disobedience of
[the] law is simply not likely to have any interesting effect, good or ill, on the
stability, efficiency, or justice of a near-just institutional structure.'60 He offers a
similar explanation for his rejection of utilitarian arguments: '[W]hile
disobedience may often have worse [...] consequences than obedience, there is
. ■ . ■' ) i
57 A.J. Simmons Moral Principles and Political Obligations 139. See also A.J. Simmons 'The
Principle of Fair Play' 24-25.
58 See A.J. Simmons 'Political Obligation and Authority' 24; A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to
Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 102-103.
59 Note that I do not follow Simmons's classification of utilitarianism as the source of one
sort of 'natural-duty' argument for a political obligation: see A.J. Simmons 'Political Obligation
and Authority' 27; A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 103.
60 A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 168.
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no guarantee that this will be the case, and we are all perfectly acquainted with
the many commonplace instances in which it quite plainly is not the case.'61
Given the considerable emphasis that Simmons puts on the need for a
political obligation to be sufficiently general - indeed, his case for philosophical
anarchism depends on the failure of certain arguments to satisfy this condition -
one might expect him to justify its place in his theory. Yet he is surprisingly
i tiild' - '1
ambivalent about whether a political obligation must possess the property of
generality:
While I am not personally dedicated to finding such a general
account [...], it is clear that most of those who have advanced
accounts of political obligation have regarded generality (or even
"universality" [...]) as the primary criterion of success. We can,
then, adopt this wider criterion of success as a [...] standard
against which to measure suggested accounts. Insofar as an
account fails this test of generality, it fails to fill the role in political
theory which an account of political obligation has been thought to
fill by most political theorists.62
Simmons, then, seems to incorporate the attribute of generality in his conception
of political obligation only because of the regularity with which it features in
: , i -polish '-t qbl
other interpretations. Philosophical consensus is not, however, an adequate
reason for its appearance in his theory. The fact that the characteristic of
generality receives widespread support from other philosophers merely
61 A.J. Simmons 'Political Obligation and Authority' 25. See also A.J. Simmons 'The Duty
to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 125.
62 A.J. Simmons Moral Principles and Political Obligations 56.
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suggests the potential availability of - but does not actually provide - a
justification for putting it in his definition of political obligation. Moreover,
Simmons does not treat the evident popularity of the conditions of minimal
justice and universality as an obstacle to his dismissal of them. Indeed, his
objection to the need that many philosophers perceive for a political obligation
to be universal also necessitates rejection of his alternative requirement of
generality. If - as he says in response to the frequent insistence on universality -
he 'can see no obvious objection to a theory which allows that some people have
political obligations while others[...] do not',63 then he must deny - when, in
fact, he asserts - the need for a political obligation to be suitably general. And
my criticism of the contention that a moral duty of this sort must bind everyone
also pertains to Simmons's alternative criterion. If the existence of a moral
reason for action is not normally contingent on the extent of its application, then
the requirement of generality flouts ordinary beliefs about morality no less than
that of universality. Contrary to Simmons and the numerous philosophers to
whom he apparently defers, therefore, the proviso of generality ought not to
bi r I into a e\
feature in an account of political obligation.
i. it./ t'0;l
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My dismissal of the conditions of universality and generality implies that
- to return to the amended version of Simmons's example - one might have a
political obligation as a result of a promise to one's mother to comply with the
law. Yet what if this pledge - because, say, one is about to go on holiday - were
to extend to the duties imposed by a state of which one is not a citizen? Could
such an undertaking generate a political obligation? According to Simmons, its
scope would prevent it from doing so. He maintains that a political obligation
must be peculiar to the law of the community to which one belongs. His
,;i f i"v! 1;
conception of political obligation thus includes the last of the requirements that I
consider, which both he and I call 'particularity'.
Simmons insists that 'a moral reason for supporting other states as fully
as we support our own could not be a political obligation.'64 Given his
association of political obligation with citizenship, he rejects all attempts to
ground this type of moral reason for obedience to the law in a natural duty to
support just institutions:
[Sjuppose that I am a citizen living under a just government.
While it follows that J; have an obligation to support my
government, it does not ifpllpw that there is anything special about
this obligation. I am equally constrained by the same moral bond
64 A.J. Simmons 'Political Obligation and Authority' 30. See also A.J. Simmons Moral
Principles and Political Obligations 31-35; A.J. Simmons 'Associative Political Obligations' 68; A.J.
Simmons 'Political Obligation and Authority' 29-30; A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our
Natural Moral Duties' 110.
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to support every other just government. Thus, the obligation [...]
would not bind me to any particular political authority in the way
we want.65 ,
' (TyUiiCA U"
Alongside the proviso of generality, the condition of particularity is central to
Simmons's defence of philosophical anarchism. Although he is not the only
philosopher for whom a political obligation must bind a citizen exclusively to
his or her own state,66 the degree of Simmons's emphasis on particularity is
unique. In comparison to his tentative endorsement of the need for generality,
moreover, his dedication to this requirement is obvious. He justifies its place in
his theory with reference to the prevalent belief among moral agents that a
citizen has a special tie to his or. her; own state. Accounts of political obligation
ii Sw
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from which the condition of particularity is absent, he suggests, neglect a
'•
, 1 ic* 1
prominent aspect of moral discourse.67
Simmons's claim that 'positive' morality vindicates his inclusion of
particularity among the essential features of a political obligation is surprising,
however, given the evident scepticism with which he treats the moral opinions
65 A. J. Simmons Moral Principles and Political Obligations 31. See also A.J. Simmons
'Associative Political Obligations' 68; A.J. Simmons 'Political Obligation and Authority' 30; A.J.
Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 166.
66 See, for example, L. Green The Authority- of the State 227; G. Klosko Political Obligations 12.
67 See A.J. Simmons 'Associative Political Obligations' 68; A.J. Simmons 'Political
Obligation and Authority' 29; A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties'
110.
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of citizens regarding their states.68 In response to the objection that philosophical
anarchism is at odds with the typical attitudes of participants in moral practice,
he cautions against immediate acceptance of the common belief that a political
\:jS ! ■i .'i/w '('.'if i( ..
obligation exists. His doubts as to the reliability of this conviction derives from
the circumstances of its formation:
Especially where relations of domination and subjection are at
issue, as they certainly are in all organized political societies with
functioning legal systems, we should be extremely wary of trying
to defend judgments about moral duty by simple appeal to the
feelings of the subjects - feelings of duty that may be
straightforward components of "false consciousness" or perhaps
just uncritically accepted sentiments of loyalty to the dominant
authorities in one's domain.69
Simmons cites '[t]he clear instrumental value to political and legal superiors
(and, more generally, to those enjoying positions of privilege) of an inculcated
v,. :i. ■t.ft.'i:'t'TDca
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popular sense of duty to obey, along with the wide variety of means of
inculcation available to leaders and to the privileged in modern states' as the
'obvious sources' of his reservations concerning everyday opinions on the
existence of a political obligation.70 Due to the context in which these attitudes
develop, Simmons is adamant that 'we should not regard such feelings as
68 On the distinction between 'positive' and 'critical' morality, see H.L.A. Hart Law, Liberty
and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) 20.
69 A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 99.
70 A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 99. See also A.J.
Simmons Moral Principles and Political Obligations 195; A.J. Simmons 'Philosophical Anarchism'
120;
< ki. yii.','- ,
'
'.■■■; ;• . .Ave '"iV
: f'A i.idn. v
'
•-.»• .' ■■■' * ; <1 . V;,.
213
Moral Reasons II: Legitimacy
justified, or as accurately tracking true obligations, unless we can support them
by reference to some intelligible line of moral reasoning.'71 He thus insists on the
need for substantive appraisal of them. His analysis, of course, finds these
conventional views about political obligation wanting.
The circumstances that prompt Simmons to doubt these opinions also
warrant scepticism about the shared belief of participants in moral practice that
they owe distinctive obligations to the states of which they are citizens. Yet -
notwithstanding the absence of any discernible reason for doing so72 - Simmons
effectively dismisses state-power as a probable cause of the latter conviction by
relying directly on it to support his avowal of a necessary connection between
political obligation and citizenship. His apparent trust in the common feeling
among moral actors that they have special duties to the law of the community to
which they belong conflicts with his insistence on the need for critical
assessment of their general belief in the existence of a political obligation.
; ■ d ,cr\| b.'lk.'
Simmons's immediate acceptance of the familiar view that a citizen has a
special tie to his or her own state - as implied by the explanation that he offers
for the requirement of particularity - not only contradicts his wary approach to
other widespread opinions about the relationship between citizens and their
71 A.J. Simmons 'Political Obligation and Authority' 23. See also A.J. Simmons 'The Duty
to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 98.
72 See W.A. Edmundson 'State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law' 232.
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state, but is also at variance with his critique of attempts to establish a political
obligation on membership of a specific community. He classifies these
arguments as 'associative'73 and his response to them warrants rejection of the
facet of positive morality on which he grounds his contention that a political
obligation cannot apply to more than one legal system.
Ronald Dworkin presents an associative case for the existence of a
political obligation. Whether a moral agent has a duty of this kind, he asserts,
depends on his or her identity as a member of a 'true' political community
whose government is committed to - even if it fails to realise the finest
interpretation of - the twin principles of ethical individualism.74 He holds that
citizens owe a political obligation to their state '[ojnly so long [...] as it accepts
the equal importance of their lives and their personal responsibility for their
own lives and tries to govern them in accordance with its sincere judgement of
what those dimensions of dignity require.'75
Simmons objects to the moralistic conception of fraternity on which this
argument rests. By defining community in terms of the ideal of equal concern,
■ uty as .: !'iV'
he says, Dworkin effectively denies that a political obligation is a communal
73 See A.}. Simmons 'Associative Political Obligations'; A.J. Simmons 'Political Obligation
and Authority' 24; A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 102.
74 See R. Dworkin Laiv's Empire 195-206; R. Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles
for a New Political Debate 95-97.
75 R. Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate 96-97.
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responsibility and treats it instead as a natural duty to support legitimate
states.76 Yet Simmons also criticises associative arguments that eschew such
moralism due to their failure to explain the moral force that they attribute to
communal roles.77 Consequently, he declares that a single predicament scuppers
every attempt to ground a political obligation in membership of a community:
The claims about our moral duties or obligations made by
[associative theories are (and need to be) either too strong to be
plausible or too similar to the claims made in [other] theories to be
interestingly distinguishable from them. Thus, [associative
theories are hung on the horns of a dilemma. They must either
make claims that are counterintuitive and indefensible, or (once
their claims are rendered plausible) they must collapse into some
kind of non-[a]ssociative theory.7?
• •
. \ ' . • 'd
Despite his powerful critique of these arguments, Simmons nevertheless
maintains that a political obligation must bind a citizen exclusively to his or her
own state. By including the requirement of particularity in his account of this
duty, however, he ignores the reasons that he provides - even if only by
implication - for querying and then rejecting the general belief that a moral
actor has distinctive responsibilities to the law of the political community to
which he or she belongs. This tension results from the fact that Simmons treats
■ ■■ A A, •:*}&'},
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inc.i .• pk-u -.-.Oit.
76 See A.J. Simmons 'Associative'frdlifical Obligations' 79; A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey
and Our Natural Moral Duties' 189.
77 See A.J. Simmons 'Associative Political, Obligations'; A.J. Simmons 'Political Obligation
and Authority' 31-32; A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 112-115.
78 A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties 111.
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the notion of particularity as relevant both to an attempt to establish a specific as
well as to the nature of every political obligation. In doing so, he mistakes a
substantive question - whether citizenship alone provides a moral agent with a
: .. J, ,4 ■
reason to fulfil the duties imposed by a state - with a structural matter - whether
a moral agent can have a political obligation to a state of which he or she is not a
citizen. In common with philosophers whose accounts of political obligation
feature the condition of minimal justice,79 Simmons converts the premise of a
moral argument into a conceptual necessity. Like them, moreover, he must alter
his definition of political obligation if he wishes to realise the meta-theoretical
ideal of clarity.
Only by dropping the requirement of particularity from his account - by
denying that particularity is one of the particularities of political obligation, in
i : trt ; qSe-ilW'' a sth
other words - can Simmons achieve such precision. Were he to effect this
deletion, then he would inevitably admit the possibility of conflict between
political obligations to different legal systems. Although he expresses concern at
this prospect,80 his anxiety is puzzling - Edmundson favours the epithet
'hyperbolic'81 - given his recognition elsewhere - most notably when
79 See above.
80 See A.J. Simmons 'Political Obligation and Authority' 29-30; A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to
Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties' 167-168.
81 W.A. Edmundson 'State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law' 232.
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considering the practical implications of philosophical anarchism82 - that moral
obligations might clash. Simmons should, therefore, proceed with the excision
that clarity recommends.
Indeed, both he and every other philosopher ought to exclude from the
concept of political obligation all but two of the properties that their conceptions
* v. . ' :''''itV .'"V,; '
tend to feature. They should leave the requirements of minimal justice,
universality, generality and particularity out of their accounts and hold that a
political obligation obtains whenever a content-independent reason for a moral
agent to obey the law is non-procedural and complete. According to this
interpretation, moral appraisal of the mere existence of a primary rule
determines whether there is a political obligation to comply with the law. This
definition may seem thin, but I think that it better satisfies the meta-theoretical
standards on which pure theorists rely than thicker alternatives. Hence, I adopt
: ..uk 0M but . u
it - and urge Simmons and other philosophers to adopt it too.
82 See, for example, A.J. Simmons Moral Principles and Political Obligations 11, 29-30, 193;
A.J. Simmons 'Philosophical Anarchism' 109; A.J. Simmons 'The Duty to Obey and Our Natural
Moral Duties' 191-192.
J; 218
Moral Reasons II: Legitimacy
II
A political obligation is not the sole type of content-independent reason for
which a moral agent might obey a legal norm: he or she might regard the origin
- as opposed to the mere existence - of the law as a reason to act legally.
Perhaps he or she lives in the United Kingdom, for example, and believes that
the supposedly 'democratic' character of the law-making process contributes to
i - ' i U
the legitimacy of the state and so furnishes him or her with a reason to comply
k k p|r:
with some (and maybe all) of the legal requirements to which he or she is
?:•* 1 < ' ' •;/ I*'
subject - even if they demand behaviour that principles of justice condemn.83
Although his or her opinion is common among (and frequently voiced by)
participants in moral practice, its popularity does not mean that it is sound. The
availability of support for it is my topic in this (relatively short) section.
The rest of the present chapter, then, focuses on some ways in which a
moral actor for whom the 'democratic' nature of the state provides a reason to
obey the law might seek to explain his or her conviction. Unlike the structural
h V - u .-'.I '..I'iisiu
analysis of political obligation that occupies the previous section, my
examination of this second kind of content-independent moral reason for
83 Note that his or her conviction does not suppose that he or she takes part in the
procedure. Whether such involvement generates a moral reason for obedience to the law - based
on implied consent - is a matter of political obligation. For discussion, see P. Singer Democracy
and Disobedience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) 49-50.
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obedience to the law is neither conceptual nor comprehensive. I do not explore
the nature of this reason,' but look instead at a familiar assertion about its
existence. My analysis is, therefore, wholly substantive. Moreover, my exclusive
focus on a specific - albeit prevalent - allegation as to the circumstances in
which the source of a legal requirement warrants lawful conduct means that my
investigation is restricted in scope. From the perspective of a pure theorist
whose conception of morality is pluralistic, I consider the justifiability of this
contention alone.
In examining potential arguments for the widespread conviction among
, u Uy.cfqAm
moral actors that they have an obligation to obey 'democratic' law, however, I
1
. ! '■.!f'" h '. .
need not comment on the accuracy with which they use this adjective. My
concern is not the real meaning - whatever that may be84 - of 'democracy'.
Rather, I am interested in how participants in moral practice might defend their
claim that the law-making process that they - even if some philosophers do not
- call 'democratic' gives them a content-independent reason to obey the law.
Although my discussion reaches no overall conclusion (and is thus limited in
more than scope), I nevertheless make a number of observations about the
values that they might cite in an .attempt to vindicate their belief.
'
•
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84 Given the extent to which people disagree about this form of government, I doubt that a
pure analysis of it is possible.
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If 'democracy' advances no moral ideal, then it cannot justify obedience
to the law. Yet this species of government might be morally valuable without
' O V V r. i t")I i0 U : ' J! ;
establishing a content-independent reason for a moral agent to obey the primary
norms that it yields. Were its moral worth due entirely to its perceived ability to
produce (or even guarantee85) just outcomes, then a participant in moral practice
would have no more than a content-dependent reason to comply with the law.
Hence, attempts to explain 'democratic' government with reference to the
substance of the norms that it generates cannot support the everyday view
whose moral justification is my subject here. Since not every argument for
'democracy' is relevant to my present concern, moreover, then whether a moral
■ '■ <, r. Li'm, Li
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agent has a content-independent reason for obedience to legal requirements as a
.;c ■ dpi:; rw >r
result of their 'democratic' pedigree does not necessitate reflection on the
i ■ ;• •? r t.
optimal method of law-making. Alexander Pope describes this latter (and
larger) issue as one that 'fools contest'.86 The topic that he scorns is not, however,
mine.
To supply moral actors with a content-independent reason for obedience
to the law, 'democracy' itself must - even if the law that it creates does not -
85 On such 'pwfect procedural justice', see J. Rawls A Theory of Justice 74; J. Rawls Political
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) 72.
86 A. Pope 'An Essay on Man' in 'The'Pgems of Alexander Pope (Edited by J. Bett) (London:
Routledge, 1963) 3rd epistle, line 303. j
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promote one or more of the ideals on which these actors rely. Yet to which - if
any - moral principles does it conform? I now consider some answers to this
question. The first response at which I look is both the most obvious and the
least convincing. i i.-YV«i-
fv
Perhaps the 'democracy' that many moral agents regard as a content-
independent reason for obedience to the law serves the value of democracy. If
this proposed justification for their conviction is to succeed, then democracy - in
its 'true' sense - must be a moral ideal as well as a particular form of
government and the process that these moral actors classify as 'democratic'
must actually be so. David Held seems to propose a conception of democracy
according to which it is inherently valuable. Indeed, he appears to define it as
the supreme moral ideal: 'The idea of democracy is important because it does not
just represent one value among many, such as liberty, equality or justice, but is
:b.;> H"'''fftiV' ^ '
the value that can link and mediate among competing prescriptive concerns.'87
Given my commitment to value-pluralism, I inevitably reject Held's
belief in the sovereignty of democracy. Yet I also deny its purported status as a
moral ideal. Although I refrain from conceptual analysis of democracy in the
current section, I nevertheless doubt that an institutional mechanism for the
D. Held Models of Democracy (2nd edition) (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) 298.
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production of law can be a moral value. Ross Harrison is sceptical too:
'Democracy is not a value in itself - if it is valuable, it is for some further
reason.'88 By proposing a theory of value-monism that is distinct from the
version advanced by Held, moreover, Ronald Dworkin agrees that the moral
significance of democracy must be explained in terms of other ideals.89
Participants in moral practice for whom the 'democratic' character of the state
affords a content-independent reason to obey legal norms must, then, seek
support for their opinion elsewhere.
They might (and are likely to) look to the value of autonomy instead. More
precisely, they might claim that 'democracy' provides them with a reason for
obedience to the law because it promotes the ideal that Isaiah Berlin calls
'positive liberty'.90 This potential argument supposes that citizens of the United
Kingdom and other ostensibly 'democratic' states govern themselves. But do
they? A cursory inspection - anything more rigorous would be otiose - of the
aid: yt ima:-ph ,L>
88 R. Harrison Democracy (London: Routledge, 1993) 133.
89 See R. Dworkin Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996) 17; R. Dworkin Justice in Robes (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006) 156, 161; R. Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here?
Principles for a New Political Debate 134.
90 For a concise statement of the difference between 'positive' and 'negative' liberty, see I.
Berlin 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in Liberty (Edited by H. Hardy, with an essay on Berlin and his
critics by I. Harris) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 169.
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extent to which contemporary 'democracies' satisfy the necessary conditions for
■ ■ fdn
self-rule indicates that they do not.
The 'democratic' governments to whose law obedience is allegedly
warranted are invariably representative in form. Only on the rare occasion of a
referendum do their citizens make the law directly. Yet the practice of
representation is inimical to self-determination. A citizen - as Rousseau notes91 -
relinquishes his or her autonomy whenever he or she permits someone else to
impose duties on him or her. Benjamin Barber even suggests that 'representative
s ■■ . S'J li .
democracy is as paradoxical an oxymoron as our political language has ever
•o " ' dent: i
produced.'92
i f < i -
Indeed, all of the constitutional restrictions - and not merely the
constraint of representation - that 'democracies' place on the ability of citizens
to determine the law preclude self-government. Quite simply, everything - both
procedural and substantive - must be up for grabs. Insofar as electoral
regulations, bills of rights and other constitutional provisions limit what, how or
when citizens are able to decide, self-rule cannot be realised.
: i 0 :
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91 See J.J. Rousseau 'The Social Contract' in The Social Contract and Discourses (Edited by
G.D.H. Cole, J.H. Brumfitt & J.C. Hall) (London: Everyman, 1973) Book III, Chapter 15.
92 B.R. Barber Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkley: University of
California Press, 1984) xiv.
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Among the constraints that must be expunged from the constitutions of
'democracies' if their citizens are to be autonomous is the norm that the will of
the majority ought to prevail. Whenever some people are subject to the wishes
of others, the former lack positive freedom. 'No one/ says Jack Lively,
'determines a decision who has voted against it.'93 Yet the incompatibility of
majority-rule and self-rule does not mean that each citizen should be entitled to
veto any proposed law with which he or she disagrees. The introduction of a
' : lv, f. ' V-t-v"
requirement of unanimity would simply replace one procedural restriction on
decision-making with another and enable a lone citizen to thwart the wishes
(and so the positive liberty) of the rest.
Hence, self-government requires complete agreement among citizens -
which, of course, no procedural rule can ensure - on all changes to the law.94
Every citizen must, as a matter of fact, agree to the creation of every legal norm
if he or she is to be autonomous. Such unanimity is quite improbable and is
palpably absent from contemporary 'democracies'. Yet self-determination
<. ,b. v.n. u !v- ..v
requires even more.
■ :"v ' v. c 'si; v .
Suppose that a man refuses to obey a legal duty to whose introduction he
(and every other citizen) previously agreed. Were the state to force his
93 J. Lively Democracy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975) 17. See also W.N Nelson On Justifying
Democracy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980) 63; R. Harrison Democracy 5-6, 164-165.
94 See J. Lively Democracy 24.
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compliance with this norm, would he still rule himself? Robert Paul Wolff
insists that he would because 'a man who is constrained only by the dictates of
his own will is autonomous.'95 But - as Zenon Bankowski points out96 -Wolff is
mistaken: someone to whom an option is not available due to human -
including his or her own - behaviour cannot be autonomous. Self-determination
implies that a citizen must be able to change his or her mind. It thus necessitates
the agreement of every citizen to existing as well as new laws.
Given these requirements, the ideal of autonomy plainly does not
validate the belief that moral agents have a content-independent ground for
obedience to 'democratic' law. Indeed, positive liberty seems to justify anarchy
instead.97 The apparent correlation between autonomy and anarchy should not
be surprising, however, given that anyone subject to government - of which
'democracies' are a species - is, by definition, not autonomous. Positive liberty,
then, cannot - and not merely does not - support the 'democratic' process that
.l.vt L'--: nfe 10 c' I i"<(
many participants in moral practice regard as a content-independent reason to
obey the law.
95 R.P. Wolff In Defense ofAnarchism 23.
96 See Z.K. Bankowski 'Don't Think About It: Legalism and Legality' Rechtstheorie Beiheft
15 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1993) 49, at 52.
97 See W.N Nelson On Justifying Democracy 63-64, 66; A. Weale Democracy (London:
Macmillan, 1999) 63.
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Yet the conclusion that citizens of 'democratic' states must be
heteronomous relies on a particular view of agency. It supposes that citizens
always behave individually and never together as a single body. Dworkin
challenges this assumption. He denies that the conduct of a group must be
understood as 'some function, rough or specific, of what the individual
members of the group do on their own, that is, with no sense of doing
something as a group.'98 Instead, he says, their behaviour might be collective 'in
a way that merges their separate actions into a further, unified, act that is
h ..r i Reascvs II
together theirs.'99 He thus proposes a 'communal' - as opposed to 'statistical' -
account of democracy in which 'political decisions are taken by a distinct entity
- the people as such - rather than any set of individuals one by one.'100 Maybe his
alternative conception of self-government vindicates the prevalent conviction
that moral agents have a content-independent reason to obey legal rules whose
source is 'democratic'.
But suspicion is likely to greet any attempt to defend 'democracy' with
reference to a communal (rather than an individual) sense of autonomy. As
: . i
98 R. Dworkin 'Equality, Democracy, and Constitution: We the People in Court' 28 Alberta
Law Review (1990) 324, at 329. See'^fsLrR. Dworkin Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the
American Constitution 19.
99 R. Dworkin Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 20. See also R.
Dworkin 'Equality, Democracy, and Constitution: We the People in Court' 329.
100 R. Dworkin 'Equality, Democracy, and the Constitution: We the People in Court' 330.
See also R. Dworkin Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 20.
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Dworkin acknowledges, the idea of communal agency seems to invoke 'a
baroque metaphysics which holds that communities are fundamental entities in
■
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the universe and that individual human beings are only abstractions or
J • Lri'-.
illusions.'101 For him, though, communal action depends 'not on the ontological
primacy of the community, but on ordinary and familiar facts about the social
practices that human beings develop.'102 A community, he says, is 'created by
and embedded in attitudes and practices.'103 Hence, an orchestra acts as a
distinct entity whenever its musicians 'recognize a personified unit of agency in
which they no longer figure as individuals, but as components.'104
According to this 'practice' view of community, citizens might regard the
hi ■ i . -is lUa,j .cpf ' > .
decisions of the government - including those with which they disagree - as
v'i ' .
their own. Before they can do so, however, their membership of the political
community must be 'genuine'.105 They cannot rule themselves, says Dworkin,
unless they belong to a community whose government treats them equally by
101 R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2000) 225. See also R. Dworkin 'Equality, Democracy, and the
Constitution: We the People in Court' 330; R. Dworkin Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the
American Constitution 20.
102 R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 225-226. See also R.
Dworkin 'Equality, Democracy, and the Constitution: We the People in Court' 335.
103 R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 226. See also 'Equality,
Democracy, and the Constitution: We the People in Court' 335.
104 R. Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 226. See also 'Equality,
Democracy, and the Constitution: We the People in Court' 335-336; R. Dworkin Freedom's Law:
The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 20.:
105 See R. Dworkin Freedom's Law: the'Moral Reading of the American Constitution 22-23.
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seeking to implement an honest - even if flawed - interpretation of the
principles of ethical individualism.106 Such a 'true' community satisfies the
conditions of 'moral membership' that equal concern implies.107 These
i
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requirements are of two kinds.
First, a 'genuine' community must meet 'the genetic or geographical or
other historical conditions identified by social practice as capable of constituting
a fraternal community.'108 That is, 'true communities must be bare communities
as well.'109
Second, there are certain 'relational' conditions that define 'moral
membership'. In a 'genuine' community, 'each person must have an opportunity
to make a difference in the collective decisions, and the force of his role - the
magnitude of the difference he can make - must not be structurally fixed or
.
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limited in ways that reflect assumptions about his worth or talent or ability, or
the soundness of his convictions or tastes.'110 There must, then, be 'universal
suffrage and effective elections and representation' plus 'free speech and
expression for all opinion, not just on formal political occasions, but in the
106 See my remarks in the previous section on Dworkin's understanding of community.
107 See R. Dworkin Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 23-24.
108 R. Dworkin Law's Empire 201. See also R. Dworkin Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of
the American Constitution 24.
109 R. Dworkin Law's Empire 201.
110 R. Dworkin Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 24. See also R.
Dworkin 'Equality, Democracy, and the Constitution: We the People in Court' 337-338.
In; .
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informal life of the community as well.'111 Moreover, 'the political process of a
genuine community must express some bona fide conception of equal concern
for the interests of all members, which means that political decisions that affect
the distribution of wealth, benefits, and burdens must be consistent with equal
concern for all.'112 Finally, 'moral membership' requires 'liberal tolerance of
unpopular sexual and personal morality.'113 A 'genuine' community 'must not
dictate what its [members] think about matters of political or moral or ethical
judgment, but must, on the contrary, provide circumstances that encourage
them to arrive at beliefs on these matters through their own reflective and
finally individual conviction.'114 In short, it must be 'integrated' rather than
'monolithic'.115
With reference to the 'relational' conditions, Dworkin separates 'true'
from 'bare' communities. The latter are instances of the former in which every
member has 'a part in any collective decision, a stake in it, and independence from
-t-i : ii -K about u
111 R. Dworkin Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 24-25. See also
R. Dworkin 'Equality, Democracy, and the Constitution: We the People in Court' 338-339.
112 R. Dworkin Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 25. See also R.
Dworkin Law's Empire 200-201; R. Dworkin 'Equality, Democracy, and the Constitution: We the
People in Court' 339-340.
113 R. Dworkin 'Equality, Democracy, and the Constitution: We the People in Court' 341.
114 R. Dworkin Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 26. See also R.
Dworkin 'Equality, Democracy, and the Constitution: We the People in Court' 340.
115 On this distinction, see R. Dworkin 'Equality, Democracy, and the Constitution: We the
People in Court' 336.
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it.'116 A government that satisfies these conditions, says Dworkin, is democratic.
As with every other aspect of morality - justice, legitimacy and so forth - he
thus interprets democracy according to the sovereign ideals of ethical
individualism. The principles of equal importance and special responsibility
yield the 'relational' conditions in terms of which he defines communal
autonomy and, hence, democracy.
Given the moralistic understanding of community on which Dworkin's
alternative sense of positive liberty is contingent, I deny that it validates the
; Yv ■■ ■ «y ,.y.j !•
popular claim that is the subject of the present section. My rejection of his
communal reading of self-government as a justification for the belief that a
moral actor has a content-independent reason to obey legal norms of
'democratic' pedigree follows inevitably from my commitment to pure analysis.
Yet perhaps the 'relational' conditions themselves - as distinct from the moralistic
version of autonomy in which Dworkin incorporates them - justify obedience to
'democratic' law. I conclude by suggesting that the principle of 'participation'
has the potential to do so.
by * ubefiy. CP t
This principle - unlike those of 'stake' and 'independence', which involve
'
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substantive matters - concerns the law-making process. It imposes two
116 R. Dworkin Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 24. See also R.
Dworkin 'Equality, Democracy, and the Constitution: We the People in Court' 337.
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requirements: an equal vote and an opportunity to take part in the discussions
on which the informed qxercise'of that vote depends.117 Only a 'democracy''.! V ;* * 0ii . c' .
whose departures from universal suffrage are justified - presumed or actual
incapacity is an obvious explanation for the exclusion of a particular group of
citizens from the franchise118 - and whose electoral arrangements aim to ensure
the equal worth of every vote - by providing for, say, majority-rule119 - can fulfil
the first requirement. To satisfy the second, a 'democratic' government must
permit all citizens to speak freely and to form associations with one another.
The 'democracies' - there are certainly some - that comply with both
requirements seem to further the ideals of equality and negative - as opposed to
c'y ■ "dse'cf :i' .a"
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positive - liberty. Such governments - which do not include 'democracies'
! 'lr.;
whose citizens are legally bound (and not merely entitled) to vote120 - advance
these two ideals by giving every citizen the same freedom (from human
interference) to discuss and then to decide the substance of the law. But is their
117 On the relationship between these two elements of the principle, see M. Saward The
Terms ofDemocracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) 89-90.
118 But such incapacity does not account for the removal of the vote from criminals. On the
justifiability of the ban on their participation in the law-making process, see H. Lardy 'Prisoner
Disenfranchisement: Constitutional Rights and Wrongs' Public Law (2002) 524.
119 On the connection between equality of input and majority-rule, see J. Waldron Law and
Disagreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).
120 The morality of compulsory voting in Australia and elsewhere depends on the existence
of a 'political obligation' in. the broader: sense That I mention (and then ignore) in the first part of
this chapter. For discussion, see JjR. Lucas Democracy and Participation (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1976) 160; C. Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970).
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promotion of equality and negative liberty sufficient to furnish a moral agent
with a content-independent reason to obey the legal duties that they impose?
Although neither an equal vote nor freedom of speech is trivial - indeed, the
. Uv t e - A •
mere symbolic value of the former ik considerable121 - perhaps more is necessary
before a reason for obedience of this kind obtains.
Such a reason might, for instance, require the entitlement of every citizen
to an education that enables him or her to participate effectively in the
'democratic' process.122 According to Michael Saward, its existence might also
depend on the universal provision of appropriate health-care:
[B]asic liberty rights [cannot] mean a great deal if citizens lack
physical mobility, or if a lack of access to medical care and
information is such that health problems become a factor so time-
and energy-consuming , thafcrwe, i.can say that they are of "life-
consuming" concern. To'be1 able to "associate" and to "express" -
to talk, travel, watch, listen, read, pay attention to issues of the
day, form preferences and vote - citizens need a safety net of
health care information and services that can contribute
substantially to equality in the exercise of basic freedoms.123
Moreover, a 'democracy' that conforms to Dworkin's principle of 'participation'
might only supply moral agents with a content-independent reason to obey the
law if the involvement of no citizen in the decision-making process is hampered
121 See J.R. Lucas Democracy and Participation 170.
122 See R. Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate 148-150;
M. Saward The Terms ofDemocracy 96.
123 M. Sawavd The Terms ofDemocracy 98.
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by his or her lack of wealth. Hence, material equality among citizens might be
vital.124
Whether 'democracy' gives a moral actor a content-independent reason
for obedience to legal norms is, ultimately, a matter of judgment.125 Although I
indicate some - after rejecting other - values that are relevant to this question,
the need to ascertain their application in the particular circumstances of each
case means that I do not answer it here. Even if - contrary to my intention - the
foregoing consideration of pertinent ideals were exhaustive, then I would only
be able to offer a definite conclusion following close scrutiny of the exact context
. i. j.'-.yhi, \'i .<V;
in which the 'democratic' character of the state is alleged to provide a specific
'
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participant in moral practice with a content-independent reason to obey the law.
Suppose, though, that 'democracy' does warrant the lawful behaviour of a
moral actor. Can this reason ever motivate his or her actual response to the law?
Indeed, the same question might also be asked of a political obligation. Perhaps
a moral agent must always treat the substance - and never the source or the
mere existence - of a legal requirement as decisive. Given my commitment to
value-pluralism, however, I need not suppose that justice inevitably trumps
legitimacy. I thus allow for the possibility that the latter often prevails and claim
■ <* h: ..actor cY in.
124 See M. Saward The Terms ofDemocracy 99.
125 On the notion of judgment, see the penultimate section of chapter three.
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that identification of the particular occasions on which it takes priority depends
on exercising judgment in each x&fee between the plurality of reasons for
T ' •
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obedience and disobedience to the law that figure in my pure interpretation of■ V. . J..
; >.A>
moral practice. Although my analysis of these reasons is finished, their proper
application remains to be determined.




Political Reasons: Civil Disobedience
I now turn to the last of the three forms of behaviour that I examine in this
thesis. Having argued against the need for moralistic analysis of human action
and offered pure interpretations of two ways in which people respond to the
law, my concern in this final chapter is the practice of civil disobedience. Once
again, I reject an influential theory due to the moralistic methodology on which
it depends and - with exclusive reference to the meta-theoretical norms of
clarity, consistency, comprehensiveness and coherence - propose an alternative
• .1 C-fes kfitfti'Sfi*. \.
account. Before I introduce the reading of civil disobedience to which I object,
however, consider the following events.
At dawn on 26 July 1999, twenty-eight members of Greenpeace U.K.
entered a field of genetically-modified maize at Walnut Tree Farm in Norfolk.
Dressed in distinctive white overalls and watched by four journalists, they
began to cut down the crop. The farmers soon disturbed them. When the police
arrived, the activists submitted to arrest and were then charged with theft and
; uce Tie icao * g
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criminal damage.1 At their trial, they asserted their innocence. They said that
their conduct was necessary to prevent damage to the environment and was,
therefore, legally justified.2 The jury found them not guilty of theft, but failed to
reach a verdict on the charge of criminal damage. The activists were eventually
acquitted of the latter offence at a subsequent retrial.3
On 18 March 2003, With the invasion of Iraq by the United States and her
allies imminent, Dave Burgess and Will Saunders climbed to the top of the
Opera House in Sydney and painted 'NO WAR' on the largest of the building's
sails.4 Will - a British citizen - had previously written to Tony Blair and to
several newspapers to express his opposition to the proposed conflict. He had
also taken part in numerous rallies and even booked a flight to Amman - which
his friends persuaded him to cancel - with the intention of travelling to Iraq to
act as a 'human shield'. Both Dave and Will believed that Australia's anticipated
■ i;. I..-.' i\ vi • t •
.... ' '? k vU.
involvement in the attack - which they regarded as illegal and immoral - was
. / 'WA, 'f t Fb t, • V:
contrary to the wishes of the majority of the population and that some form of
illegal behaviour was the only means by which the two of them might be able to
1 See The Guardian 27, 28 July 1999.
2 See The Guardian 4 April 2000.
3 See The Guardian 21 September 2000.
4 My account is drawn entirely from Sydney Opera House: NO WAR
<http://www.sydneyoperahousenowarcleanupfund.org>.
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avert military action. According to Will, several criteria informed their decision
to paint the Opera House:
It was paramount that there be no risk to other people and no
permanent damage done; but otherwise we were keen to attract as
much attention across the world as possible to the lack of support
within Australia for the war. The Opera House was an obvious
choice, because it is so visible and so closely identified with
Australia, because it is tiled and hence certain to be cleanable and
because we judged that we would be able to ascend it without any
risk to others or any great risk to ourselves. [...] A banner was
considered, but would have been very difficult to take up and affix
and would have had very much less impact.5
Inevitably, Will and Dave were arrested. When tried, they claimed - with
reference to s. 418 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) - that their behaviour was in
defence of others. The judge rejected their argument, however, and the jury
found them guilty of maliciously damaging property.6 They were sentenced to
nine months of periodic detention and ordered to pay $151,000 to the Sydney
Opera House Trust as compensation for the cost of removing the paint. Their
convictions and sentences were upheld on appeal.7
V.r . g OS, , :
Are these instances <of civil disobedience? If so, why? Is the fact that the
a ! r- r I ■
protagonists sought publicity relevant? Does their submission to arrest have any
significance? Is their insistence on the necessity of their actions important? And
5 W. Saunders 'Statement on the events of 18th March 2003' on Sydney Opera House: NO
WAR <http://www.sydneyoperahousenowarcleanupfund.org/april_statements.html>.
6 For this offence, see s. 195(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
7 Rv Burgess and Saunders [2005] NSWCCA 52.
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what about the particular goals that they sought to achieve? Do these matter?
The answers to such questions are contingent on the definition of civil
disobedience. Yet philosophical consensus on the nature of this concept is
absent. 'In fact/ observes Robert Hall, 'the precise meaning of the phrase "civil
disobedience" is one of the most, disputed aspects of the topic.'8 Prominent
: ; i , : p i 'V V*--
among the diverse accounts of this response to the law, however, is the
conception advanced by John Rawls. His theory is my concern here.
My examination of civil disobedience has three parts. I start by dissecting
Rawls's theory and locate a moralistic understanding of politics at its core. Then
- in section two - I suggest an alternative interpretation of political practice in
terms of which civil disobedience might - and, I insist, should - be defined.
Finally, I indicate some sorts of facts that a value-pluralist is likely to treat as
relevant when judging the morality of illegal behaviour that is political in this
pure sense.
8 R.T. Hall The Morality of Civil Disobedience (New York: Harper & Row, 1971) 13. See also
H.A. Bedau 'Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsibility for Injustice' 54 The Monist (1970)
517, at 517; J.G. Murphy 'Introduction' in J.G. Murphy (ed.) Civil Disobedience and Violence
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1971) 1.
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I
According to Rawls, civil disobedience is 'a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet
political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a
change in the law or policies of the government.'9 In other words, he regards
civil disobedience as an open and peaceful breach of a legal obligation that
normally seeks to modify the conduct of.the state and whose motive is political
as well as conscientious. Although he cites Hugo Bedau's formulation as the
template for his account, the definition that he purports to copy does not state
that civil disobedience must be political.10 For Rawls, however, this attribute is
fundamental. I reveal its centrality among the various aspects of his theory by
looking at each of them in turn.
I begin with the need that Rawls perceives for an act of civil disobedience
to be 'contrary to the law'. This condition appears straightforward for the reason
that Bedau identifies: 'Compliance, even if done under open protest, and after
i .'V ■ u a ..'omitR :>t i
efforts to avert or nullify the law, is not civil disobedience - for nothing illegal
9 J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice (Revised edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 320.
See also J. Rawls 'The Justification of Civil Disobedience' in Collected Papers (Edited by S.
Freeman) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) 181.
10 H.A. Bedau 'On Civil Disobedience' 58 Journal of Philosophy (1961) 653, at 661. See also
H.A. Bedau 'Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsibility for Injustice' 519.
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has been done, no law has been disobeyedYet the requirement of illegality is
more complicated than it seems and generates at least a couple of difficulties to
which solutions are essential. Since Rawls discusses neither of them, I venture to
do so on his behalf.
The first problem is to identify a breach of the law. Compare the
outcomes of the two cases with which this chapter begins. Whereas the
members of Greenpeace were ultimately exonerated, the convictions of Dave
Burgess and Will Saunders were confirmed on appeal. Does this mean that only
the latter contravened the law and that the behaviour of the former cannot be
described as civil disobedience? Michael Bayles would say 'yes'. He supposes
that the legality of an action depends on the subsequent judgment of a court.12
Given the potential for courts to make mistakes, however, I reject his
assumption and claim instead that the lawfulness of conduct must be
determined at the time of its performance with reference to prevailing norms. I
• ■•■"itp WiKil
thus agree with Hall: 'In speaking of civil disobedience as an illegal action, it is
best to define as illegal an act for which the agent is liable to arrest, regardless of
whether he actually is arrested or not and of whether he is ultimately found
11 H.A. Bedau 'Introduction' in H.A. Bedau (ed.) Civil Disobedience in Focus (London:
Routledge, 1991) 5. See also H.A. Bedau 'On Civil Disobedience' 653-654; C. Cohen Civil
Disobedience: Conscience, Tactics, and the Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971) 4.
12 See M. Bayles 'The Justifiability of Civil Disobedience' 24 Review ofMetaphysics (1970) 3,
at 4.
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innocent or guilty.'13 If this is correct and later proceedings in court have no
impact on whether the requirement of illegality is satisfied, then both or neither
of my two cases might be instances of civil disobedience.
Suppose, though, that the members of Greenpeace and the two anti-war
protestors did violate the law. Of what - if any - significance is the fact that they
argued to the contrary at their respective trials? Do their submissions indicate
that they did not mean to act illegally? If so, must one infer that their conduct
was not civil disobedience? The problem of intentionality is the second
( i;ok. ! g
complication that the requirement of illegality generates.
T i ■ ' r.. I , ,
My solution to this difficulty follows from my general understanding of
obedience and disobedience to the law. In the first section of chapter one, I
classify these actions as deliberate responses to primary rules. Consequently, I
hold that an actor does not commit civil disobedience unless he or she plans to
contravene a legal duty. As Carl Cohen acknowledges, an action can only
constitute civil disobedience if '[the actor] not only breaks the law, but does so
knowingly and deliberately.'14
■' i-t >.i >
in ' l;iJlit Of iI: ,'gp i
13 R.T. Hall The Morality ofCivil Disobedience 19.
14 C. Cohen Civil Disobedience: Conscience,, .Tactics, and the Law 7. See also M. Bayles 'The
Justifiability of Civil Disobedience' 4; P. Harris 'Introduction: The Nature and Moral Justification
of Civil Disobedience' in P. Harris (ed.) Civil Disobedience (Lanham, Maryland: University of
America Press, 1989) 6.
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Since conduct in whose lawfulness the actor believes cannot be a
deliberate breach of a legal obligation, then civil disobedience is distinct from
behaviour that seeks to provoke a 'test-case'. As Sidney Hook says, '[a]n action
iff !' /kbit I'd'H':%/, .
launched in violation of a local law or ordinance, and undertaken to test it, on
! i., • ' I
the ground that the law itself violates state or federal law, or launched in
violation of a state law in the sincerely held belief that the state law outrages the
Constitution, the supreme law of the land, is not civilly disobedient.'15 Given
this distinction, must one conclude from the legal arguments of the protestors in
my examples that they sought to 'test' the law and did not engage in civil
disobedience? I do not think so. Just as one must determine the legality of an
action at the moment of its performance, one must ascertain the legal
' iA'1 b. > a test-m
convictions of the actor then too. Yet one cannot assume that his or her sense of
the law at that time is accurately represented by the submissions that he or she
subsequently makes to a court. Numerous factors - including the prospect of
punishment - might cause a discrepancy between these views. Notwithstanding
their later arguments, therefore, the activists in my two cases might have
committed civil disobedience.
15 S. Hook 'Social Protest and Civil Disobedience' in J.G. Murphy (ed.) Civil Disobedience
and Violence (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1971) 54-55. See also D. Rucker 'The Moral Grounds of
Civil Disobedience' 76 Ethics (1966) 142, at 143. Contrast P. Harris 'Introduction: The Nature and
Moral Justification of Civil Disobedience' 6.
■ CHi ick). Y:\lb
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Consider, next, the requirement of publicity. According to Rawls, '[civil
disobedience] is engaged in openly with fair notice; it is not covert or
secretive.'16 He explains the need for transparency by supposing that civil
disobedience must be conscientious and political: 'One may compare it to public
speech, and being a form of address, an expression of profound and
■ 1 iotsiPihin'
conscientious political conviction, it takes place in the public forum.'17 Because
civil disobedience is conscientious and political, says Rawls, it is necessarily
public.
But what must be public? Do people need to know who is responsible for
an act of civil disobedience? Or need they be aware of no more than its
occurrence? Must both the actions and the identities of the protagonists in my
two examples be apparent? Paul Harris declares that 'civil disobedience must be
public in two senses: the act itself is not concealed, and the agent does not try to
vT i U|" &p,fr;c'
hide his or her own identity.'18 That Rawls concurs is demonstrated by his
refusal to allow that civil disobedience might be violent.
Although Rawls does not define violence, he nevertheless regards it as
inconsistent with civil disobedience in two ways. First, he says, it contradicts the
16 J. Rawls A Theory of Justice 321. See also M. Bayles 'The Justifiability of Civil
Disobedience' 4; S.M. Brown 'Civil Disobedience' 58 Journal of Philosophy (1961) 669, at 670.
17 J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 321. See also H.A. Bedau 'Introduction' 6-7.
18 P. Harris 'Introduction: The Nature and Moral Justification of Civil Disobedience' 7.
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notion that this type of behaviour conveys a political and conscientious
message: 'To engage in violent acts likely to injure and to hurt is incompatible
with civil disobedience as a mode of address.'19 Hence, he relies on the allegedly
conscientious and political character of civil disobedience in support of his
assertion that such a response to the law cannot be violent. Second, he maintains
that civil disobedience expresses fidelity to law and this demands an absence of
violence, a 'willingness to accept the legal consequences of one's conduct.'20 He
insists that an individual who fails to surrender to arrest and punishment does
i« ■■■ .. ,.i.
not commit civil disobedience.21 For Rawls, therefore, the identity of the agent as
well as the act of disobedience must be made public.
On these two grounds, Rawls distinguishes civil disobedience from
violence. Yet the second ground is no more than an elaboration of the first. As
indicated by his admission that 'fidelity to law helps to establish [...] that the act
is indeed politically conscientious and sincere',22 he treats submission to arrest
and punishment as mere evidence of a conscientious political belief. As with the
19 J. Rawls A Theory of Justice 321..,See also J. Rawls 'The Justification of Civil Disobedience'
182.
20 J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 322. See also J. Rawls 'The Justification of Civil Disobedience'
182.
21 On this, see P. Harris 'Introduction: The Nature and Moral Justification of Civil
Disobedience' 14; B. Lang 'Civil Disobedience and Nonviolence: A Distinction With a Difference'
80 Ethics (1970) 156, at 157.
22 J. Rawls A Theory of Justice 322. See also J. Rawls 'The Justification of Civil Disobedience'
182.
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requirement of publicity, then, the condition of nonviolence follows from
Rawls's opinion that civil disobedience is conscientious and political. But how
does he understand this pair of attributes?
Rawls seems to accept Bedau's view that a breach of the law is
conscientious when performed for a moral reason.23 To avoid the confusion of
civil disobedience with 'conscientious objection', however, Rawls limits the
moral principles on which the former can be based. He states that civil
disobedience must 'appeal to a commonly shared conception of justice, whereas
conscientious refusal may have other grounds.'24 Civil disobedience is, he says,
always political:
[It] is a political act not only in the sense that it is addressed to the
majority that holds political power, but also because it is an act
guided and justified by political principles, that is, by the
principles of justice which regulate the constitution and social
institutions generally. In justifying civil disobedience one does not
appeal to principles of personal morality or to religious doctrines,
though these may coincide with and support one's claims; and it
goes without saying that civil disobedience cannot be grounded
solely on group or self-interest. Instead one invokes the commonly
shared conception of justice that underlies the political order.25
23 See H.A. Bedau 'On Civil Disobedience' 659.
24 J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 324. See also J. Rawls 'The Justification of Civil Disobedience'
181.
25 J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 321.
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According to Rawls, civil disobedience is directed at the governing majority and
indicates that 'the conditions of social cooperation are not being honored.'26 It
occurs only in a community that is 'nearly just':
[Tjhis implies that [the society] has some form of democratic
government, although serious injustices may nevertheless exist. In
such a society [...] the principles of justice are for the most part
publicly recognized as the fundamental terms of willing
cooperation among free and equal persons. By engaging in civil
disobedience one intends,"then, to address the sense of justice of
the majority and to serve fair notice that in one's sincere and
considered opinion the conditions of free cooperation are being
violated.27
Civil disobedience, says Rawls, is 'a final device to maintain the stability of a
just constitution.'28 He claims that it seeks to correct deviations from the
principles of justice to which free and equal people - those in the 'original
position'29 - would agree. These principles, he says, give each person the same
fundamental liberties and permit social and economic inequalities only to the
extent that they benefit the.worst-off and are associated with positions to which
i ; « U-; ■ and eoua! . i
• ; «
everyone has a fair chance"M, being' appointed.30 Rawls's version of civil
disobedience supposes a democratic society in which these liberal principles are
26 J. Rawls 'The Justification of Civil Disobedience' 181.
27 J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 335.
28 J. Rawls T Theory ofJustice 337.
29 I discuss this hypothetical scenario in the third section of chapter three. For an
introduction to it, see J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 10-19.
30 For a concise statement of these principles and the relationship between them, see J.
Rawls A Theory of Justice 266.
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shared. The agreement that he assumes, though, is not necessarily perfect. He
allows for 'considerable differences in citizens' conceptions of justice provided
that these conceptions lead to similar political judgments.'31 In short, he regards
an 'overlapping consensus' as sufficient.32
For Rawls - as his later work verifies33 - politics takes place within the
context of agreement between democratic citizens on his brand of liberalism.
Given its reliance on the theory of justice that he favours, his interpretation of
'Mi t*V,' -V
political practice is moralistic. It makes sense of such behaviour in moral terms.
It is, moreover, the crucial element in Rawls's account of civil disobedience. As
he acknowledges, his understanding of this response to the law 'rests solely
upon a conception of justice' and '[ejven the features of publicity and
nonviolence are explained on this basis.'34 With the exception of the requirement
of illegality, his entire definition of civil disobedience follows from his liberal
interpretation of political action. I confirm this dependence by examining the
remaining aspect of his theory.
■' fh )iv 61 jus act .
Rawls states that civil disobedience generally aims at altering the law or
i : S.\
policies of the government. This, of course, 'does not require that the civilly
31 J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 340.
32 See J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 340.
33 See especially J. Rawls Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
34 J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 337.
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disobedient act breach the same law that is being protested.'35 He acknowledges
that civil disobedience might be either direct or indirect. It is direct if it breaches
the legal norm of whose injustice the actor wishes to make the majority aware
and indirect if the rule with which the actor fails to comply is not the law that he
or she wants the government to change.35 Rawls notes that direct civil
disobedience often cannot be performed. In some instances, he says, 'there is no
way to violate the government's policy directly, as when it concerns foreign
affairs, or affects another part of the country.'37 Moreover - since only duty-
vy- v v . on;. C\
imposing laws can be disobeyed - civil disobedience must be indirect whenever
k c'eVH,w - #
it seeks to modify a secondary rule of the legal system.38
h,i ■; r d-r>
Yet Rawls limits the laws which civil disobedience - whether direct or
indirect - might try to change. Civil disobedience, for him, is not about
'transforming or even overturning an unjust and corrupt system.'39 It assumes
the legitimacy of the constitution and is, therefore, not concerned with
revolution. Carl Cohen - among other theorists - agrees:
35 J. Rawls A Theory of Justice 320. See also E. Van Den Haag Political Violence and Civil
Disobedience (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) 3.
36 See C. Cohen Civil Disobedience: 'Conscience, Tactics, and the Law 52; P. Harris
'Introduction: The Nature and Moral JOstifiCatioK of Civil Disobedience' 27.
37 J. Rawls A Theory of Justice 320. See also C. Cohen Civil Disobedience: Conscience, Tactics,
and the Law 55-56.
. m,
38 I discuss H.L.A. Hart's distinction between primary and secondary rules in the first
section of chapter one.
39 J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 319.
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It is important to distinguish civil disobedience from revolution.
The revolutionary seeks to overthrow the established government;
he repudiates the System tofclaWs, denying their legitimacy and
their rightful authority over him: The civil disobedient does not do
this. He deliberately violates one law whose technical legitimacy
he admits. He accepts and tacitly approves of the system of laws
in general, recognizing their rightful authority over all citizens of
the polity, himself included. In short, the civil disobedient
consciously acts within the frame of constituted authority, while
the rebel seeks to demolish that frame, or to escape from it.40
As with the conditions of publicity and nonviolence, Rawls's rejection of
revolution follows from the moralistic interpretation of politics according to
which he constructs his definition of civil disobedience. If this form of dissent
aims to uphold the liberal principles by which a democratic society is regulated,
, ■ , if J. , ybrT ::. y
it cannot attempt to discardr: those .principles. Revolution is simply not
. 0 '* ■ t ■' h A f . , *
compatible with bolstering a constitution that is largely just.
Rawls thus portrays civil disobedience as the defence of liberal
democracy by illegal means. He insists that neither its occurrence nor the
identity of its perpetrator is unknown. He also requires the person responsible
to act peacefully and to accept any state-imposed sanctions for his or her
40 C. Cohen 'Defending Civil Disobedience' 54 The Monist (1970) 469, at 470. See also C.
Bay 'Civil Disobedience: Prerequisite for Democracy in Mass Society' in J.G. Murphy (ed.) Civil
Disobedience and Violence (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1971) 78; M. Bayles 'The Justifiability of
Civil Disobedience' 4-5; C. Cohen Civil Disobedience: Conscience, Tactics, and the Law 42, 44; A.
Fortas Concerning Dissent and Civil. Disobedience (New York: Signet, 1970) 59-60; R.T. Hall The
Morality of Civil Disobedience. -I'StMWF^y/Introduction' 1-2; J. Raz The Authority of Law:
Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clareqdon Press, 1979) 265; D. Rucker 'The Moral Grounds
of Civil Disobedience' 143; E. Van Den Haag Political Violence and Civil Disobedience 6.
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violation of the law. Yet what are the implications of his moralistic account?
What sort of behaviour does Rawls classify as civil disobedience?
Consider, once again, the two cases with which this chapter begins. Even
if those involved - the GreenpeaicW'-abtivrsts and the two anti-war campaigners -
deliberately broke the law,41 their behaviour does not satisfy every condition
that Rawls specifies. Although their conduct was public in both of the requisite
senses and arguably peaceful - the latter depends on whether Rawls's
(unstated) conception of violence includes damage to property - their
arguments in court do not suggest that they were willing to be punished for
their actions. More significantly, though, they did not aim to correct departures
from the liberal principles of justice to which free and equal people would
supposedly agree. .w-m
On the (rather generous) assumption that the governments of the United
Kingdom in 1999 and Australia in 2003 complied sufficiently with these
principles to be labelled 'nearly just', neither the members of Greenpeace nor
Dave Burgess and Will Saunders were motivated by a wish to remedy breaches
of such norms. They sought changes to state-policy in relation to matters - trials
of genetically-modified crops and the military invasion of another state - on
41 See my remarks at the start of the present section on the application of the proviso of
illegality to these examples.
• bi" p "»• rti&lh *.> A;.
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which these principles are silent. The liberal values on which Rawls's theory of
civil disobedience supposes agreement are concerned with the distribution
among citizens of 'primary goods' such as liberties and wealth.42 Their
anthropocentrism - their exclusive focus on the entitlements of humans - means
that they are not relevant to the environmental objectives of the Greenpeace
activists. Given their assumed application within - but not beyond - particular
communities, moreover, Dave Burgess, and Will Saunders could not have relied
on them either. Indeed, their restricted scope implies - notwithstanding Rawls's
apparent belief to the contrary43 - that alteration of the government's foreign
policy can never be the goal of civil disobedience. Although Rawls elsewhere
suggests norms for the regulation of international relations, they differ from -
even if they might be added to - the specific principles in whose terms he
defines civil disobedience.44
The moralistic conception of politics with reference to which Rawls
-'' ■- • >
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construes the practice of civil disobedience thus limits the extent to which he
a hu i'go /■
detects engagement in it. Actually, says Vinit Haksar, his liberal preconditions
are likely to result in the complete disappearance of this response to the law
42 See J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 54-55.
43 Recall his comments - see J. Rawls A Theory of Justice 320 - on situations in which civil
disobedience must be indirect.
44 See J. Rawls 'The Law of Peoples' in The Law of Peoples, with 'The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited' (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).
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from his point of view.45 By confining civil disobedience to actions that both take
place in and seek to uphold the shared ideals of a liberal society, Haksar
believes that Rawls renders it superfluous. If the members (and, hence, the
government) of a society really are committed to the promotion of justice, says
Haksar, then why would one of them need to breach a legal norm (and risk
punishment) to bring some injustice to the attention of - so that the law might
be amended by - the rest? Given the lack of an obvious answer to this question,
then Rawls's 'political moralism' - to borrow an expression from Bernard
Williams46 - might cause the practice of civil disobedience to vanish from his
sight altogether.
For a pure theorist - whose methodology I endorse in chapter one and
practise throughout this thesis - the serious (and potentially fatal) checks that
Rawls's liberalism impose on his interpretation of civil disobedience cause him
to neglect the beliefs of participants in the practice that he describes and,
therefore, to flout the meta-theoretical requirement of comprehensiveness.
Many commentators point out the degree to which the conception of politics
mo Ghn';. v
that is central to his account of this response to the law diverges from common
45 For this argument, see V. Haksar Civil Disobedience, Threats and Offers: Gandhi and Rawls
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986) 15-18.
46 B. Williams 'Realism and Moralism in Political Theory' in In the Beginning Was the Deed:
Realism and Moralism in Political Argument (Selected, edited, and with an introduction by
Geoffrey Hawthorn) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) 2.
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understandings of such behaviour. According to Williams, for instance, Rawls
n: ... the d
does not pay sufficient attention,'to what is platitudinously politics'.47
The lack of fit with ordinary convictions is not the only ground on which
a pure theorist objects to the liberal interpretations of political action in general
and civil disobedience in particular that Rawls proposes. A philosopher of this
sort is also troubled by the imprecision of his theories. By making sense of these
practices in moral terms, Rawls brings together questions of meaning and
morality on whose separation the meta-theoretical value of clarity insists. The
absence of violence from his definitions of politics and civil disobedience, for
example, distorts moral consideration of attempts to reform the law by violent
Asu brAo .ft. ;
means. As Bayles notes, it obscures a moral question that 'should be squarely
'
V , ' \i-i
faced'.48
In the next section, I offer interpretations of politics and civil
disobedience that are, I submit, both clearer and more comprehensive than
those advanced by Rawls. I start by articulating a pure conception of politics
from which I then derive an alternative theory of civil disobedience. The former
47 B. Williams 'Realism and Moralism in Political Theory' 13. For similar observations, see
also C. Mouffe The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 2005) chapter three; G. Newey After
Politics: The Rejection ofPolitics in Contemporary. Liberal Philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).
48 M. Bayles 'The Justifiability of Civil Disobedience' 5. See also R.T. Hall The Morality of
Civil Disobedience 15; P. Harris 'Introduction: The Nature and Moral Justification of Civil
Disobedience' 12.
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originates in the work of Carl Schmitt. Although scepticism is inevitable about
my reliance on a theorist whose links to Nazism are well-known, only the
moralistic approach to philosophy that I eschew could justify a complete refusal
to engage with his thought;49 > ■, .Q.
II
Schmitt aims to identify the peculiar character of politics. 'A definition of the
political,' he says, 'can be obtained only by discovering and defining the
specifically political categories.'50 According to Schmitt, politics must 'rest on its
own ultimate distinction, to which all action with a specifically political
meaning can be traced.'51 He identifies this distinction as that between friend
yt• ) Y'Y v V
and enemy.52 The latter has a more narrow meaning than one might expect. For
.Sjryl ■ 1 • •
Schmitt, '[a]n enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting
collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity.'53 He defines an enemy in
49 For a similar point, see C. Mouffe On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005) 5.
50 C. Schmitt The Concept of the Political (Translated by G. Schwab) (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1996) 25.
51 C. Schmitt The Concept of the Political 26.
52 C. Schmitt The Concept of the Political 26.
53 C. Schmitt The Concept of the Political 28.
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terms of 'the ever present possibility of combat.'54 War, he says, is the most
extreme consequence of enmity.55
By means of the distinction between friend and enemy, Schmitt declares
that opposition is the core of politics.56 Yet Schmitt fails to explain the
connection that he makes between enmity and war. He does not account for the
dependence of the distinction between friend and enemy (and so politics) on the
prospect of combat. There is, however, an obvious reason: war is simply the
most extreme method by which one group of people can attain or preserve
power over another group (that is, the enemy). As Max Weber states: 'The
decisive means for politics is violence.'57
Hence, I suggest that politics is about the acquisition or maintenance of
the ability to get a community to act in a particular manner. Possession of this
sort of power is the goal of politics. But are communities the only agents that
desire it? To hold - as Schmitt does - that political action must be collective
: .'no: b -ywpen.Vyc ■ s
ignores the fact that individual persons might also be motivated by a wish for
.> ' ■ . vs .. I
54 C. Schmitt The Concept of the Political 32.
55 C. Schmitt The Concept of the Political 33.
56 See B. Williams 'From Freedom to Liberty: The Construction of a Political Value' in In
the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument (Selected, edited, and with
an introduction by Geoffrey Hawthorn) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) 78.
57 M. Weber 'Politics as a Vocation' in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Translated,
edited and with an introduction by H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills) (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1948) 121.
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power over a group of people. I thus drop Schmitt's assumption that political
agency is always communal. By doing so, moreover, I preclude a nationalist
reading of the friend-enemy distinction and avoid a possible objection to my
account.58
What, though, about the agent over whom power is sought? Must politics
be limited to the acquisition or continuation of power over a group? Or might
. ..V . :OV;. *01':
this practice be concerned with the attainment or protection of the capacity to
effect the behaviour of an individual person as well? Such an extension would
no doubt introduce a neat symmetry into my theory, but it would not match
ordinary speech. It would bring within the scope of politics too much that is
seldom - if ever - classified as political. So I reject it. Moreover, I believe - for
the same meta-theoretical reason of comprehensiveness - that the association
over whom power is coveted must have some normative structure - which need
not be a legal system - that regulates the conduct of members. Whenever I refer
to a group, I assume that a framework of this type exists.
.d v ifh chc "''fa'
Politics, then, is any activity that seeks power over a community.59
. u: oo'i
Behaviour of this sort is not necessarily confined to specific institutions - say,
58 For a statement of this potential critique, see D. Dyzenhaus Legality and Legitimacy: Carl
Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)
chapter two.
59 Note that the actor need not be a member of the community.
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parliaments - but might take plage in numerous locations. It is open-ended too.
'It does not describe its own substance/ says Schmitt.60 My conception of politics
does not discriminate between the different reasons for which an agent might
want power over a group of people and so applies equally to an actor for whom
power of this kind is intrinsically desirable and another for whom this ability is
no more than a means for the attainment of a further goal.61 Participants in
political practice whose aspiration for power over a community is instrumental
are almost certain to have different reasons for wishing to acquire or maintain it.
Some of them might treat a moral reason as authoritative, whereas others might
share Niccolo Machiavelli's belief that the ultimate justification is 'glory and
' ■ : i • 'i . J-f, ' ' , ■
riches'.62 The nature of this further objective, however, has no bearing on
whether their conduct is political. The latter depends solely on the fact that each
of them strives for power over a community.
Power - in which Rawls has no apparent interest63 - is thus central to my
pure account of politics. Yet one might object that this notion cannot fix the
limits of politics with sufficient precision. Indeed, Peter Morriss responds to the
60 C. Schmitt The Concept of the Political 38. See also B. Williams 'From Freedom to Liberty:
The Construction of a Political Value' 77.
61 See M. Weber 'Politics as a Vocation'!78.
62 N. Machiavelli The Prince (Translated by G. Bull) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961) 78-
79. For commentary, see Q. Skinner Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) 29-30.
63 On the neglect of power by liberalism, see C. Mouffe The Return of the Political 49, 140-
141; G. Newey After Politics: The Rejection ofPolitics in Contemporary Liberal Philosophy 8.
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suggestion that power is the subject-matter of political science by pointing out
that 'the study of power as the ability to effect [would not] make much sense as
a discipline: one's powers are far too varied for even the most systematic
->h 'i V : . i ■
synthesist to say anything'geri'eraPabciut them.'64 But I do not claim that political
practice is simply about power. Rather, I define this activity in terms of power of
one sort, namely, the ability to determine the behaviour of a group of people. As
Morriss notes: '[P]olitical power is a subcategory of power: the adjective is not
redundant.'65 There is a difference between the species of power sought by, first,
a person who visits the gym regularly because he or she desires the capacity to
lift a certain weight and, second, someone who paints 'NO WAR' on the Sydney
Opera House in an attempt to avert an imminent war. Only the second of these
people wants political power.- =
Of course, not all political, action is effective. An actor might lack
I ■ t. ;
•
; 7 ifr f i •
judgment and so fail to achieve or maintain the power over a collectivity for
which he or she yearns.66 Political success depends on the adoption of
appropriate means and these vary according to the circumstances. As
64 P. Morriss Power: A Philosophical Analysis (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1987) 44-45.
65 P. Morriss Power: A Philosophical Analysis 45. This point is not affected by the fact that
Morriss has a rather different understanding of politics: see 45-46.
66 For discussion, see I. Berlin 'Political Judgement' in The Sense of Reality: Studies in Ideas
and their History (Edited by H. Hardy, with an introduction by P. Gardiner) (London: Pimlico,
1997).
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Machiavelli observes: '[T]he one who adapts his policy to the times prospers,
and [...] the one whose policy clashes with the demands of the times does not.'67
Machiavelli's advice that one 'should appear a man of compassion, a man of
good faith, a man of integrity, a kind and a religious man'68 supposes that such
characteristics are highly regarded by the community over which one wishes to
have power. The attainment of political power is contingent on the beliefs of this
group of people.69 If they consider honesty to be a virtue, one should not appear
to lie; if they prize wit, one should tell jokes;70 if they believe in higher public
spending, one should not propose cuts; if they approve of intelligence, one
should seem clever; if they think that the law ought never to be broken, one
should always appear to be law-abiding; and, if they dislike politics, one should
not be seen to behave politically.71 A competent political actor is sensitive to
their attitudes. He or she challenges their opinions only insofar as their other
convictions permit him or her to do so. As a result, he or she is trusted by and
> Wli pp'mo: p,. .
has power over them.
67 N. Machiavelli The Prince 78. See Q. Skinner Machiavelli 38.
68 N. Machiavelli The Prince 56.
69 On this, see K. Minogue Politics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1995) 72.
70 See K. Minogue Politics: A Very Short Introduction 66.
71 In this regard, note Henry Kissinger's insistence that he was not influenced by the work
of Machiavelli. For discussion, see Q. Skinner Machiavelli 1.
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On my account, then, politics is a distinct form of behaviour whose
objective is the ability to control a group of people. With its emphasis on conflict
and power, I believe that my understanding satisfies the quartet of meta-
theoretical ideals - especially those of comprehensiveness and clarity - to which
I express my commitment in chapter one more fully than the liberal conception
of Rawls. Hence, I recommend the deletion of his version of politics from the
meaning of civil disobedience and the insertion of mine. Following this
substitution, civil disobedience is a deliberate breach of a legal obligation that is
motivated by a desire for power over a community. To grasp the implications of
this revision, consider the impact of my interpretation of politics on the other
features that Rawls includes in his theory of civil disobedience.
Take, first, the requirement of publicity. Rawls includes it in his
definition because he supposes that civil disobedience is an appeal to shared
liberal values. Yet publicity is no longer a necessary attribute of this response to
. 'i 11ir.'i lire d.s®>.eu
the law. Instead, it is merely a precondition for effectiveness.72 If political power is
to be acquired or retained, an act of civil disobedience must be apparent to the
relevant members of the community over whose behaviour the actor seeks
control. Both the members of Greenpeace and the anti-war campaigners realised
72 See H.A. Bedau 'On Civil Disobedience' 655; C. Cohen Civil Disobedience: Conscience,
Tactics, and the Law 16; J. Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 265.
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this. Whereas the former wore distinctive clothing and invited four journalists to
witness their actions, the latter chose to graffiti the Opera House because they
were - in the words ofWill Saunders - 'keen to attract as much attention across
the world as possible to the lack of support within Australia for the war.'73 No
one other than a political incompetent - someone whose political judgment is
altogether deficient - would engage in secret civil disobedience. As Bedau
states: 'There would clearly be something odd about a policeman's reporting
that he had surprised several persons in the act of committing civil disobedience
1 lib ;ji.Reaveoh: :<!h ••
or about employing detectives to root out conspiracies to commit civil
iw •.
disobedience.'74 Publicity is crucial if civil disobedience is to be successful. But
civil disobedience can nevertheless occur without it.
Rawls also holds - again, for liberal reasons - that civil disobedience
must be peaceful. On my revised view, however, violence is compatible with
this response to the law. An infringement of a primary norm whose ultimate
aim is power over a community can be violent. Yet one might object that the
definition of civil disobedience now extends to the actions of terrorists and is,
■
- • u! p.-iy. iS ; > ,
therefore, too wide. Notwithstanding everyday disagreement about the nature
■
re . "• h h .
of terrorism, I agree that the meta-theoretical value of comprehensiveness
73 W. Saunders 'Statement on the events of 18th March 2003'.
74 H.A. Bedau 'On Civil Disobedience' 655.
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requires a distinction between these two forms of behaviour and so exclude
from the scope of civil disobedience any conduct - violent or otherwise - that
': > . k lq ■'
seeks to create terror.75 Whenever I refer to an action that tries to acquire or to
maintain power over a community by consciously illegal means, I assume that
the actor does not intend to terrify the people whose behaviour he or she wants
the ability to effect.
Hence - contrary to Rawls and many other theorists - I deny that civil
disobedience must be peaceful. The potential for violence to secure political
power is, though, another matter. The attitudes of the members of the group
w ; X'i . q ft. T j ' • ■' l-
over which power is sought, qrq j,crucial to the question of effectiveness. In
■ i i .tdiiv'iq: -r . i
emphasising the tactical importance of nonviolence, Cohen supposes that
people are impressed by it.76 Yet his doubts about violence as a political strategy
have no impact whatsoever on the meaning of civil disobedience. A violent act
is an instance of civil disobedience if the actor wishes to acquire or maintain
political power by an intentional breach of the law - regardless of whether he or
she succeeds. To the (rather superficial) objection that his or her behaviour does
75 For an excellent introduction to this topic, see C. Gearty Terrorism (London: Phoenix,
1997). :'! , s-\
76 See C. Cohen Civil Disob,etdieyc$\Qpn$cierip&i Tactics, and the Law 24. See also D. Miller 'The
Use and Abuse of Political Violence' 32, Political Studies (1984) 401, at 414; H. Zinn 'A Fallacy on
Law and Order: That Civil Disobedience Must Be Absolutely Nonviolent' in J.G. Murphy (ed.)
Civil Disobedience and Violence (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1971) 110-111.
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not deserve to be called 'civil'/7 Hall provides a convincing response: "'Civil
disobedience" no more means disobedience in a civil manner than the phrase
"civil authorities" denotes officials who are always courteous, or than a "civil
war" implies a nonviolent conflict.'78
Remember that Rawls does not treat civil disobedience as peaceful unless
the agent is willing to accept the legal consequences of his or her action. For
Rawls, fidelity to law demonstrates adherence to shared liberal values.
Although my revised definition does not require the actor to welcome the
•'T re' 'tiii : ■ \
prospect of arrest and punishment, I recognise that he or she might only secure
political power by doing so. Acceptance of the legal outcome might create
valuable publicity. As Cohen states: 'Arrest and trial and conviction all are likely
to catch the public eye, especially if the protester be one of respected position in
the community.'79 Moreover, the community over which the actor wants power
might be impressed by his or her readiness to suffer.80
Finally, Rawls says that civil disobedience is usually about changing the
law or policies of the government. According to my revised account, he is
•i ..n ■ i ^
correct to regard this purpose as merely normal. Since the new definition does
77 See H.A. Bedau 'On Civil Disobedience' 656.
78 R.T. Hall The Morality of Civil Disobedience 27. Cf. C. Cohen Civil Disobedience: Conscience,
Tactics, and the Law 7-8.
79 C. Cohen Civil Disobedience: Conscience, Tactics, and the Law 87.
80 See C. Cohen Civil Disobedience: Conscience, Tactics, and the Law 88-89.
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not specify the association of people whose behaviour the actor wants the
capacity to determine, it encompasses a knowingly unlawful attempt to have
power over a group other than a nation. The Greenpeace activists, for instance,
no doubt wanted the ability to change the conduct of the manufacturers of
genetically-modified seeds as well as the policy of the British government.
Rawls is wrong, though, to deny that revolution can be the objective of civil
disobedience. My open-ended conception of politics is consistent with such an
aim. As Paul Harris states: 'There seems to be no good reason why a person bent
'■ Ajjji ; y >,£aSjOJy' . {J
on the overthrow of a regime should not be able to perform an act of civil
disobedience in the service of that aim [...].'81 On my view, a person whose goal
is the abolition of the existing constitution might commit civil disobedience.
By obtaining the definition of civil disobedience from my pure
interpretation of political practice, I deny that it is 'a public, nonviolent,
conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of
bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government.'82 Instead, I
describe it as an intentional violation of a legal obligation that is motivated by a
desire for power over a community. It plight be - even if it is probably not -
. cr. ne she1 1 ■
81 P. Harris 'Introduction: The Nature and Moral Justification of Civil Disobedience' 13.
See also H.A. Bedau 'On Civil Disobedience' 659; R. Martin 'Civil Disobedience' 80 Ethics (1970)
123, at 125; J. Raz The Authority ofLaw: Essays on Law and Morality 264.
82 J. Rawls A Theory ofJustice 320.
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secret, violent, immoral dnd revolutionary. Moreover, it is almost certainly
•;' Set > ' '
committed by the Greenpeace activists and the anti-war campaigners. Although
they obviously sought political power, I cannot be sure - given their subsequent
legal arguments - that they meant to act unlawfully. On the (not unrealistic)
assumption that they did, however, then their conduct is properly classified as
civil disobedience in the revised sense.
As with my account of politics, I believe that my theory of civil
disobedience is clearer and more comprehensive than the Rawlsian alternative.
. (: v •' • !; ;rv •
Since his liberal version - recall my observations at the end of the first section -
f.* ! " • 4® •' i' '•
distorts both everyday beliefs and questions of morality to an extent that my
pure account does not, I conclude that a person engages in civil obedience only
when he or she consciously violates a primary norm due to a wish for political
power.
Ill
Having examined the concept (and proposed a conception) of civil
disobedience, I now consider its.morality. My brief discussion relies on the pure
• •• rc>. ;i 11 myrVv ;er ,
interpretation of moral practice - value-pluralism - that I expound in chapters
three and four. Hence, moral appraisal of civil disobedience is contingent on the
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proper application of the values - many of which have intrinsic worth - that
provide reasons for obedience and disobedience to the law. Each of these
■ :V; qUy'STOP if ,
reasons is either content-depepclent. or content-independent. Whereas a reason
l v b •• ' >i ,
of the former variety relates to the conduct whose performance the law
demands (or - in cases of indirect civil disobedience - the substance of the
desired consequence), a reason of the latter type is concerned with the mere
existence of the law or the nature of its source.
Whenever the ideals that supply these reasons clash and no 'trade-off'
between them is possible - whenever they warrant both obedience and
disobedience to the law - then one or more of them must be 'sacrificed'.83 In the
political context of civil disobedience, this dilemma occurs as the
■■
,• '• clt;, t; jdeh. <v; y*, :
'Machiavellian' problem of 'dirty hands'.84 When it arises, the actor must decide
whether to violate a primary rule with which one moral principle justifies
compliance in an attempt to realise an outcome - such as the repeal of unjust
legislation - that another moral principle requires. To secure the political power
on which the result apparently depends, he or she must employ immoral means
and so cannot keep his or her hands clean.
83 On the metaphors of 'trade-off' and 'sacrifice', see S. Lukes Liberals & Cannibals: The
Implications ofDiversity (London: Verso, 2003) 66-67.
84 See N. Machiavelli The Prince .48. For discussion, see Q. Skinner Machiavelli 37-40; M.
Walzer 'Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands' 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs (1973) 16.
i'!, 4A ■ • KlpP■ q: yv
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Whether the actor responds appropriately to this conflict between
incommensurable ideals is a matter of judgment in the particular circumstances.
The proper solution to every moral problem hinges on close examination of the
precise context in which it takys, place. Given this need for attention to the
concrete situation - which often includes previous events in the actor's own
life85 - then I am unable to reach any definite conclusions about the morality of
civil disobedience here.861 might, however, indicate some sorts of facts that are
likely - I cannot suppose that any is certain - to be relevant to the judgment on
which moral evaluation of a response to the law of this kind depends.
The specific way in which the actor pursues political power is liable to
have an impact on the application of morality to his or her act of civil
disobedience. Whether he or she employs violent means, for example, is almost
i i v vi' • '
sure to affect moral evaluation of his or her behaviour. Indeed, many theorists
if?') <rM *■ 'ih it .
claim that a violent breach of the law is always immoral.87 They infer a moral
conclusion from the fact of violence alone. But the immorality of violent
disobedience cannot be assumed. As Harris states: 'The possibility that a
85 See C. Taylor 'Leading a Life' in R. Chang (ed.) Incommensurability, Incompatibility and
Practical Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
86 Compare C. Cohen Civil Disobedience: Conscience, Tactics, and the Law 93.
87 See, for example, M. Bayles 'The Justifiability of Civil Disobedience' 17; S.M. Brown
'Civil Disobedience' 678; A. Fortas Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience 80; S. Hook 'Social
Protest and Civil Disobedience' 58.
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violence charge against an act of civil disobedience might be overridden has to
be recognized, even though we might think that the circumstances in which this
could happen would be rare and difficult to imagine.'88
The character (and not merely the fact) of the violence is also potentially
relevant to whether it can be morally justified. As s. 420 of the Crimes Act 1900
(NSW) - which qualifies the defence on which Dave Burgess and Will Saunders
sought to rely at their trial - illustrates, violence to persons is generally
distinguished from violence to property.89 Both the particular target - the
identity of the person or persons at whom or the property at which the actor
directs his or her conduct - and the actual degree of the violence are liable to
have a bearing on moral evaluation of it.
To determine the proper application of moral norms to an instance of
civil disobedience, however, consideration of the precise way in which and the
specific purpose for which the actor tries to secure political power is unlikely to
be sufficient.90 Examination of the potential success of his or her action is almost
88 P. Harris 'Introduction: The Nature and Moral Justification of Civil Disobedience' 33.
See also J. Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 267; H. Zinn 'A Fallacy on Law
and Order: That Civil Disobedience Must be Absolutely Nonviolent' 107.
See R. Audi 'On the Meaning and Justification of Violence' in J.A. Shaffer (ed.) Violence:
Award-Winning Essays in the Council for Philosophical Studies Competition (New York: David
McKay, 1971) 98-99.
90 I assume here that the actor does not seek political power for its own sake.
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certain to have an effect too.91 Whether a particular method is liable to succeed
depends on the beliefs of the people over whom the actor desires power. If they
have an aversion to violence, then a violent breach of the law is unlikely to be
effective. If, moreover, they are unable in cases of civil disobedience that is
indirect to perceive any connection between the legal norm that the actor
infringes and the goal to which he or she aspires - the link is obvious when civil
disobedience is direct - then failure seems inevitable.92
I also expect the correct 1 application of morality to an act of civil
ai'frWdsb v t , ^ '
disobedience to be influenced by the availability or otherwise of alternative
means that are no less likely than those that the actor employs to generate the
desired outcome.93 Yet this is not to say - as many theorists do94 - that civil
disobedience cannot be morally justified if the actor is able to pursue his or her
91 See M. Bayles 'The Justifiability of Civil Disobedience' 18; P. Harris 'Introduction: The
Nature and Moral Justification of Civil Disobedience' 31.
92 See M. Bayles 'The Justifiability of Civil Disobedience' 18; C. Cohen Civil Disobedience:
Conscience, Tactics, and the Law 480-481; K. Greenawalt Conflicts of Law and Morality (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1987) 235-236; R.T. Hall The Morality of Civil Disobedience 97; P. Harris
'Introduction: The Nature and Moral Justification of Civil Disobedience' 28; S. Hook 'Social
Protest and Civil Disobedience' 59.
93 According to Will Saunders, -none }yas;fiyailable to him: 'I did what I felt I had to do.'
See Sydney Opera ' House: NO WAR
<http://www.sydneyoperahousenowarcleanupfund.org/quotes.html>.
94 For discussion, see M. Bayles 'The Justifiability of Civil Disobedience' 12; C. Cohen
'Defending Civil Disobedience' 482; A. Fortas Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience 80; P.
Harris 'Introduction: The Nature and Moral Justification of Civil Disobedience' 31; S. Hook
'Social Protest and Civil Disobedience' 58; J. Rawls A Theory of justice 327-328; J. Rawls 'The
Justification of Civil Disobedience' 183; P. Singer Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1973) 84.
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objective in a lawful manner. Legality is no guarantee of an equal or superior
chance of success. A
Oner a.
Finally, the willingness of the actor to be penalised for his or her breach
of a legal obligation is likely to make an impression on whether an instance of
civil disobedience is morally justified.95 Although subsequent acceptance of
punishment cannot have a direct effect on the morality of an action,96 the actor's
readiness to suffer might impress the group over whom he or she wishes to
have power and thereby increase the probability of the outcome that he or she
seeks. By doing so, it may indirectly affect moral evaluation of his or her conduct.
These, then, are some of the facts that are likely to (or, at least, might) be
^ *;••<. • V jii ' •'* ii ►•
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relevant to the judgment on which the morality of a particular act of civil
disobedience depends. Although my list is inevitably partial, I hope that it
nevertheless indicates several considerations that are liable to have an impact on
the proper application of morality to civil disobedience. I hope, therefore, that it
enhances the analysis of moral practice that I advance in chapters three and
four. I hope, too, that it helps to demonstrate the superiority of the philosophical
95 See M. Bayles 'The Justifiability of Civil Disobedience' 20; S.M. Brown 'Civil
Disobedience' 676; A. Fortas Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience 125; S. Hook 'Social Protest
and Civil Disobedience' 59; K. Greenawalt Conflicts of Law and Morality 239.
96 See L.J. Macfarlane 'Justifying ..Political Disobedience' 36; E. Van Den Haag Political
Violence and Civil Disobedience 32-33.
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approach on which I rely in those chapters and, indeed, throughout the present
work.
I defend the possibility of! this methodology in the first chapter by
1 -j -1 S'H-.
denying the need for a '.philosopher to engage in moralistic interpretation of
conduct that he or she wishes to describe. In an attempt to vindicate my
commitment to this mode of comprehension, I then offer pure interpretations of
various forms of obedience and disobedience to the law. I start by examining
obedience that results from a belief in the law's authority and suggest an
alternative to Joseph Raz's moralistic account of such behaviour. Next, I
articulate a theory of moral practice - namely, value-pluralism - that ascribes
intrinsic worth to many - and not merely one or a few - of the ideals that
v'th- .ir 1- < - *
participants cite in support of their obedience and disobedience to the law. I
if-i'i ■ .
contrast my reading of these values with Ronald Dworkin's moralistic
, ■,
. ■ K ;o 1 , i
interpretation of them. Finally, I propose the replacement of the liberal
conception of politics in terms of which John Rawls defines civil disobedience
with an understanding of political action that emphasises conflict and power. By
subjecting these forms of behaviour to pure analysis, I aim to improve
comprehension of them. But that is not my sole objective: I also want to show
that a philosopher ought to rely exclusively on meta-theoretical norms when
1 ' ,*£ - J- ■ £
,<<.on theff • > •' -
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trying to make sense of human conduct. My ambitions are, therefore,
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